

Dixiecrats and the Electoral College

by

Kevin Spann

(Under the Direction of Anthony Madonna)

ABSTRACT

This project aims to explore how political factions can exploit the structure of the United State's electoral system by using the Dixiecrats' strategies as a case study. Though political institutions are generally understood as constructs to safeguard democracy and government legitimacy, this work will illustrate that partisan actors have repeatedly sought to game the Electoral College for the benefit of faction. Specifically, the work will examine the 1948, 1960, and 1968 presidential contests and how conservative Southern Democrats, known colloquially as Dixiecrats, attempted to leverage concessions. The faction sought explicit political concessions through a contingent election and by using the threat of disrupting the normal electoral process to incentivize the major parties to cater to their political interests. Congressional DW-NOMINATE scores from the eras are utilized to estimate the factions' prospects of denying the major party candidates a first-round contingent election victory under the assumption of sincere preference voting. The roles of unpledged delegates, faithless electors, third parties, and the machinery employed to determine the victor in a presidential election are highlighted and their relevance to contemporary presidential contests.

INDEX WORDS: The Electoral College, Civil Rights, Dixiecrats, Southern Politics, Faithless Electors, Unpledged Delegates

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by

Kevin Spann

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Kevin Spann

Committee:

Anthony Madonna

Charles Bullock

Keith Dougherty

Electronic Version Approved:

Ron Walcott

Vice Provost for Graduate Education and Dean of the Graduate School

The University of Georgia

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DEDICATION

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Chapter I. Introduction

Outline of Chapters

The goal of this project is to examine in detail the repeated efforts of mid-twentieth century Southern Democrats to throw the outcome of a presidential election into the House of Representatives. This political faction sought this outcome with three goals in mind. Ideally, their candidate could emerge from the scramble of a contingent election in the House of Representatives as the next commander in chief.¹ Knowing that this ideal scenario was unlikely, the faction hoped to leverage policy concessions from the eventual victor. Lastly, the faction recognized that the mere threat of disrupting the electoral process could incentivize one or both major parties to cater to their political interests going into a presidential election. The broader implications of this work are aimed at exploring how organized political forces may exploit wrinkles in the nations Electoral College system to circumvent the voters' will. While political institutions are generally understood as bulwarks to safeguard democracy and government legitimacy, this work will illustrate that partisan actors have repeatedly sought to game the Electoral College for the benefit of their faction. This work would seem particularly timely given the recent attempt to interfere with the certification of electoral votes with the hope of changing the outcome of a presidential election. The project will use DW-NOMINATE scores in an attempt to estimate Southern Democrats' potential to supplant the national Democratic ticket or deny both major parties a first-ballot victory in a contingent election.

¹ As defined in Article Two, Section 1, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution and amended by Section 3 of the 20th Amendment, contingent elections are the process through which the House of Representatives selects the president if no candidate receives the necessary 270 votes in the Electoral College. The House picks from only the top three electoral vote-getters. The victor must earn an absolute majority of state delegations, with balloting continuing until a winner is determined (Kura, 2001, p. 2, 12, and 13).

The first chapter of the project consists of the introduction, research question, significance, and literature review. The research question section expands on the examination of how the construction of America's Electoral College system opens the door to meddling by organized political factions seeking to game the system. Specifically, the section will elaborate on the rules and process through which contingent elections are conducted within the House of Representatives. This section will also briefly introduce the goals of the Southern Democratic faction that plotted to produce a contingent election and their differences from traditional third parties. The section regarding significance details as to why given recent skullduggery involving the Electoral College and the low probability of reform, academics, as well as political practitioners alike, would be well served by delving into the potential trapdoors of the institution. The 1948, 1960, and 1968 presidential elections offer excellent case studies as they represent seemingly the best example of an organized political faction repeatedly conspiring to trigger a contingent election. This section also notes that while contingent elections have been an understudied aspect of American politics, academics have ignored them entirely. The literature review section details the gradual realignment on the issue of civil rights, particularly the perspective that realignment was not a rapid shift that occurred in the 1960s. The highlighted readings illustrate that by the New Deal era, both major parties had sizeable factions that were civil rights proponents, opponents, and those that could be swayed. Background and overview of the quirks of the Electoral College system are provided, such as the differences between unpledged and faithless electors. Lastly, the history of Southern Democrats' simmering discontent with the national party is established leading up to the Dixiecrat revolt and the repeated efforts to meddle with the Electoral College.

Chapter three covers presidential campaigns from 1948 through 1968. Particular emphasis is placed on the tactics utilized by conservative Southern Democrats or Dixiecrats, as they were known colloquially, to influence the two major parties and lay the groundwork for triggering a contingent election. Efforts to placate southerners by the major party presidential candidates to reduce the prospect of a contingent election are also highlighted. The 1948, 1960, and 1968 presidential contests are given the most focus as each election was hyper-competitive, and Dixiecrats supported candidates who garnered votes in the Electoral College. DW-NOMINATE data are used for the three contests in an effort to estimate how a contingent election in the House of Representatives would have played out had efforts to produce a deadlock in the Electoral College proved successful. Members of the House of Representatives are matched with the candidate closest to their ideological dispositions as measured by DW-NOMINATE in the hopes of approximating how the House may have decided under sincere preference voting. The expected outcome of these three analyses being that Dixiecrats had sufficient fellow travelers in the House during these three contests to prevent a first-ballot victory under sincere preference voting. Illustrating that Dixiecrat types would have been in a position to extract concessions from one of the two major parties had their goals of producing a deadlock in the Electoral College been successful.

Chapter three concludes the work with conjectures, conclusions, and avenues for future research. The conjectures section deals with why Dixiecrat-style bids to produce a deadlock disappeared after 1968. The surmised conclusion is that the late 1960s represented the death rattle for this brand of politics. In a hypothetical 1968 contingent election, Alabama Governor George Wallace is expected to draw minimal support beyond the Deep South. Wallace's brand of populist rhetoric coupled with centrist economics and far-right segregationist positions no

longer had its previous resonance in the House of Representatives. Republican inroads in the South by the 1960s had also diminished Dixiecrat's lock on power significantly. Following the late 1960s, the retirement and defeat of old school Dixiecrats are observed as they were replaced by pro-civil rights New South Democrats or Republicans. The segregationists who remained were also forced to evolve with the times as signaled by African American voter participation accelerating following the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the gradual demise of Jim Crow. Absent this split in the Democratic Party, schemes such as unpledged electors and lobbying electors to become faithless fell by the wayside. Avenues for future research may demand inquiry into why those wishing to meddle with the Electoral College have shifted in recent decades from scheming at the front end through efforts to trigger a contingent election to objections at the backend regarding the state certification of election results and Congress' ceremonial certification role.

Research Question

This dissertation seeks to examine the role played by the construction of electoral systems on vote choice. Specifically, this examination will focus on how wrinkles in America's Electoral College can allow sufficiently organized and motivated actors to game the system. This research will additionally examine subsidiary topics such as how accurately the Electoral College represents American voters as well as discussing the roles of unpledged delegates, faithless electors, third parties, and the machinery that goes into determining the victor in a presidential election. Furthermore, this examination will take place against the backdrop of the Democratic Party's fraying party unity, regional realignment, and the struggle for civil rights reform throughout the mid-twentieth century.

This work will specifically explore the presidential elections of 1948, 1960, and 1968 as they represent seemingly the best examples of large organized political factions seeking to exploit loopholes in the electoral system to produce a deadlocked Electoral College. Such an eventuality would place the outcome of the election into the hands of the House of Representatives. In addition to exploring how segregationist southerners attempted to engineer this outcome, DW-NOMINATE scores will be utilized in an attempt to estimate how the House may have decided these elections had southerners' maneuverings proven successful.

As students of American government are aware in the event that no presidential candidate wins an absolute majority of the Electoral College, the decision is placed in the hands of the House of Representatives. Article Two, Section 1, Clause 3 of the Constitution established the process.

The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;-The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;-The person having the greatest Number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following,

then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President-The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States (Gillman et al., 2017, p. 832).

Section 1 of the 20th Amendment ratified in 1933 refined the process with the shortening of the lame-duck sessions of Congress.

The terms of the President and the Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin (Gillman et al., 2017, p. 839).

Under such a scenario, the president is selected via what is known as a contingent election. In the case of a contingent election, members of the House of Representatives vote in alphabetical order and choose between only the top three electoral rather than popular vote-getters. In essence, this means that members of Congress become the Electoral College. The requirement that each state delegation, regardless of its size, vote *en bloc* meaning that each state has only a single vote, complicates the process. This requirement means, for example, that despite California having over fifty members in the House, their delegation's vote carries the same weight as Wyoming, which has only a single representative. If a state's delegation is tied, they must abstain from the process. Meanwhile, the Senate chooses the vice president and picks between only the top two electoral vote recipients. This technicality in the process means that the House could choose a third-party candidate for the president. The Senate, however, could

simultaneously select a vice president belonging to one of the two major parties and disregard the third party vice-presidential candidate (Kura, 2001, p. 2, 12, and 13).

To achieve victory, a candidate must win an absolute majority of state delegations or a minimum of 26, with balloting required to continue until this threshold is reached. Lacking true statehood, the District of Columbia plays no role in this process despite possessing three electoral votes under normal circumstances. Under this model, the presidency has been decided on only two occasions, the 1800 and 1824 contests (Kura, 2001, p. 13 and 14).

The 1800 presidential election represented the emergence of organized national political parties that fielded a ticket featuring a presidential and vice-presidential candidate. Prior to this contest, the understanding had been that the runner-up would serve as vice president. As a result of the growing pains of the party system, Thomas Jefferson's Democratic-Republican Party failed to arrange that Jefferson received one more electoral vote than his running-mate Aaron Burr. The resulting tie triggered a contingent election. A stalemate followed due to Aaron Burr politicking to usurp Jefferson, and many members of John Adams defeated Federalist Party lining up behind Burr. The stalemate broke on the 36th ballot, with Jefferson emerging victorious. The 12th Amendment passed soon after to prevent this from happening again. The 12th Amendment stipulated that it was the duty of the House to select the president and the duty of the Senate to select the vice president in a contingent election (Ellis, 2000, p. 41).

The 1824 contest saw the era's overwhelmingly dominant Democratic-Republican Party split into multiple competing factions. After no candidate received sufficient votes in the Electoral College, a contingent election was triggered. The House then selected Secretary of State John Quincy Adams over General Andrew Jackson, who won the popular vote, and

Treasury Secretary William Crawford. The outcome inspired a long-running debate as to whether members of the House favored Adams due to ideological sincerity or backroom dealing (Jenkins and Sala, 1998, p.1157-1161).

After the ratification of the 20th Amendment, which shortened the length of lame-duck sessions of Congress, contingent elections were removed from the purview of the members who had secured office during the previous electoral cycle. A potential contingent election would now be placed in the hands of the legislators who secured office during the election cycle in question. As a result, the contested election would not be decided until January of the following calendar year (Edwards, 2004, p. 75).

While contingent elections did not decide the outcomes of the previously highlighted presidential elections, this hypothetical event merits examination for two reasons. These three presidential elections were hypercompetitive, with even slightly different allocations of votes shifting the balance in the Electoral College or resulting in a deadlock. As such, each contest bore a strong possibility of becoming the first to use a contingent election since the nineteenth century. This cohort of presidential elections is distinct for representing seemingly the best examples of large organized groups plotting to throw the election outcome into the House of Representatives. Other third-party movements such as Teddy Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party or high profile Independents like Ross Perot sought to win the presidency outright. Minor parties like Henry Wallace's Progressive Party or the modern Green Party have sought to shift the political Overton Window but not secure the presidency outright. The Dixiecrats had very different machinations. The Dixiecrats reasoned that by shifting the field of battle from the ballot box to the House of Representatives, they could harness factors such as southern nationalism and

the era's Conservative Coalition to either elect one of their own or force concessions from the eventual winner of a contingent election (McCorvey, 1960, p. 93 and 98).

In 1960, the unpledged delegate scheme backed the unofficial standard-bearer of southern conservatives, Senator Harry Byrd (D-VA). Supporters reasoned that given the race's competitiveness, southerners in the House were well-positioned to play the role of kingmaker if things played out as they anticipated (Edwards, 2004, p. 56). Governor George Wallace saw this wrinkle in the Electoral College as a way to potentially give himself a veto regarding the eventual president, their cabinet, and Supreme Court nominees. In the likely event that his independent bid fell short of propelling him to the White House, his supporters in the House would be instructed to support the candidate who provided assurances that he would pursue policies and appointments that were acceptable to southern segregationists (Leshner, 1994, p. 401).

Significance

An investigation into the potential trap doors of the Electoral College is warranted now more than ever. Split outcomes between the popular and electoral vote winner were considered a hypothetical scenario for most of the twentieth century. Following the infamous 2000 Bush versus Gore outcome, the consensus was that this represented a once-in-a-century fluke. Following the 2016 presidential election, however, many political observers began to treat it as a given that absent an electoral realignment, Republicans were positioned to win the Electoral College for the foreseeable future but likely doomed to lose the popular vote (Bernstein, 2020). In the run-up to the 2020 presidential contest, political journalists found themselves writing about not just the probability of a split between the popular and the electoral vote but having to

dust off their college textbooks to attempt to explain the intricacies of delegates, contingent elections, and ties in the Electoral College.

Disputes over the efficacy of vote by mail, particularly in the states that allow a significant lag time between ballot arrivals and their tabulation, produced fears of chaos. If substantial numbers of mail-in ballots are challenged due to accusations of fraud requiring courts to step in to halt counting to address accusations, several scenarios could play out. Potentially state legislatures could act to submit a slate of electors loyal to a different candidate than the one who leads in the official vote tally. In states where the governor or secretary of state belong to a different party than the majority of the legislature or are sympathetic to the candidate currently leading in the official vote count, they may respond by seeking to certify the results so as to block competing electors authorized by the legislature. These moves would, in effect, authorize two slates with dueling claims of legitimacy as occurred in the disputed 1876 election. Such scenarios increase the prospect of the Supreme Court stepping in to deal with disputes or the House of Representatives intervening to decide the results via a contingent election. If the process becomes irreconcilably deadlocked, an unprecedented scenario could arise where the presidency and vice presidency are technically vacant due to an uncertified process. Following the line of presidential succession, the Speaker of the House resigns the position and prepares to be sworn in as Acting President until a resolution is reached (Kura, 2001 p.83-84). Alternatively, if the House is hopelessly deadlocked past January 20th, but the Senate reaches a resolution regarding the identity of the vice president, they become president (Galpin, Sep 11, 1960, p. 22A).

Fears of dueling slates of electors proved unfounded. Supporters of President Donald Trump sought to legitimize alternative slates of electors from the states of Arizona, Georgia,

Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin due to claims of fraud and malpractice that were eventually dismissed in a series of court cases. Despite, much debate these slates of electors were never certified or given legitimacy by the appropriate authorities (Prokop, 2020). After failing to validate their accusations, supporters of President Trump persisted with a strategy that included misconstruing the role of the vice president in the ceremonial certification of the electoral vote based on an incorrect interpretation of the Electoral Count Act of 1887 (Edwards, 2004, p. 25).

Despite claims to the contrary, the vice president lacks any statutory power to put their finger on the scale in the case of disputed electors and simply defers to the certification of the states. Disputes are resolved via a process where the body votes on which slate to recognize if both a member of the Senate and House voice objections on the same grounds. To recognize an alternative slate, a simple majority is needed in both chambers of Congress. Regulations regarding debate on the issue are strict. Debate is restricted to two hours in total, with no speaker being allowed to speak for more than five minutes and no more than once. If the two chambers cannot agree, the electors whose certification was codified by their state's governor are regarded as legitimate and certified by Congress. Prior to 2020, the only test case that had ever come before Congress was in 1961 when Hawaii switched from Nixon to Kennedy following a recount. The Republican elector's state certification, however, was never rebuked. Nixon felt that litigating the particulars of Hawaii's recount process before Congress was pointless and called for JFK's electors to be recognized. Congress then sided with Nixon's decision via unanimous consent (Edwards, 2004, p. 24-27 and 30-32).

Before 2020, the only serious dispute regarding certification came in 1968 when Senator Muskie (D-ME) tried to object to certifying a pro-Wallace faithless elector. Muskie was joined by thirty-eight House members and six senators, but both chambers did not ultimately accept the objection. More recently, small numbers of Democrats have raised objections during the ceremonial counting to no avail. In protest of alleged irregularities in Ohio during the 2004 election, Congresswoman Jones and Senator Boxer of California attempted to raise objections regarding the certification of the state's vote. The effort slowed the process but was voted down by lopsided margins (Edwards, 2004, p. 30).

While the system eventually played out as intended, the unprecedented episode of rioting during the most recent certification indicates that complications in future elections remain a looming concern. The threat of dueling claims of legitimacy or political skullduggery will endure for the foreseeable future as efforts to reform the Electoral College have proven fruitless. In the recent Supreme Court case of *Chiafalo v. Washington*, the Supreme Court, on the one hand, reduced the likelihood of future instances of faithless electors, while on the other hand may have set back a reform effort. The ruling determined that states have the power to enforce faithless elector penalties, which have been on the books in several states but, until 2016, never utilized (Millhiser, 2020). Electoral College reformers have recently garnered support for a so-called National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. The organization's goal is to get the vast majority of states to formally agree that their electors will cast their votes for the national vote winner regardless of which candidate carried their particular state. The *Chiafalo v. Washington* decision has complicated this reform because, if executed, it would require that dozens or even hundreds of delegates become faithless electors (Winters, 2021).

For a popular vote compact to take effect, states must also repeal their faithless elector penalties in addition to getting enough states on board with the proposal to make it workable. Given that the prospect of the Constitution being amended to eliminate the Electoral College is so unlikely in the near term, and backdoor attempts to reform the institution have borne no fruit, exploring the wrinkles of the system and how they may be exploited is necessary. The 2020 fiasco is only the latest example of chicanery employed with the hope of disrupting the outcome of a presidential election. Such attempts have been made before. The presidential elections of 1948, 1960, and 1968 specifically provide excellent case studies. Political observers have paid little consideration to how close these elections came to being disrupted and being settled by the House of Representatives due to the efforts of organized regional factions.

Literature Review

Examination of hypothetical contingent elections is not new to the study of American politics. The two most prominent examples of such explorations include Jeffrey Jenkins' dual works concerning the Corrupt Bargain of 1824 and the role played by John C. Breckinridge in the election of President Abraham Lincoln. Jenkins' work regarding the Corrupt Bargain of 1824 sought to answer whether the House of Representatives selection of John Quincy Adams over Andrew Jackson was due to an exercise in sincere preference voting or the result of political horse-trading. To address the question of whether members of Congress who were ideologically closer to Jackson were nevertheless bought off with alleged political favors in exchange for supporting Adams, the authors look at the member's Nominate scores. After using Nominate scores to match legislators with the candidate who best matched their ideological dispositions, the researchers concluded that Adam's victory was consistent with the legislators sincere preferences as measured by Nominate (Jenkins and Sala, 1998, p. 1157).

Jenkins' work with Morris, meanwhile, seeks to explain the mystery of the role played by John C. Breckinridge during the 1860 presidential election. The 1860 contest saw Abraham Lincoln emerge victorious in a crowded field of four candidates. The logic behind the candidacy of Lincoln's rivals Stephen Douglas and John Bell is explained easily enough. Douglas was a moderately pro-slavery unionist who stood the best chance of competing with Lincoln in the northern states. John Bell led a newly formed moderate party aimed at charting a middle course on the issue of slavery to ease regional tensions. The candidacy of John C. Breckinridge was an outlier as he was an extremist on issues of slavery and state's rights. Thus, Breckinridge stood no conceivable chance of carrying enough states beyond the South to win the election. Breckinridge's candidacy can be best explained in two ways. The first of many efforts by southerners to throw a presidential election into the House of Representatives or perhaps Breckinridge's goal was to ensure a Lincoln victory, increasing the prospects of southern succession (Jenkins and Morris, 2006, p. 307-308).

After examining Breckinridge's limited Electoral College prospects, the authors attempt to estimate support for the candidates within the House of Representatives using W-NOMINATE. The authors conclude that the House median at the time was slightly anti-slavery, and defeating Lincoln in a contingent election was most likely in a three-way race between Lincoln, Douglas, and Bell. The authors posit that this lends credence to the notion that Breckinridge was purposely put forward as a spoiler to inflame tensions. This interpretation is based on the candidate meeting with future Confederate president Jefferson Davis before accepting the nomination of Democrats' splinter southern faction (Jenkins and Morris, 2006, p. 321). Thus, the authors conclude that either purposely or inadvertently, Breckenridge's presence in the race enhanced Lincoln's chances of victory. They determine that Lincoln was most

vulnerable to defeat in either a two-person contest in the Electoral College against Douglas or in a contingent election in the House where the anti-Lincoln vote was not divided (Jenkins and Morris, 2006, p. 325).

In abridged reflections of American history, it is generally treated as a given that the Republican Party was committed to advancing African American civil rights from Reconstruction until a swift issue realignment around 1964 produced in part by the candidacy of Barry Goldwater. Until this aforementioned issue realignment, the Democratic Party was generally thought to have been dominated by southern segregationists and mostly indifferent northerners. This historical shorthand acknowledges evolving commitments toward civil rights on the part of a handful of Democrats, like Harry Truman, but notes that they achieved few tangible victories. More granular investigations of civil rights history record that the parties' realignment on the issue was not so rapid. Democrats steadily became the senior partners in the bipartisan civil rights coalition before the presidency of Lyndon Johnson.

Researchers such as Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver's (2010) investigation of congressional activity between Reconstruction and the mid-twentieth century civil rights movement illustrates that the issue realignment began earlier than is generally assumed. The authors note that while civil rights groups like the NAACP blamed both parties for the failure to pass federal anti-lynching legislation like the unsuccessful Dryer Bill, their strongest criticism was directed at Republicans for showing indifference on the issue. This was perhaps best exemplified by Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a crusader for civil rights early in his political career before devolving into a lukewarm proponent (Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver, 2010, p. 72 and 75). They additionally note that Republican's failure to show commitment to such measures corresponded with a dip in African American support for the party of Lincoln in the northern

states where they represented a significant voting bloc. The authors also push back on the notion that African Americans' willingness to support Democrats during the early New Deal era was simply a reflection of support for FDR's economic program. The authors argue instead that northern Democrats were generally in the driver's seat in the congressional battles to pass federal anti-lynching legislation and other measures related to civil rights. African Americans also found increased electoral success, and starting in 1936, the handful of African American members of the House were universally Democrats from urban districts (, Ibid., p. 77-79 and 81).

Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver highlight the establishment of the Conservative Coalition and its role in preventing action on civil rights-related measures. In addition to simply blocking or trimming the sails on New Deal legislation, the informal partnership made up of particularly conservative Republicans, and much of the southern flank of the Democratic caucus began to play a role in bottling up and killing civil rights legislation. For the ostensible purpose of supporting the privileges of the minority party and smaller factions in Congress, Republicans assisted or consented to Southern Democrats' efforts to kill civil rights legislation, disappointing African American Republicans. While the strategy would not be pursued seriously for several more decades, Republican political strategists began toying with the idea of pivoting away from northern African American constituencies and courting white southerners (Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver, 2010, p. 85-86). Democrats, in contrast, began to actively court African American constituencies starting with the 1928 presidential campaign of Al Smith. As a result, during the New Deal era, the African American voting bloc was not fully captured by either major party (Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver, 2010, p. 71).

Authors such as Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein (2010) also argue that during the mid-1940s, Democrats largely displaced Republicans as the leading advocates for civil rights in the House. These scholars push back against the narrative that Democrats' evolution was a relatively top-down affair with Democratic presidents first championing civil rights. The authors instead describe a bottom-up realignment based on the two parties' coalitional partners (Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein, 2010, p. 672). By the early to mid-1940s, Democrats had become more active than Republicans when it came to advocating for civil rights-related legislation, with the gap growing wider with each new Congress. This evolution is credited to union members, liberal intellectuals, and people of the Jewish faith becoming increasingly politically active in urban Democratic districts. The authors argue that Republican constituency groups, in contrast, steadily put less effort into pressing their representatives on these issues (Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein, 2010, p. 673). They buttress these claims by looking at support for discharge petitions on civil rights-related measures. The trio notes that primarily Republicans signed onto such efforts during earlier periods, but the two parties achieved parity during the early 1940s, and Democrats took the lead by the Truman era. On metrics such as civil rights-related floor speeches, the record shows that Democrats overtook Republicans by the Truman administration (Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein, 2010, p. 677 and 679).

Quirks of the Electoral College

Unpledged Delegates/Unpledged Electors

Unpledged delegates or unpledged electors have become an obscure political footnote discussed only when academics debate how precisely to classify them when dealing with mid-twentieth century presidential elections. While obscure, they played a role in four separate

presidential elections and altered the Electoral College tally in the fiercely contested 1960 contest. In short, the terms refer to electors who are not pledged to any particular presidential ticket and could serve as free agents.

The unpledged elector strategy was first pursued by anti-New Deal Southern Democrats during the 1944 presidential contest to limited success, only securing ballot access in one state. The strategy was associated with Senator Harry Byrd (D-VA) during the 1956 and 1960 election cycles, with the strategy only producing electoral votes in 1960. Alabama Governor George Wallace was the last to experiment with the ploy to little fanfare during the 1964 presidential election. Following 1964 Dixiecrat types abandoned unpledged electors, and no other political faction has revived the tactic.

It is worth noting that constituent's ability to vote directly for specific presidential candidates is a relatively recent phenomenon. During the nation's early years, voters generally picked between slates of electors pledged to a particular party or candidate. As recent as the mid-twentieth century, a number of states continued this practice rather than giving the citizens the option of a straightforward vote for a particular candidate. Such balloting systems complicated elections as ballots were not always clear regarding the candidate individual electors were pledged to support. This practice potentially altered voter decisions because electors were often former politicians or individuals of prominence. If voters were extremely cued into state politics or owed allegiance to a party machine, they may have felt cross-pressured between voting for a sympathetic elector and supporting their most preferred presidential candidate. It took until the 1970s for states like Alabama to reform their process and allow citizens to directly vote for presidential candidates rather than electors (Loveman, 1983, p. 66). Other states simply listed the

parties that voters had to select from for president without mentioning the specific candidate or their electors (Galphin, Sep 11, 1960, p. 22A).

The logic of giving citizens the option of voting for unpledged delegates is that such figures could serve as powerbrokers in the event of a close presidential election in which no candidate received enough votes to secure the presidency. Theoretically, these figures could gain concessions for their geographic region or political faction from one of the major-party candidates in exchange for their support. Sufficient unpledged delegates could also potentially draft a presidential nominee. If the Electoral College is deadlocked, the House must select between the top three electoral vote-getters meaning that unpledged electors could force a new candidate into the running.

As conservative Southern Democrats, referred to as Dixiecrats from here forward, became increasingly at odds with their national counterparts, specifically on matters of civil rights, a variety of strategies were explored to maximize their political power. Following the Civil War, southerners understood that the presidency was beyond reach, and virtually no southern candidate waged a serious campaign for the office. This dynamic started to change with Vice President John Nance Garner, and Dixiecrats began supporting candidates in the primaries and at the conventions. Save for 1948 and 1968, fielding their own official presidential tickets proved unfeasible. Only on these two occasions did the stars align so that Dixiecrats had high enough profile candidates with the audacity to compete for the presidency along with the funding and infrastructure to support their ambitions. Outright breaking from the party was also a risky proposition given the poor odds of success and the South's reliance on the Democratic Party for patronage. During the period in question, the vast majority of the southern electorate also found voting for Republicans unthinkable. Republicans, for their part, rarely courted southerners in a

meaningful way prior to the 1950s. The unpledged elector strategy emerged as the perfect middle ground where Dixiecrats could keep one foot in the party while hoping for the opportunity to maximize their interests. This is why unpledged delegates have virtually never appeared on the ballot in a state outside of the South. After the South became genuinely competitive at the presidential level, the Dixiecrats died out or melded into one of the two major parties. Unpledged electors have thus ceased to be a factor in presidential elections.

The unpledged elector strategy was first attempted in 1944 in Texas with the Texas Regulars, a slate of anti-New Deal Democrats. If successful, Texas' twenty-three electoral votes could have been denied to either major party candidate. FDR's overwhelming electoral dominance, though, meant that this figure was not likely to prove determinative. The strategy gained further traction with the publication of *Whither Solid South?* by Charles Wallace Collins, a prominent Alabama lawyer. Among the author's diatribes about looming civil rights legislation was recognition that the Electoral College could be gamed to deadlock a presidential contest (Novotny, 2004, p. 377-378). The tome argued that the South's single-party political system all but assured that the region could withhold over 100 electoral votes from either major candidate through unpledged electors. Absent a sweep of the rest of the country; the leading candidates would then be forced to bid for the region's support either prior to the official meeting of each state's Electoral College or in a contingent election in the House (Collins, 1947, p. 261-263). The text and others would inspire segregationists to advocate for unpledged electors for roughly the following two decades.

Georgia politicians were particularly intrigued by the unpledged elector strategy. With the support of Governor Herman Talmadge, the General Assembly in 1954 passed the Unpledged Elector Act empowering electors formally pledged to a particular ticket to vote how they

wished (Baird, 1960, p. 3). This was significant as Georgia was a rare southern state where the presidential candidate's names were clearly placed on the ballot. Unlike their southern neighbors, Georgia voters could presumably count on their preferences being carried out absent political intrigue before the passage of this new law. The move was made with the explicit intention of leveraging Georgia's vote in the event of an extremely close election (Novotny, 2004, p. 379). Unpledged electors' final appearance on a southern ballot came in 1964 when Governor George Wallace advocated the strategy means to undermine both Democrat Lyndon Johnson and Republican Barry Goldwater. Alabama's mere electoral votes, however, stood little chance of proving determinative.

The 1944 and 1964 contests represented isolated rebellions to the Democratic Party. In 1956 and 1960, the unpledged elector strategy was deployed across the South. The strategy paid few dividends in 1956, although by securing ballot access in over a dozen states, there was the potential that unpledged electors could have been determinative. The strategy achieved some success in 1960 and garnered 14 electoral votes out of a potential 41 votes. Given the competitive nature of the election, the unpledged electors came close to achieving their proponent's goal of producing a contingent election. The formally unpledged electors were informally aligned with Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-VA) during these two election cycles. Like most southern members of Congress, Harry Byrd had a liberal to center-left voting record during the early stages of the New Deal but steadily became more conservative. Harry Byrd's rightward drift was especially dramatic, eventually making him a conservative outlier even among his fellow Southern Democrats. Despite being out of step with other Dixiecrat-style politicians on economic issues, Senator Harry Byrd (D-VA) was greatly respected and, starting in the 1930s, was viewed as a champion of the region and a presidential contender. In 1956 and particularly

1960, pseudo campaigns were waged on the Senator's behalf. While Harry Byrd did virtually no formal campaigning for the presidency, he was aware that machinations to support him were at work across multiple states and did little to undermine them.

Faithless Electors

Faithless electors simply refer to any elector who goes rogue and casts their vote for a presidential ticket that did not carry their state. Unlike unpledged electors, faithless electors continue to be a looming specter in presidential elections. Faithless electors have, in fact, become more prominently discussed as in 2016, seven faithless electors cast ballots for five different candidates. An additional three electors were blocked from defecting by relatively new state laws (Schmidt and Andrews, 2016). While theoretically capable of wreaking havoc with the electoral process, particularly in narrowly decided contests, faithless electors have never proven determinative (Kura, 2001, p.4). This is more the result of norms and the public backlash that electors would suffer than a result of legal sanctions. Currently, only about a third of states have taken action to either bind electors to cast their ballot for the ticket that carried their state or punish them for defecting from the will of the people. These penalties are more theoretical than practical. Virtually no faithless elector has ever suffered major legal sanctions (Millhiser, 2020).

While faithless electors have never proven determinative in a presidential contest, this does not mean that it has not been attempted. In the lull between November 8, 1960, and the formal meeting of each state's presidential electors, a faithless Republican elector by the name of Henry Irwin broke ranks to join with the unpledged Democratic delegates who cast their ballots for Senator Harry Byrd (D-VA). Furthermore, Irwin actively courted other Republican electors to do the same. Acting on personal initiative, Irwin lobbied the rest of the Republican electors to

become faithless to deny John F. Kennedy's victory. Despite his Democratic Party affiliation, Byrd was more conservative than many Congressional Republicans, with those either indifferent or hostile to civil rights finding him particularly appealing. While a few dozen other electors were reportedly intrigued by the scheme, GOP leaders stepped in to prevent other electors from following Irwin's lead (Edwards, 2004, p. 56). Irwin's plot was ultimately unsuccessful but impacted the electoral process, with several states subsequently adopting laws to sanction faithless electors. The plot was echoed fifty-six years later when electors cheered on by activists, and a few liberal scholars unsuccessfully floated a similar strategy to deny President Trump victory following the 2016 election (Lessig, 2016).

The Old South

Given Republicans' increasing electoral dominance in the American South, it may be difficult for recent political observers to believe that from the conclusion of Reconstruction to just a few decades ago, much of the region was a Democratic stronghold. From the 1880s to the 1940s, nowhere was this more applicable than the Deep South consisting of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana (Bullock and Rozell, 2010, p. V). The 1928 presidential election offers a prime example. Despite Democratic candidate Al Smith suffering such a crushing defeat to Herbert Hoover that he failed to carry his home state, the Deep South remained loyal (Key, 1949, p. 318). As scholars have thoroughly documented, fissures began to develop between Southern Democrats and their national counterparts during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration. During FDR's second term southern elites and elected officials began to sour on the New Deal.

Around 1936 the informal Conservative Coalition consisting of the GOP's most orthodox members and the lion's share of southern Democrats arose to either outright block or trim the sails of progressive legislation (Heinemann, 1996, p. 287). On the surface, FDR had little to worry about electorally when it came to the South as his vote margins approached or, in some cases, surpassed ninety percent (Leip 1932-1944). These lopsided victories concealed a brewing rebellion. The South's most conservative Democrats toyed with methods to dislodge FDR with attempts ranging from supporting Vice President Garner at the 1940 Democratic Convention, attempting to draft Senator Harry Byrd as a Democratic alternative, and an outright bolt from the party in Texas.

FDR's massive popularity, even amongst segregationists, meant that conservative Southern Democrats' attempts at insurrection amounted to little. This would change in 1948 due to Truman's middling popularity and embrace of civil rights reform, leaving him unable to keep the party's southern flank solidly in the Democratic column. While Democrats remained the dominant party in the region for several more decades, these Southern Democrats' relationship with the national party grew increasingly strained.

1932-1944 Rumblings of Southern Discontent

Conservative southerner's discontent with Roosevelt's New Deal began to fester around the 1940 presidential election. Inspired by the political intrigue of the 1876 presidential election, conservative southerners began plotting. The 1876 contest and the subsequent unwritten compromise that settled it is infamous for a number of reasons. Opponents of the Electoral College sometimes point to it as the first time that the will of the people was thwarted, and the winner of the popular vote was not awarded the presidency. The election was also notorious for

the unwritten compromise hashed out between members of Congress, which settled the disputed outcome. Irregularities primarily in the southern states of South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida made the Electoral College outcome uncertain. While New York Democrat Samuel Tilden was said to have carried the states, this was almost certainly the result of widespread ballot stuffing and the intimidation of African American voters (Woodward, 1991, p. 20).

The constitutional crisis was averted when southern leaders agreed to acknowledge Rutherford Hayes as the victor in exchange for several unwritten understandings. Reconstruction would end, Hayes would appoint at least one Southern Democrat to his cabinet, and legislation would be passed to aid southern industrialization as well as economic recovery (Woodward, 1991, p. 208). Hoping for another opportunity to play presidential kingmaker southerners began toying with the concept of unpledged electors. In Mississippi and Texas, Democratic electors were put forward that were independent of either party. Similar efforts were made in Louisiana, Arkansas, Alabama, and South Carolina but began too late to gain ballot access or were derailed by Democratic party loyalists (Collins, 1947, p. 265). If the situation arose, these electors could theoretically swing the outcome of a close election in exchange for payoffs like those southerners had extracted in the 1876 Compromise (Feldman, 2015, p. 59).

Others were unsatisfied with the complex unpledged elector scheme and wished to challenge FDR and the New Dealers more directly. At this time, Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-VA) was looked to as the champion of the southern conservative bloc when it came to presidential politics. The Senator had been a favorite son candidate at the 1932 Democratic Convention but garnered negligible support outside of his home state. Texan and Speaker of the House John Nance Garner received the support of most southerners. Starting in 1940 southern conservatives

began a pattern of courting Byrd to actively challenge the party's standard-bearers that lasted decades (Feldman, 2015, p. 59).

1940 John Nance Garner Challenge

The prospect of FDR seeking a third term was warmly received by most in the party. A handful of figures viewed it as a troubling precedent and a despotic consolidation of executive power if successful. These voices were loudest in the South, where most elected officials had drifted away from the New Deal. Among those who opposed a potential third term included many future organizers of the Dixiecrats movement (Barnard, 1974, p. 97). Senator Byrd of Virginia, who had long since refuted the New Deal agenda, was vehemently against a third term. Though few ultimately came forward, the Virginia Senator was not alone. Newspaper reports put the number of Democratic senators who privately opposed a third term at twenty-eight (Timmons, 1948, p. 257). Business interests also opposed a third term, with Harry Byrd striking up a working relationship with Joseph P. Kennedy (Sweeney, 1991, p.4). The most high-profile southerner who expressed apprehension with the development was FDR's own Vice President John Nance Garner of Texas, otherwise known as Cactus Jack. In the immediate aftermath of FDR and Garner's victory in 1936, they had both publicly vowed not to seek office again (Timmons, 1948, p. 210). As the 1940 election season approached, FDR publicly opposed running for a third term. Still, prominent Democratic officeholders and party loyalists frequently put up trial balloons for the idea (Timmons, 1948, p. 250).

In the spring of 1940, New Dealers found themselves in a bind. FDR had groomed no particular heir to succeed him, and no such figure had arisen organically. If FDR retired, his most obvious successor would be Vice President Garner. In the eyes of New Dealers, Cactus Jack was

not considered an attractive successor for a variety of reasons. While Garner was in excellent health, he was in his early 70s, making him a Methuselah in the eyes of the younger men attracted to politics and public service by FDR. Politically Cactus Jack was also a man of another era. He was out of step with facilitators of the New Deal coalition, such as intellectuals and union leaders (Timmons, 1948, p. 260). As Speaker of the House, Garner had been a respected party leader and remarkably liberal for a southerner, but was still not considered a New Dealer.

Garner had championed FDR's program during their first term and played a fairly active role for a vice president of the era. During the early days of their administration, Garner had even been among the first to propose New Deal measures such as the Bank Holiday (Timmons, 1948, p. 178). However, by their second term, Garner openly expressed that the New Deal had gone far enough. In Garner's mind, Democrats needed to focus on amending and refining the programs they had already passed rather than pursuing new initiatives. Cactus Jack's southern background was another strike against him as no southerner had led the parties' ticket or been a serious contender since the Civil War (Brown, 1992, p.192). The final strike against Garner was that he lacked even tacit support from FDR. Before settling on a third term, FDR reportedly alerted insiders that he would leave the party if it selected a successor to his administration who was not a New Dealer (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 200).

Nevertheless, as the 1940 election season approached, Democrats began to line up behind Cactus Jack slowly. At the Democratic State Convention of Garner's home state of Texas delegates pledged their unanimous support following the 1938 midterms, which were disastrous for the national party (Timmons, 1948, p. 237). Centrist Democrats from beyond the South began to line up behind Garner, such as Senator Edward Burke (D-NE). Garner also had support within the business community, with his most prominent supporter being Henry Ford. Gallup polling

showed Garner dominating a weak field of prospective candidates, assuming FDR was not in the running (Timmons, 1948, p. 250- 253).

In light of Garner's presidential prospects, New Dealers began publicly courting FDR to retract his pledge against seeking re-election. Power brokers such as Chicago Mayor Edward Kelly and California Governor Culbert Olson began whipping up support for a third FDR term. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes penned a widely read essay in *Look Magazine*, making such a case (Timmons, 1948, p. 253 and 256). As the prospect of a Second World War increased, New Dealers used this as justification for another four years of FDR's steady leadership. Secretary of Agriculture and FDR intimate Henry Wallace was particularly vocal in this view. Shortly after the shooting began in Europe, Henry Wallace started lobbying the cabinet to support another bid (Timmons, 1948, p. 261 and 263). Despite FDR's immense popularity, public support for an unprecedented third term was not predetermined. Polling in states, like California, showed a majority of voters supported keeping a Democrat in the White House but were concerned with breaking from tradition (Timmons, 1948, p. 262). Torn between whether to uphold his pledge to retire or seek another term, Roosevelt refrained from public comment. Loyalists did not stop putting his name forward in almost every state that hosted a presidential primary.

Garner abhorred the idea of a president breaking the precedent and was specifically bothered by FDR recanting his word. Realistically, Garner was fatalistic about the prospect of anyone within the party defeating FDR. Cactus Jack felt that the two-term tradition was so important because it was inconceivable to stop a popular president who sought re-nomination from the party. Garner believed this was truer now as the various New Deal programs distributed

vast pork and patronage. Beneficiaries would be eager to see the system continued unabated (Timmons, 1948, p. 247).

Garner was ambivalent about seeking the presidency. His candidacy for the office in 1932 had been a low-key affair. Cactus Jack was said to have accepted the number two slot on the ticket to avoid a bloody prolonged convention fight that would divide the party (Timmons, 1948, p. 164 and 168). When it seemed that FDR would follow the two-term norm, Garner was inclined to seek the presidency if drafted by party power brokers (Timmons, 1948, p. 251). New Dealers' blatant efforts to coax FDR into a third bid led Garner to step forward to prevent this violation of tradition (Timmons, 1948, p. 278).

Cactus Jack was a poor candidate for southern conservative's first public clash with the National Democratic Party, explaining Garner's weak showing. Unlike Thurmond, Byrd, and Wallace, who followed, Garner was a party loyalist rather than a champion of the South. Garner supported eliminating the two-thirds rule, which referred to the two-thirds majority threshold a nominee needed to secure and become its standard-bearer. As long as representatives held together, this rule gave the South a pseudo-veto over presidential nominees, allowing them to block pro-civil rights or especially liberal candidates. As a party man rather than a regional candidate, Garner believed no region of the country deserved a de-facto veto over party nominees (Timmons, 1948, p. 161). Unlike the Dixiecrats to follow, Garner thought of himself as a progressive politician and Democrats as the progressive party (Timmons, 1948, p. 184 and 236).

For all Garner's differences with future Dixiecrats, they had two things in common, opposition to the New Deal and distrust for FDR. As a party man, Garner intensely disliked those who identified as New Dealers rather than Democrats. He thought of them as mercenaries with no loyalty to the party to which he had devoted his life (Timmons, 1948, p. 205). Despite his reservations regarding FDR's policies, Garner was cordial with the cabinet except for Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace, whom he regarded as an extremist (Timmons, 1948, p. 203). Garner's relationship with FDR steadily deteriorated following the failed 1938 party purge in which New Dealers supported aggressive primaries against Democrats who opposed FDR's agenda. He saw these unsuccessful attempts not as purging the party of corruption but as trying to convert the organization into FDR's personal fiefdom (Timmons, 1948, p. 236). Garner perceived FDR as succeeding with the Democratic-controlled Congress rarely countering his proposals regardless of popularity (Timmons, 1948, p. 265). By 1939 the deteriorating relationship became mutual. FDR largely froze out Garner and ended their regular private meetings (Timmons, 1948, p. 240).

When the primaries began, Garner hoped that enthusiasm for FDR would fall short of expectations and the president would reconsider breaking his pledge. In addition, two other candidates contested the Democratic nomination, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Democratic National Committee (DNC) Chairman James Farley. After clarification that FDR would not explicitly vie for the nomination but would accept if called on, Hull and Farley largely suspended their formal campaigns. Unlike Garner, the two feared burning bridges within the party. Hull refused to allow supporters to organize or enter his name into the primaries. Farley confined campaigning to his home state of Massachusetts (Timmons, 1948, p. 266).

Garner soldiered on entering most primaries and strongly polled initially. Despite his solid polls, FDR won overwhelmingly despite not being an official candidate. Garner netted over 400,000 votes to FDR's greater than two million. In the delegate race, Garner's defeats were often extremely lopsided. Requirements that candidates carry congressional districts in exchange for delegates hampered Cactus Jack's cause. In states where he did respectably, like Wisconsin, he netted only 13% of the delegates despite earning 25% of the vote. Garner suffered more than a dozen humiliations at the ballot box. The most prominent being California, where Garner defeated FDR eight years previously but in 1940 earned a single delegate (Timmons, 1948, p. 271).

1940 Democratic Convention

During the 1940 Democratic Convention, FDR had more than enough delegates that were either formally pledged or pledged to loyal favorite sons. Garner hoped that once the delegates were faced with the prospect of breaking precedent, enough would get cold feet so that a revolt would ensue. Insiders believed that around 100 of the delegates were willing to revolt. This alleged figure was insufficient to deny FDR re-nomination but perhaps enough to make Roosevelt reconsider. Despite predictions, a rebellion by party insiders and anti-New Dealers did not occur (Timmons, 1948, p. 274).

In a well-crafted display of political theater, FDR formally released his pledged delegates and renounced a third term. After the convention erupted in an outpouring of support for another stint, he reconsidered (Timmons, 1948, p. 274). In turn, convention attendees hassled Garner's supporters, disrupted his campaign pageantry, and booed the customary nomination speech (Timmons, 1948, p. 275-76). Once the roll was called, FDR was re-nominated on the first ballot.

Garner netted 61 delegates who almost exclusively came from his home state and the Byrd Machine in Virginia. When later asked by reporters if he regretted his role in FDR's administration, he professed remorse over accepting the vice presidency. He believed that as Speaker, he could have checked the president's excesses (Timmons, 1948, p. 279).

Only the most die-hard southern opponents of FDR rallied behind Garner. The vice-presidential selection was considerably more heated. To mollify those skeptical of FDR, loyalists gave the impression that if re-nominated, FDR would leave the identity of his running-mate to the body (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 209). With the vice presidential slot up for grabs, numerous candidates stepped forward, including South Carolina Senator Jimmy Byrnes, Speaker of the House William Bankhead, Senate Majority Leader Alben Barkley, Garner's protégé Jesse Jones, and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. However, FDR defied political wisdom and favored Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, the most progressive member of his cabinet. Advisors were vocal in their calculation that Henry Wallace added nothing to the ticket and angered the party's center and right flank, but FDR was adamant (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 209-210). The decision increased FDR's opposition, who immediately began organizing to block Henry Wallace. FDR retaliated by making a take it or leave it proposition (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 220).

Henry Wallace had organic support among progressives in a few states and some inroads with especially liberal southerners like Senator Lister Hill (D-AL) and Claude Pepper (D-FL) (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 217). Party loyalists like Congressman Sam Rayburn also reluctantly lined up behind Henry Wallace. The nomination was catcalled and hissed due to his socialist policy positions and recent status as a progressive Republican. The reaction on the convention floor was so hostile that Ilo Wallace reportedly wept over her husband's reception (Culver and

Hyde, 2000, p. 220-21). Once balloting began, party loyalists largely got behind FDR's wishes. The Deep South and various western states supported the moderate Bankhead while others voted for Henry Wallace or minor candidates. With a final tally of 626 to 329 for Speaker Bankhead, Henry Wallace became FDR's running-mate and heir apparent (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 220-22). The dynamic was best summed up in a reported exchange between a Louisianan attendee and FDR intimate George Allen. The Louisianan challenged Allen to name a single individual who wanted Henry Wallace on the ticket. Allen responded with, "Brother, that I can do and that one man was Roosevelt" (Allen, 1950, p. 130-31).

Democrats for Willkie

Anti-New Deal southerners embraced Republican nominee Wendell Willkie but come Election Day their numbers were abysmal. Willkie had only recently left the party leading the southern business community, particularly in Texas and South Carolina, to call him the real Democrat in the race. This nascent southern support was ironic as Willkie expressed more support for civil rights than Roosevelt. Alabamians considered an independent elector movement but abstained. Those who still desired a channel for their discontent began to organize Democrats for Willkie clubs. Bitter feelings regarding Henry Wallace's victory over Speaker of the House, Will Bankhead for the position of vice president produced more energy for Willkie Democrats. Energy for Republican nominees was unusual in the Solid Democratic South. Efforts produced only a slight improvement for the GOP compared to the previous election (Feldman, 2015, p. 59-60). The most high-profile Southern Democrat for Willkie was former Vice President John Nance Garner. After failing to secure the Democratic nomination, Garner sported a Willkie lapel pin upon returning to Texas (Caro, 1982, p. 600). These efforts bore little fruit but established a

trend of nominally Democratic organizations lobbying voters on behalf of the GOP candidate during presidential election years.

1944 Democratic Convention

By 1944 southern elite's frustrations increased with Roosevelt. Attempts to ban the poll tax, creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), the passage of the Soldier Voting Act, and further progressive measures angered southern conservatives who felt New Dealers threatened Jim Crow (Heinemann, 1996, p. 235). After Vice President Garner's anemic performance, there was little appetite among southern leadership to take on the unbeatable Roosevelt. Those who wished to voice their frustrations openly turned to Senator Harry Byrd. Since 1924, the Senator had been a conservative voice who had never backed a winner in the struggle for the parties' nomination (Karabell, 2000, p. 47).

Harry Byrd (D-VA) was coaxed to challenge FDR for the presidency in 1936 and 1940, but the Senator remained an unenthusiastic supporter of the president (Heinemann, 1996, p. 176 and 211). Viewing a challenge to FDR in 1944 as a fool's errand, Senator Byrd resisted the calls for a draft campaign. Unofficial Byrd for President organizations popped up in Virginia and the Deep South leading to him becoming a favorite son candidate (Heinemann, 1996, p. 236). A handful of Republicans for Byrd groups also popped up across the country, with one in Kansas having the support of several of the state's leading Republicans (AP, 1944, p. 8). Despite refusing to actively campaign against Roosevelt, the Senator stepped up his political actions and began championing the "Four Freedoms of the Home Front" as a conservative response to FDR's better known "Four Freedoms" Harry Byrd's version stressed freedoms from racketeering labor

leaders, freedom from bureaucratic red tape, freedom of individual opportunity, and freedom of state and local rights from federal domination (Feldman, 2015, p. 98-99).

The Virginia Senator's support was confined mainly to the far right flank of the Democratic Party and the business community. Despite his limited appeal, there was some belief that Harry Byrd would emerge as the strongest candidate through organizing early if FDR publicly announced that he was retiring. In the 1944 Democratic primary cycle, the Senator faced FDR in Florida, where he was second with 45 percent of the vote. Harry Byrd's ardent backers began plotting avenues through which he could remain a factor in the race. The possibility of using unpledged electors to give the South leverage if the election was close or to throw the decision into the House of Representatives was considered. Putting Byrd forward as an independent candidate with the intent of creating a deadlocked Electoral College was pursued, but held little allure for Byrd (Heinemann, 1996, p.77).

At least four southern states explored the unpledged elector strategy, with Texas being the most successful. A handful of electors publicly threatened to become faithless and support Byrd but backed down (UP, 1944, p. 6). In Byrd's home state, the strategy proved untenable as Virginia was a rare southern state in which the major candidates' names appeared on the ballot rather than their pledged electors. Despite Byrd's political organization's power, changing the voting system to obscure who delegates were pledged to or adding the option of voting for unpledged delegates proved too controversial. Though Byrd's efforts were not an official campaign, he garnered 89 votes to FDR's 1,086 at the 1944 Democratic Convention. Byrd's delegates mostly hailed from Virginia, Texas, and the Deep South, with his only non-southern delegate being former DNC Chairman Jim Farley (Heinemann, 1996, p.77 and 242).

Although Byrd's support represented a small piece of the party, it was an improvement from the more famous Garner's showing, illustrating the slow-growing divide within the party (Feldman, 2015, p. 92). After the Convention, Byrd was approached to lead a unity ticket alongside a non-disclosed Republican. Disgruntled New Dealers like Jim Farley and former Secretary of War Henry Woodring openly supported the idea. Byrd refused to participate in this ruse (Heinemann, 1996, p. 236 and 238). Even as a fissure was developing between Southern Democrats and their national counterparts, the discontent was more an elite than a grassroots phenomenon. The limited Gallup polling demonstrated overwhelming support for FDR among rank and file southern voters (Feldman, 2015, p.102). As schemes to promote Senator Byrd lost momentum, conservative and moderate Southern Democrats began questioning how to remove Henry Wallace from the ticket (Heinemann, 1996, p. 241).

While conservative Southern Democrats gathered few forces to challenge FDR, a political battle was waged over the position of vice president. During the period where conventions rather than primaries selected presidential candidates, parties generally gave their candidates deference in selecting their running-mate, but delegates were under no obligation to respect their wishes. Balloting was thus a two-track process selecting the presidential candidate and vice-presidential candidate separately rather than as a packed ticket (Baumgartner, 2012, p. 301). The extent of FDR's deteriorating health was obscured to the general public, but many within the party suspected that his odds of completing a fourth term were meager. Party insiders viewed the vice-presidential selection as critical due to the probability that he would succeed the president (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 353). A target was placed on Henry Wallace, the president's presumed running mate. Henry Wallace was relatively popular among the public and admired by the parties' left-wing and intellectual class, but seen as possessing many liabilities.

Elites viewed him as providing nothing to the 1944 ticket electorally, having never won an election himself, and ideologically his vaguely socialist stances were outside of the party norm. Henry Wallace's distaste for the horse-trading and glad-handing of politics resulted in him making few inroads with political opponents or organizing potential allies (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 314). Henry Wallace did have a few redeeming factors. While FDR was unwilling to present an ultimatum regarding his running-mate, Henry Wallace had his public support. Arguably due more to his incumbent status than political skill, Wallace had a strong lead over other candidates like Jimmy Byrnes, according to Gallup polling going into the convention (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 346 and 350).

Southerners like Senator Lister Hill initially backed his fellow Alabamian and Senate colleague John Bankhead, older brother of Speaker Bankhead, who Henry defeated previously (Hamilton, 1987, p. 93). Jimmy Byrnes, who left the Senate to serve numerous positions in FDR's administration, also courted southerners. Resembling 1940, southerners were against Henry Wallace but did not unite behind an alternative (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 316). Those that opposed Henry Wallace slowly coalesced around Senator Harry Truman (D-MO), who FDR found acceptable if his first choice was rejected (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 355).

Initially, it appeared that Henry Wallace's re-nomination would be less dramatic than his previous experience. He counted on holding a third of the necessary 589 delegates and was poised to gain further after agreeing to glad-hand at the convention. Compared to previously when he was booed mercilessly, most attendees greeted him warmly. He had forged alliances with the South's leading liberals like Governor Jim Folsom, Georgia's Governor Ellis Arnall, and Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL). When taking the floor, he was overwhelmed by a roar of cheers that lasted twenty minutes. Had balloting begun on July 20th, with enthusiasm for Henry

Wallace at its apex, he may have prevailed on the first ballot. Unfortunately for Henry Wallace, the day's business adjourned after Senator Pepper failed to reach the stage to make a motion to begin the vote (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 357-358 and 363).

Party bosses began working all night to line up support for Truman with ambassadorships, minor appointments, and cash allegedly being offered in exchange for votes. Either by coincidence or a means to dilute the vote and ensure a second ballot, over a dozen favorite son candidates came forward the next day. Towards the conclusion of the first round, Henry Wallace stood at 429 compared to Truman's 319 and John H. Bankhead's 98, with the remaining 329 scattered between minor candidates. Henry Wallace and Truman were virtually tied on the second ballot, but the process concluded after those supporting favorite sons broke decisively for Truman. Many of Henry Wallace's soft supporters saw the writing on the wall and changed horses. When balloting finished, Truman was the winner with 1,031 votes to Henry Wallace's 105 (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 364-65). Henry Wallace remained in the cabinet as Secretary of Commerce but rarely saw eye to eye with Truman.

1944 Revolt of the Texas Regulars

While given little attention at the time, something of a revolt was brewing among conservative Texan Democrats. In hindsight, the episode served as a precursor to both George Wallace's American Independent Party and the 1960 unpledged delegate movement. Governor W. Lee O' Daniel, nicknamed Pappy from his radio career, parlayed his local fame into a successful populist bid for the governor's mansion. While in some regards unusually liberal for the era, Pappy aroused suspicion amongst Texas New Dealers and party loyalists for openly courting Republican voters and appointing Republican businessmen to various state boards and

agencies once in office. After being elected to the Senate, Pappy's politics shifted from the heterodox and populist to the sort of small government libertarianism embraced by Senator Byrd. In the lead-up to the 1944 election, Senator Pappy O' Daniel tried in vain to organize a third party titled the American Democratic Party (Feldman, 2015, p. 96).

Senator O' Daniel's efforts ultimately amounted to little. Still, he did attract the support of a few other notable southern populists and conservatives like former Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge. Talmadge tried unsuccessfully to get Pappy's American Democratic Party on the states' ballot (Feldman, 2015, p. 99). Conservatives in Mississippi also toyed with revolting, but these efforts were premature (Barnard, 1974, p. 1974). After failing to establish a new party, Pappy endorsed an unpledged elector slate loyal to Senator Harry Byrd (D-VA) known as the Texas Regulars (Weeks, 1964, p. 227). The Texas Regulars primarily consisted of pro-business conservative Democrats opposed to the New Deal. While the movement was organized enough to gain ballot access, it garnered relatively few votes and had little impact on the election. In some ways, the Texas Regulars' efforts backfired, with Texas being the sole southern state where FDR's vote margin did not decline thanks to the Texas Regulars dividing the anti-FDR vote (Feldman, 2015, p. 99).

Chapter II: Elections

1948 Democratic Primaries

Despite the intraparty controversy sparked by Truman seeking the presidency in his own right, he faced no high-profile challenge during the primaries. Several candidates threatened to challenge Truman but ultimately, little came of the threats. These threats came primarily from the South, with Senator Fulbright of Arkansas bluntly declaring that Truman should resign following the Democrats bloody 1946 midterm (Libby, 2009, p. 92). The populist and racially moderate Governor of Alabama, Jim Folsom, began denouncing Truman and entertained the idea of running for president or at least launching a favorite son campaign to influence delegates, but the plan found little traction (Hamilton, p. 151). In February of 1948, at a meeting of the Southern Governors Association, Folsom sought the support of his fellow governors to serve as the leader of an interparty revolt against Truman (Barnard, 1974, p. 105). Prior to Truman's embrace of civil rights reforms, he was rather popular among southern conservatives. Future foe Bull Connor charged that Folsom's true intention was to bloody Truman so that he would be replaced at the party convention with a more progressive Democrat like former Vice President Henry Wallace (Barnard, 1974, p. 105). Connor's charges were not unfounded, with limited polling showing an appetite among Democrats for the party to dump Truman in favor of Henry Wallace (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 418).

Folsom's nascent campaign was quickly brought crashing down by scandal. While Folsom's political career was far from over, he entered an especially low point. In March of 1948, Folsom faced accusations of fathering an illegitimate son. The matter was reportedly

settled out of court, but between Folsom's paternity scandal, excessive drinking, and racial moderation at a time when race rather than economics was driving Alabama politics, his popularity plummeted (Barnard, 1974, p. 105). Governor Folsom's standing sank low enough that he came in dead last in his race for delegate to the Democratic Convention (Feldman, 2015, p. 216).

Folsom's footnote of a candidacy was, however, a harbinger of the problems Truman would face along both his southern and progressive flanks. Seeing how shaky Truman's standing was in the South, Folsom began stumping against him as early as January of 1948, before he angered the region by embracing significant civil rights reforms. Like Henry Wallace, who Folsom had supported for vice president in 1940, Folsom also saw an opening in attacking Truman from the left. Folsom charged that Truman was a fine man personally but politically beholden to Wall Street and corporate interests (Barnard, 1974, p. 96 and 104). Folsom's fellow southern liberal Senator Claude Pepper also briefly put himself forward as an alternative to Truman (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 479).

Truman's southern opponents failed to oppose him in the handful of primaries and caucuses that took place. His opposition held out some hope that Truman was unpopular enough that they could deny him a first-ballot victory by uniting behind a protest candidate. They reasoned that support for Truman would collapse absent a first-round victory. A compromise candidate could then emerge who would not challenge the status quo on civil rights. The party bosses, activists, and local officials who would align with the future Dixiecrats meanwhile had been hard at work infiltrating and seizing control of their states' Democratic Party machinery. The party machinery was critical because it was state party leaders who primarily determined the

delegates to the national convention, and in order to block Truman, Dixie's delegates had to be in lockstep opposition to the president (Karabell, 2000, p. 108).

The question was then who best to rally behind. Strom Thurmond's path to becoming the standard-bearer of the future Dixiecrat Party began in the spring of 1948, well before the infamous convention walkout. On April 22nd, the Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee voted to nominate Thurmond as a protest candidate at the upcoming national convention (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 104). On May 10th, the future Dixiecrats hosted a meeting in Jackson, Mississippi, which served as a dry run for their summer convention. It was here that Thurmond was unofficially elevated to the face of the movement. Thurmond delivered a stirring speech that supporters viewed as striking the perfect balance of being viciously anti-Truman without being so threatening on civil rights as to scare away southern voters with an aversion to over-the-top race-baiting (Karabell, 2000, p. 113). Not all in attendance were won over. The Georgia delegation, in particular, exited the meeting in opposition to the purpose of the gathering clearly to lay the groundwork for a bolt from the Democratic Party (Karabell, 2000, p. 114). South Carolina Democrats made Thurmond's leadership all but official on May 19th when delegates to the upcoming national convention voted to support Thurmond on the first ballot and reject Truman or any other pro-civil rights candidate in what they assumed would be a multi-ballot process (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 108).

Draft Eisenhower Movement

A combination of Truman's floundering approval and opposition to the president's recent embrace of civil rights reforms left many in the party scrambling for an alternative standard-bearer. This desire was particularly strong among members of the party's conservative and

southern flanks. Calls for General Dwight Eisenhower to swoop in as a party unifier ranged from the rank and file voters to the party elite. Truman's standing in the South sank so low that in states like Alabama, their most liberal representatives, Senators Lister Hill, John Sparkman, and Congressman Albert Rains, led the call (Barnard, 1974, p. 108). Hill and Sparkman's efforts were not just rhetorical as they even visited Truman to tell him that he had lost their support, and they encouraged him to step aside for the good of the party (Feldman, 2015, p. 219). Senator Russell promoted the idea of Eisenhower at the top of the ticket with a liberal southerner that the party establishment could accept in the vice-presidential slot like Senator Claude Pepper or Georgia Governor Ellis Arnall (Fite, 1991, p. 238). Rather than seeking the presidency again, either formally or informally, in 1948, Senator Byrd supported drafting Ike (Heinemann, 1996, p.260). Before accepting the presidential nomination for the newly formed States Rights Democrats or Dixiecrats Governor, Storm Thurmond also came out in support of the Democrats Draft Eisenhower movement (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 109).

Support for the draft Eisenhower cause extended beyond southern conservatives. Big city party bosses such as Mayor Hague of Jersey City and Mayor William O' Dwyer of New York lobbied Ike, as did liberal groups such as the anti-communist Americans For Democratic Action (ADA) organization (McKeever, 1989, p. 116). Virtually all of the politically active members of FDR's family were against Truman's re-nomination. The former president's sons Franklin Jr. and Elliot emerged as vocal supporters of the Draft Ike movement. Support for the draft materialized in the streets as well, with picketers marching in front of Ike's home with signs that read, "Ike, you favor the draft, we favor it for you." Democratic Party bosses' efforts to entice Eisenhower went so far that he was offered a blank check regarding his hypothetical running-mate and the party's platform (Karabell, 2000, p. 87 and 153). On the other side of the country,

Democrats in the western states also engaged in a similarly unsuccessful attempt to court the especially bipartisan Republican Governor of California Earl Warren (Katcher, 1967, p. 236).

Due to his belief that military officials should eschew politics, Ike refused overtures from both major political parties. While his thinking on the matter would, of course, evolve in a few short years, Ike announced that he would refuse the Democratic nomination even if nominated. Senator Claude Pepper made a last-ditch attempt to attract Eisenhower by arguing that Democrats should get behind a unity ticket made up of a Democratic vice president and a politically independent Dwight Eisenhower. Putting aside the logistics of such a scheme, Ike still reiterated his opposition to entering politics just before the Democratic Convention (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p.479).

1948 Democratic Convention

The 1948 Democratic Convention held from July 12th to the 14th was easily among the rowdiest and most infamous conventions in the party's history. Despite previously enjoying strong support from the more conservative and southern wings of the Democratic Party, opposition to Truman reached a boiling point after he came out in support of a modest package of civil rights-related reforms. Truman's proposals included abolishing the poll tax, making lynching a federal crime, prohibiting segregated accommodations on interstate transportation, making the sunsetted Fair Employment Practice Committee permanent, and setting up a civil rights division within the Justice Department (Hamilton, 1987, p. 151). With the possible exception of abolishing the poll tax, which had a modicum of support, such measures were anathema to even progressive southern politicians (Brown, 1992, p. 361). These policies cost him

the endorsements of southerners who had supported him earlier in the year when the left flank of the Democratic Party was scheming to replace him (Feldman, 2015, p. 218).

With all but the most faithful in the party expecting defeat in November, the Convention was largely a joyless perfunctory affair with insiders comparing the atmosphere to a wake. In something of an omen of the calamity ahead, a well-intentioned tribute to Truman went far from according to plan. The sister of Senator Joseph Guffey (D-PA) commissioned a flower display in the shape of the Liberty Bell to be presented at the opening ceremonies. Inside the display was a birdcage filled with common pigeons rather than more eloquent doves because none could be procured in time. The plan was to release the birds in a grand display, but many of the birds had died from the excessive heat by the time things kicked off. Upon their release, the remainder harassed attendees as well as defecated on the stage and crowd to the organizers' dismay. Congressman Rayburn, for example, was caught on microphone shouting, "Get those goddamned pigeons out of here" (Karabell, 2000, p.151).

The tension between Southern Democrats and their national counterparts reached its boiling point following Hubert Humphrey's successful resolution to adopt a civil rights plank stronger than the one proposed by Truman. The new resolution passed by a narrow vote of 682 to 651, prompting some southern delegates to stage a walkout in protest (Karabell, 2000, p.158). Future Dixiecrat vice presidential nominee Governor Fielding Wright led the departure of Mississippi's entire delegation. South Carolina's delegation was prevented from participating in the walkout due to the presence of a group of progressive South Carolina Democrats with an alternate delegation on hand to replace them (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 110). The Arkansas delegation also decided against a walkout as the state's alternative delegates were more loyal to Truman (Karabell, 2000, p. 165).

The Alabama delegation was split roughly down the middle between future Dixiecrats who participated in the walkout and loyalists who stayed behind (Feldman, 2015, p. 216). Somewhat ironically, despite keeping the National Democratic Party at arm's length for the rest of his political career, a young George C. Wallace was among the loyalists who refused to participate in the southern walkout. Wallace remained to cast his vote for Senator Richard Russell of Georgia. Invoking populist William Jennings Bryan's famous cross of gold speech, Wallace promised that "Russell will see that the South is not crucified on the cross of the so-called civil rights program"(Leshner, 1994, p 80 - 81).

The Mississippi and Alabama delegates departed to a chorus of boos while waving a Confederate flag leaving Thurmond in a bind (Karabell, 2000, p. 158). A chunk of his pledged supporters had departed in infamy leading to Thurmond's decision against being put forward as a candidate. Instead, Thurmond nominated Senator Russell, who the remaining southerners broadly rallied behind as their protest candidate (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 110). As a party loyalist, Russell reportedly took little pleasure in challenging Truman and only allowed his name to be put forward so that Truman's southern opponents had a respectable candidate (Fite, 1991, p. 240). Russell's decision served to unite the southern ranks. Delegations like Louisiana's, which though angry with Truman, opposed bolting the convention and were comfortable supporting Senator Russell. The state's somewhat progressive Governor Earl Long ended his favorite son candidacy and directed his delegates to support Russell. While southerners could do little to block Truman even at full strength, the walkouts left Russell with only 22% of the delegates compared to Truman's 75% (Karabell, 2000, p. 159). Russell also failed to garner the universal support of the southern delegates, with a handful of liberals like Ralph McGill of the *Atlanta*

Constitution sticking with Truman (Fite, 1991, p. 240). In addition to thinning the ranks of those who would have opposed Truman, the walkout hurt Southern Democrats' policy prospects. Had the future Dixiecrats not inflamed party tensions by bolting, the southerners likely would have been indulged with a softening of the civil rights plank or some other concessions aimed at preserving party unity (Karabell, 2000, p. 115).

Coupled with the walkout and Democrats' feelings of malaise regarding their prospects in November, Truman had some difficulty attracting a running-mate. Feeling that Truman's defeat was inevitable, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas allegedly turned down Truman's offer (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 479). Senate Minority Leader Alben Barkley (D-KY) was few delegates' ideal choice for vice president, but he had some goodwill among southerners. His passionate keynote address had also been one of the few highlights of the glum convention. Additionally, Barkley was an ardent New Dealer beloved by rank and file Democrats for his wit and oratory (Libby, 2009, p. 92). Seeing that the remaining delegates could at least agree on Barkley, President Truman asked him to be his running-mate despite some previous suspicion that Barkley intended to be a compromise nominee if the convention rejected Truman. Building on Barkley's successful address, virtually the only other unifying event of the Convention was Truman's feisty acceptance speech in which he colorfully lambasted Republicans in general and the so-called Do-Nothing Congress in particular. Truman also hit upon at least one piece of political cunning with his vow to call the Congress into special session and dare Republican leaders to pass the primarily bipartisan policies they had supported at their own convention. Keeping with the largely disastrous trend of the Convention, the speech was robbed of some of its potential impact as delays pushed the address well past midnight, significantly limiting Truman's audience (Libby, 2009, p. 95).

1948 Republican Presidential Primaries

The 1948 GOP primaries represented a spirited clash between four factions of the Republican Party. Governor Thomas Dewey represented the moderate and well financed Eastern Establishment or Rockefeller Republicans. Senator Robert Taft of Ohio was the candidate of the conservative hardliners. The young Minnesota Governor Henry Stassen emerged as a charismatic upstart and something of an heir to the progressive Republican tradition of Governor Robert La Follette. Governor Warren of California lastly was a dark horse candidate with a reputation as more of an independent than a partisan Republican.

Initially, 1948 appeared to be a culmination of Governor Thomas Dewey's nearly decade-long flirtation with the presidency. In 1940, Dewey the beloved, New York City prosecutor and district attorney who had put away, numerous gangsters came close to securing his parties' presidential nomination. Four years later, New York Governor Dewey won the GOP nomination but lost the general election to FDR. Even in defeat, Dewey won respect for running a semi-competitive race against the seemingly electorally invincible FDR. As such, admirers assumed that 1948 would be the culmination of his path to the White House (Roberts, 1971, p.A1 & A6).

Earl Warren, the Governor and former Attorney General of California, represented the liberal flank of the Republican Party. Governor Earl Warren was respected on virtually all sides among the California electorate with friends in both business and labor. Warren's bipartisanship was such that as Attorney General, he swept the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive Party nominations due to the state allowing candidates to cross-file in different party primaries. As such, the Governor would sometimes call himself a Republican nonpartisan candidate. This was no mere campaign rhetoric as he rarely supported other Republican nominees, and when making

appointments, he drew roughly equally between Democrat and Republican candidates. These qualities made him anathema to the parties' conservatives. Still, he was seen as a potential compromise candidate if the convention deadlocked due to his history of electoral success (Katcher, 1967, p. 6, 111, 166, 170, 159, 181, and 185).

Governor Dewey was the favorite for the nomination from the start, but the primaries presented him with a challenge. During this era, victory in the primaries could not in itself secure the nomination for a candidate, but poor showings could seriously undermine them (Karabell, 2000, p. 80). As such, Dewey entered the primaries with some concern that his aura of inevitability could be shattered. The hard-campaigning Governor Stassen and Senator Taft, who had virtually no appeal among swing voters but was beloved among the sort of hard-right party loyalists likely to take part in the primaries and party conventions, posed different challenges. Dewey's other problem was that Republicans could have reasoned that victory in the general election was all but assured with President Truman appearing so electorally vulnerable. Overconfidence could give party members the permission structure to support an ardent conservative like Taft rather than a moderate like Dewey with tested crossover appeal. Dewey entered most of the primaries but opted against the sort of all-out barnburner campaigning of Governor Stassen (Karabell, 2000, p. 85).

Governor Stassen of Minnesota emerged as Dewey's most serious threat to securing the GOP nomination. The youthful governor was a political dynamo who had kicked off the race early and earned platitudes from voters and journalists alike for his barnstorming campaign style. By the time the race began in earnest, Stassen had already traveled extensively and charmed voters with intimate door-to-door style campaigning. Stassen also appeared to have a great deal of crossover appeal as he was beloved in a state known for progressive politics. Like Dewey, he

was a strong internationalist and, on domestic issues, rather liberal with a record of being a friend to organized labor. Stassen balanced this relative liberalism with extreme opposition to communists not so different from that of his ally Joe McCarthy (Karabell, 2000, p. 79).

The son of President Taft and a sitting Ohio Senator, Taft represented a different sort of threat to Dewey. Taft made a name for himself as a fierce opponent of the New Deal. The Senator served as the leader of the GOP's right flank and an unofficial leader of the bipartisan Conservative Coalition of hard-right Republicans and conservative Democrats that enjoyed some success when it came to blocking or trimming the sails of New Deal legislation. Taft's orthodox conservatism had earned him a reputation as a poor vote-getter in regards to courting a public who had repeatedly elected FDR. Despite his electoral shortcomings, Taft could count on the support of committed conservatives and virtually all of the parties' southern delegation, largely made up of individuals who valued patronage and conservative purity over victory at the ballot box (Smith, 1982, p. 586).

Dewey's decision to wage a more leisurely campaign was likely a mistake. Stassen won a respectable victory in the delegate-rich early state of Wisconsin. Dewey responded to this defeat by hitting the campaign trail in Nebraska harder than he ever had in New York. Despite running the most vigorous campaign of his political career, Dewey was defeated by Stassen yet again. Dewey finally put a victory on the board in New Jersey but lost Pennsylvania to Stassen as well (Karabell, 2000, p. 85). Dewey opted to essentially sit out the Ohio primary as Senator Taft was seen as guaranteed to win his home state. Governor Stassen ceded nothing, and while Taft emerged victorious, the campaign had been nasty. Party insiders generally concluded that both candidates had lost public standing. The episode was also viewed as driving the conservative isolationist wing of the party associated with Taft and the more liberal internationalist wing

associated with Stassen even further apart, hurting the parties' chances in the general election (Karabell, 2000, p. 98).

The Dewey campaign then began to treat the Oregon primary as something of a do-or-die moment as it represented the final real chance to notch a victory before the Republican National Convention (Karabell, 2000, p. 86). For the first time in the race, Governor Stassen also appeared vulnerable following the bitter race in Ohio. Interestingly the Dewey versus Stassen drama was arguably settled by the issue of communism. Stassen had come out strongly in favor of outright outlawing the existence of the American Communist Party and other communist organizations. In a seeming victory for civil liberties during the era of the red scare, Oregon voters awarded Dewey victory following a fiery radio debate in which Dewey denounced such a ban as morally un-American and strategically unwise as it would simply force radicals to go underground (Karabell, 2000, p. 96 and 104). While Stassen ended the primary season having carried the most states and Governor Warren, who hardly campaigned outside of California, earned the most raw votes, Dewey earned enough delegates and emerged from the drama relatively unscathed, leaving little doubt that party insiders would favor him at the convention.

1948 Republican Convention

Dewey arrived at the Convention as the clear favorite of party insiders, but his delegate strength was not overwhelming. Conceivably if his rivals played their cards right, they could deny him a first-ballot victory. No previous frontrunner who had failed to secure the nomination on the first or second ballot had ever recovered. Dewey's opponents thus held out some hope of denying him the nomination in the hopes that one of his rivals would emerge as a compromise candidate after many rounds of balloting (Karabell, 2000, p. 141). Dewey's opponents

successfully prevented him from securing the nomination on the first or second ballot, but no clear alternative emerged. Once the second round of balloting was complete, Governor Dewey was just thirty-three delegates shy of victory. The third ballot was then a simple formality as he was nominated unanimously. There was also a bit of drama regarding the party platform. Dewey largely got his way at the expense of the party's hard-right isolationist Taft wing. On domestic matters, the platform was fairly liberal in tone and took the sort of big tent approach to politics that served Dewey well in New York but was also somewhat vague regarding policy specifics (Karabell, 2000, p. 146-148).

Governor Warren soon emerged as the consensus pick for the position of vice president among all of the realistic contenders. Warren, though insisted that he had no interest in the position. Warren was seen as a strong running mate due to his perceived ability to win over disaffected Democrats and a seeming need to balance the ticket geographically to regain ground in the western states lost to New Dealers. Once Dewey secured 515 votes, Governor Warren gave up on his favorite son candidacy. He then arranged for his state's delegates to be awarded to Dewey, helping to put him over the top. A short time later, Dewey approached Governor Warren yet again about joining his ticket, stressing that he would be a powerful vice president and vowing to advocate for a pay raise for the position due to the Governor's modest financial means. In part due to Warren's increasingly strained relations with conservatives in his state putting his political future in doubt, he ultimately accepted Dewey's offer. Warren's liberalism on a host of issues led to rumblings of opposition, with Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) spoiling for a floor fight. Ultimately, cooler heads prevailed, and while the party's right flank was not overjoyed with the ticket, Republicans of all stripes felt their victory in November was all but assured (Katcher, 1967, p. 221, 225-228).

Dixiecrat Rebellion

The Southern Democrats led by Governor Strom Thurmond preferred the label State's Rights Democrats or Jeffersonian Democrats used in their campaign materials. Thurmond's faction would be better remembered under the label of Dixiecrat. Oddly, the term Dixiecrat did not originate with the political movement but from the Cogburn's Grill in Columbia, South Carolina. The establishment's breakfast menu included the Dixiecrat, a simple sausage link wrapped in a slice of plain white bread. Local and regional press familiar with the item soon adopted it to describe the upstart political movement, to its founders' dismay (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 97).

In Alabama, in particular, conservative Democrats and future Dixiecrats had been hard at work for some time to undermine Truman. While the state's few noteworthy liberals like populist Governor Jim Folsom toyed with formally challenging Truman, the state party's right flank was hard at work laying the groundwork for a rebellion. Horace Wilkinson, a Democratic elector, party activist, and soon-to-be leader of the Dixiecrat movement, amassed signed pledges from almost all of the state's electoral candidates stating that they would not vote for Truman or any other candidate who supported civil rights. Efforts were then made to promote the candidates who signed the states' rights pledge. After the convention walkout, Dixiecrats scored a significant victory in the state. The Alabama Supreme Court invalidated a recently passed law making it compulsory for electors to support the candidate who carried the state's popular vote opening the door for a slate of unpledged State's Rights electors (Feldman, 2015, p. 214). During the May 4th Democratic primary, voters selected a full slate of eleven anti-Truman electors, including Wilkinson and the infamous Bull Connor (Feldman, 2015, p. 216). Less successful efforts were pursued in other corners of the South. Supporters of the attempts to draft Senator

Byrd lobbied sitting governors and other politicians to support the selection of electors loyal to the South's political interests rather than the National Democratic Party.

Despite little time to organize and a shoestring budget, the Dixiecrat forces managed to stage their own party convention in Birmingham, Alabama dubbed the Conference of States Rights Democrats. The event drew around six thousand attendees, with as many as seven and a half thousand more spectators crowding the sidewalks outside (Feldman, 2015, p. 237). While the turnout was impressive given the short notice, the audience and delegates numbers were padded by state bureaucrats given the day off as well as businessmen already in Birmingham attending to other matters (Karabell, 2000, p. 167). Several former southern politicians were in attendance, including four former governors. On the other hand, active politicians were more hesitant to attend out of fear of losing standing within the party if things went poorly. This hesitancy did not extend to Mississippi, though with most of the state's congressional delegation in attendance, including Senators Stennis and Eastland. Outside of the Deep South, however, the organizers struggled to be taken seriously. The states of Florida, Texas, and Arkansas sent only modest delegations, which included few individuals of note. Tennessee and Virginia's delegations were more modest still. Georgia, Kentucky, and North Carolina meanwhile sent virtually no one. The powerbrokers and political bosses of the South were also absent. Boss Crump of Tennessee pledged his personal support to Thurmond but was unwilling to put his prestige on the line to push the state's Democratic Party machinery to follow his lead. The illustrious Senator Byrd seemed to want it both ways by withholding any sort of presidential endorsement despite his wife and members of his political machine arriving at the convention with his seemingly implicit support (Feldman, 2015, p. 230-31).

Thurmond soon arose as the obvious contender for the fledgling parties' nomination though other candidates were considered, such as Arkansas Governor Ben Laney. Governor Laney was reportedly so torn on whether to associate with the movement that he told reporters that he would not attend only to arrive in Birmingham. Once there, he got cold feet and remained in his hotel room rather than attend the convention (Feldman, 2015, p. 239). Governor Jim Folsom of Alabama was also said to desire a spot on the parties' ticket or at least a seat at the table. With Folsom's political fortunes at a particularly low point, the fledgling party had little use for him (Feldman, 2015, p. 249). The group courted Senator Russell, but he declined being too much of a party loyalist despite holding some sympathy for the cause (Fite, 1991, p. 239). Former Governor Frank Dixon of Alabama was also approached for a place on the ticket. Governor Dixon had been a good government reformer during his single term in office, but his politics had drifted toward the hard right since retiring. Instead of accepting, Dixon called Thurmond to offer him the position. Thurmond requested time to think it over but eagerly accepted after a mere hour of contemplation (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p.111).

Although Thurmond's opposition for civil rights would become fiery enough to rival George Wallace, he was a bit of an unusual standard-bearer for the southern conservatives. Governor Thurmond's record was fairly progressive, and he was initially viewed as more or less a New Dealer in contrast to other prominent southern leaders like Senator Harry Byrd (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 97). The campaign marked a stark turning point in his political career, moving his politics steadily to the right. Thurmond occasionally denounced explicit white supremacy on the campaign trail but considered seemingly any federal action to foster civil rights despotic (Aaseng, 1995, p. 92-93). If Thurmond began the campaign worried about the Dixiecrats coming off as too overtly racist, his running-mate Mississippi Governor Fielding

Wright had no such qualms. Like Thurmond, Governor Wright was something of a progressive reformer whose administration focused on infrastructure and increasing teacher pay. On the issue of Jim Crow, however, he refused to move even an inch. In some ways, Wright had informally kicked off the Dixiecrat crusade with his inaugural address being highlighted by attacks on Truman and challenging Southern Democrats to formally leave the party and create something new. Wright's political organization was also the most extensive, having already spent the spring raising money and distributing Dixiecrat literature and paraphernalia (Karabell, 2000, p. 46 and 109).

Some Dixiecrat leaders hoped to conduct a professional convention based around libertarian small-government principles and relatively free of explicit appeals to white supremacy (Barnard, 1974, p. 116). Undermining Thurmond's efforts toward respectability were the motley crew of demagogues and figures more extreme than the average race-baiting southern politician such as Alfalfa Bill Murray, the former Governor of Oklahoma. Murray arrived at the convention to sell copies of his white supremacist tome, *The Negro's Place in the Call of Race* (Feldman, 2015, p. 237). Gerald L.K Smith, the leader of the fascist America First Party, was also in attendance. Thurmond and the other organizers prevented Smith from securing a speaking role or any other legitimacy (Karabell, 2000, p. 167). Those crowding the Birmingham streets near the convention also celebrated by hanging Truman in effigy (Feldman, 2015, p. 239).

While the Dixiecrat's efforts bore fruit in the Deep South, the Thurmond campaign experienced difficulty persuading Democrats holding federal office to support the ticket openly. Officeholders who openly supported Thurmond hailed all but exclusively from the Deep South, such as Alabama Congressmen George Andrews, George Huddleston, Laurie Battle, George Grant, and Albert Rains (Feldman, 2015, p. 271 and 282). Senators Lister Hill and John

Sparkman of Alabama, in contrast, privately voted for the state's unpledged electors but refused to stump for the Thurmond Wright ticket (Hamilton, 1987, p. 160). Additionally, ardent civil rights opponents like Senator Harry Byrd refused to formally desert the party and stayed neutral in the contest. High-profile southerners with ties to the Roosevelt Administration, like former Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes of South Carolina, also remained loyal to Truman (Feldman, 2015, p. 211). As election day neared, a few southerners like Governor Folsom, who had flirted with the movement, reconsidered and announced their support for Truman. In Folsom's case, this reversal did little to aid Truman, as Folsom failed in his efforts to get loyalist electors onto the ballot (Feldman, 2015, p. 249).

Despite the long odds, Governor Thurmond viewed himself as a serious presidential candidate. In speeches and campaign paraphernalia Thurmond boasted that the Dixiecrats could count on winning a minimum of 100 electoral votes. This figure would presumably be enough to trigger a contingent election in which they believed Thurmond would be well-positioned to emerge as the next president or exert concessions from the eventual winner. In speeches and campaign materials, the Dixiecrats considered simply blocking Truman's reelection to be a partial victory. If their efforts proved sufficient to kneecap Truman's candidacy but insufficient to gain concessions from Republicans in a contingent election, Dixiecrats boasted that this would force the national Democrats to once again cater to southern priorities (States' Rights Democrat, 1948). Other Dixiecrat leaders did not universally share these assessments. Figures like Wilkinson argued that the project's point was not to form a viable third party but to pry control of state party machinery away from the hands of party loyalists and return it to the hands of state's rights Jeffersonian Democrats (Feldman, 1995, p. 132).

Beyond the Deep South, the ticket was rarely covered or taken seriously, with the few that did like the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Hartford Courant* doing so primarily out of respect for Thurmond's relatively progressive record as governor. Thurmond's distinguished military record, which included the Purple Heart, Legion of Merit, and Bronze Star among other honors, also earned the governor some grudging respect among the media and politicians. Seemingly bothered by the blatant racism on display at the Dixiecrat Convention, Thurmond stressed that he was a progressive southerner in early interviews. Additionally, Thurmond was eager to point out the tepid advances African Americans had made under his administration (Karabell, 2000, p. 54 and 169). These overtures garnered him faint praise among the more progressive southern publications as a sincere advocate of state's rights, but Thurmond's rhetoric did little to distract from the Dixiecrats having the public support of the vast majority of Klan chapters and the regions other extremist groups (McGill, 1948, p. 16). African American publications meanwhile took the threat of Thurmond's candidacy very seriously (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 112-113). As the campaign wore on, only about sixteen percent of southern daily newspapers opted to endorse Thurmond with a roughly identical figure backing Dewey and the remainder that gave endorsements reluctantly sticking with Truman (Karabell, 2000, p. 227).

Seeking to make inroads beyond his base in the Deep South, Thurmond viciously attacked Democratic Party leadership and, in speeches and campaign paraphernalia, accused Truman of "Stabbing the South in the back." That said, Thurmond was careful to rarely attack rank and file voters or rank and file officeholders still loyal to the national party (Feldman, 2015, p. 217). That said Thurmond was careful to rarely attack rank and file voters or rank and file officeholders still loyal to the national party (Feldman, 2015, p. 217). Anticipating that southern Democratic members of Congress would be too worried about risking seniority and pork to

gamble by openly backing his campaign, Governor Thurmond hoped for the support of other state officials whose political fortunes were less entangled with the national party. For a time, the Governors of Virginia, Texas, and Arkansas followed the early stages of the Dixiecrat movement with interest. Ultimately, William Tuck of Virginia, Beauford H. Jester of Texas, and Ben Laney of Arkansas decided to place party loyalty above any sympathy they had to the cause or Thurmond personally (Feldman, 2015, p. 230). Tennessee, in particular, showed little interest in the rebellion, with the state's Governor James McCord opposing the movement from the start (Karabell, 2000, p. 58). Most southern Congressmen preferred to say as little as possible on the matter, but Al Gore, Sr., stood out for his harsh criticism of the movement (Feldman, 2015, p. 239). Despite this relative lack of support, some electors pledged to the Democratic nominee threatened to become faithless and side with Thurmond (Karabell, 2000, p.223-224).

Dixiecrat's organizational ability and control of the party machinery in Deep South states like Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina, allowed them to replace Truman with Thurmond as the official Democratic candidate. In Alabama, Truman's name was completely removed from the ballot, while in South Carolina and Mississippi, Truman was classified as the nominee of the National Democratic Party. Beyond these few strongholds, the Dixiecrats' institutional power was minimal. It was not even a guarantee that they could get Thurmond on the ballot at all in every state of the old Confederacy. Faced with the real possibility that Thurmond would not appear on the ballot in North Carolina, Dixiecrats had to organize a legal challenge and rely on a sympathetic state Supreme Court to rule in their favor (Feldman, 2015, p. 248).

Virginia Governor Tuck, likely with the blessing of Senator Byrd, sought to have the names of presidential candidates removed from the state ballot and replaced with their electors to bolster Thurmond. The bid sparked sufficient backlash that it was not adopted. With the failure

of this maneuver, the Byrd Organization was forced to mostly stay neutral regarding the presidential race. The Organization feared that openly supporting the Dixiecrats would divide the powerful political machine allowing Republicans to gain ground. Members of the Byrd Organization in potentially tough races such as Congressman Howard Smith publicly supported Truman. As the campaign began to look more competitive, some in the Byrd Organization supported the idea of empowering the state's electors to become faithless to force concessions from the winner. Byrd himself refused to support the concept publicly, and it proved moot once Truman won a solid victory in both the state and the Electoral College overall (Heinemann, 1996, p. 257-258, 261, 262 and 264).

In Louisiana, Dixiecrats were initially successful at removing Truman's name from the ballot and labeling Thurmond as the official Democratic candidate. Governor Earl Long responded to this development by calling a special session of the state legislature to restore Truman's presence (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 112). What resulted was a compromise in which Truman would regain the Democratic ballot line, and Thurmond would be listed under the States Rights moniker. Thurmond was also allowed to have the rooster mascot used by the Louisiana Democratic Party placed beside his name. This compromise was seen as a great victory for Thurmond. Dixiecrats assumed that illiterate and semi-literate voters would simply vote for the candidate who shared the familiar southern mascot (Karabell, 2000, p. 223). Throughout much of the South, the rooster was the Democratic Party mascot rather than the donkey and was sometimes accompanied by racist imagery such as the Alabama emblem, which included the slogan "White Supremacy for the Right" above the head of the rooster (Bass and DeVries, 1995, p.74). After African American voter participation began to modestly increase in

the early 1960s, the “White Supremacy” slogan was dropped from the insignia (Jenkins, 1966, p. 5).

Dixiecrats also faced difficulties in Georgia where Thurmond’s relative Herman Talmadge and his political machine decided against putting their finger on the scale for the Dixiecrats. Talmadge initially favored replacing Truman with the Dixiecrat ticket but was opposed by Senator Russell’s faction (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 113). The Talmadge and Russell factions ultimately compromised. Truman maintained his status as the official party nominee while voters were also given the option to vote for Thurmond’s new party (Karabell, 2000, p. 223-224).

Fundraising was another issue for the Dixiecrats financing was often a truly nickel and dime affair. Aside from small donations, much of the fundraising came from sponsored luncheons and the sale of paraphernalia like campaign buttons. That said, the group enjoyed the largesse of the southern oil industry and some of the business community. Southern oil interests were bitter toward the Truman administration over the issue of ownership of tideland oil off the coast of the Gulf States, with the Supreme Court recently ruling in favor of the federal government. As these oilmen had limited connections with the Republican Party, they opted instead to support the Dixiecrats. Governor Thurmond was often accompanied on the campaign trail by a prominent oil executive or two. This funding likely hurt the Dixiecrats as much as it helped them, as unsympathetic news reporters and Democratic loyalists were able to write off Thurmond as being little more than a tool of big business. Unfortunately for historians, the Dixiecrats bookkeeping was haphazard to the point that staff worried about being investigated under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (Karabell, 2000, p. 172-174 and 226).

By the fall, it became apparent that the Dixiecrat campaign had fallen well short of its goals. The Dixiecrats seized control of Democratic Party machinery in only three states. Beyond the South, the fledgling party gained ballot access in only a few states with lax requirements. Thurmond's dreams of waging a national campaign also failed to come to pass. The campaign spent most of its time trying to boost support in states that were only semi-sympathetic to the cause, like Virginia, Texas, and Georgia. Thurmond managed only one excursion beyond the South, giving speeches in New York City and Boston largely for publicity as the party lacked ballot access in these states. Campaign activity in Maryland, a border state where Dixiecrats expected some sympathy, yielded few dividends as Thurmond rotated between moderating his position and viciously tearing into the state's officials for supporting Truman (Karabell, 2000, p. 223-224). Despite these shortcomings, Dixiecrat loyalists put the number of federal officials who openly supported the ticket at thirty-nine members of the House and eight members of the Senate (McCorvey, 1960, p. 100).

Progressive Rebellion

In addition to Democrat's southern flank largely joining the Dixiecrat rebellion, the parties left flank flirted with supporting the third-party candidacy of former Vice President Henry Wallace. Henry Wallace had long been the favorite of the most ardent New Dealers, with a smattering of clubs supporting a future presidential candidacy popping up as early as 1936 (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 162). Henry Wallace also had some claim to being the true political heir of FDR rather than Truman. While he was deliberating over the question of seeking a third term FDR was said to be willing to step aside for Henry Wallace to pursue the presidency but decided against it as the party was very unlikely to coalesce behind him (Culver and Hyde, 2000,

p. 181). After losing the vice presidency to Truman, progressives and the far left of American politics pushed Henry Wallace to form a new party, but he initially resisted.

Following World War II, Henry Wallace's views on American foreign policy grew increasingly heated. Henry Wallace believed Truman's administration was needlessly meddling in the Soviets' sphere of influence and inflaming tensions. This eventually led to Henry Wallace being asked to resign. When asked about Henry Wallace's leftward lurch, Truman tended to demure and simply state that he did not want to run anyone out of the party. Democrats and Republicans politicians increasingly accused him of being a witting or unwitting pawn of the Kremlin (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 439-40). Once out of office, Henry Wallace's writings and speaking engagements attracted thousands of fans but eroded his standing among rank and file Democrats, making a primary or convention challenge to Truman virtually impossible (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 443-444). As such, the former Vice President left the Democratic Party and declared his independent presidential candidacy at the end of 1947. This move cost him previous allies in the labor movement and New Dealers like Senator Claude Pepper. On the other hand, the decision endeared him to the far left, with the head of the Communist Party USA endorsing the bid (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 452-43 and 456).

As the Truman camp dealt with the prospect of conservative southerners costing Democrats the Electoral College, Henry Wallace initially seemed an even greater threat. He initially emerged as a media darling among liberal-leaning journalists. Additionally, his often large-scale events attracted him considerably more media attention than the Dixiecrats. Henry Wallace's movement initially appeared to be on the march. Leo Isacson, an especially progressive congressional candidate that Henry Wallace backed in a New York special election, emerged victorious, running under the banner of the American Labor Party. The American Labor

Party's other representative in Congress, New York's Vito Marcantonio, also supported Henry Wallace (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 461-463).

Henry's Wallace's campaign garnered further creditability with the addition of a sitting Senator to the ticket. Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) was courted but refused to leave the Democratic Party. Senator Glen Taylor (D-ID) had no such qualms and eagerly joined the ticket. Like Henry Wallace, Senator Taylor was an atypical political figure who had gotten by during the Great Depression as a country-western singer and by performing somewhat saucy song and dance numbers alongside his wife. Taylor parlayed his regional fame into political forays. After being elected to the Senate, Taylor garnered attention due to his status as the body's most liberal member, cowboy persona, and tendency to amuse the press with original songs. As a result of these developments, many concluded Henry Wallace would all but surely splinter the liberal vote tipping the Electoral College in Thomas Dewey's favor (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 461-463 and 485).

Progressive and Dixiecrat forces came to a fiery confrontation when the infamous Bull Connor roughed up and arrested Senator Taylor for attempting to enter a Birmingham meeting through the "colored" entrance (Hamilton, 1987, p. 156). Southern leaders alternatively reacted to this episode with glee and disgust. Senator Sparkman (D-AL), who had been walking a tightrope so as not to anger the Dixiecrats or the national party, opted to publically congratulate Connor on the arrest of his colleague (Feldman, 2015, p. 218). Sparkman's move was especially hurtful for Henry Wallace. Sparkman had been among the few senators who enjoyed the vice president's company, with the two having been exercise partners only a few years prior (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 255). Senator Hill (D-AL), one of Henry Wallace's few high-profile allies in

his initial bid for the vice presidency, similarly refused to condemn the arrest (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 469).

While Truman virtually ignored the Dixiecrats, Henry Wallace and his Progressives clashed with them in the South. In more of a publicity stunt than a serious effort to gather votes, He opted to campaign in the South more extensively than Truman. During these events, Henry Wallace was generally greeted by vicious crowds armed with eggs and vegetables to throw at the various speakers when they were not preoccupied with shouting Thurmond's name. The campaign felt there was some chance that Henry Wallace's anti-establishment record could appeal to some portion of Dixie rebels. His insistence on speaking to integrated crowds and explicitly courting the region's small number of African Americans who successfully exercised their right to vote trumped any goodwill he may have earned with his denunciations of Wall Street. Events occasionally turned truly violent, with the National Guard firing into the air to stave off a rowdy crowd in North Carolina. A student volunteer for Henry Wallace was also slashed multiple times with a knife during the event. Only in Mississippi was Henry Wallace given adequate police protection as Governor Fielding Wright had a vested interest in supporting minor presidential candidates' right to safely speak on the campaign trail (Karabell, 2000, p. 230-233).

When it came to ballot access Henry Wallace's Progressive Party had considerably more success than the Dixiecrats, earning ballot access in every state but Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Illinois (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 498). The Progressives were also able to capitalize on most southern states lowering their ballot access requirements to accommodate the Dixiecrats (Karabell, 2000, p. 235). In Alabama, where Truman was completely denied ballot access, voters

could opt to vote for electors pledged to the Dixiecrat, Republican, Progressive, or Prohibition tickets (Loveman, 1983, p. 57).

Taking a page from the Dixiecrat playbook, Progressives also sought to supplant Truman on the ballot in Minnesota, where they had significant support among the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party. After political jousting between Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey and the state's former Governor Elmer Benson, Humphrey's faction emerged victorious, preventing the scheme. In the state of Ohio, voters could technically vote for electors pledged to the Progressive Party, but they were not clearly labeled. The Ohio Secretary of State had sought to use arcane state laws to purge the Progressives from the ballot for allegedly holding un-American positions (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 498). This unclear labeling in Ohio may have had a determinative outcome as it resulted in tens of thousands of spoiled ballots, which potentially shifted the outcome in Truman's favor (Edwards, 2004, p. 20). Seeing the writing on the wall, most Progressive Party candidates for lower offices dropped out by the fall so that activists would not have to pass up the opportunity to support especially liberal Democrats in competitive races (Karabell, 2000, p. 236).

1948 General Election

The Dixiecrat's efforts were most successful in Alabama, where unpledged electors won all 11 of the state's electoral slots resulting in Alabama being the only state where Truman did not appear on the ballot (Hamilton, 1987, p.157). Dixiecrats' victory in the state was a testament to the organizational ability of figures like Horace Wilkinson and Gessner McCorvey. While the average Alabama voter was undoubtedly conservative on racial issues, to put it politely, these voters had also elected arguably the most economically liberal congressional delegation of any

southern state (Feldman, 2015, p. 102). Thus, the Dixiecrats' political maneuvering may well have prevented nontrivial numbers of voters from siding with Truman had they been given the option. Liberals and labor interests in Alabama attempted to get a slate of Truman electors onto the ballot but failed due to how slowly they organized compared to the Dixiecrats (AP, 1948, p. 3).

Thurmond received 1,169,021 raw votes and carried Louisiana, South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi. Henry Wallace, in contrast, carried no state and garnered 1,157,172 popular votes. In terms of electoral votes, the Dixiecrat ticket earned 38 votes (Karabell, 2000, p. 254). When the Electoral College met, the Dixiecrat's total grew to 39 electoral votes as a result of the actions of a faithless elector from Tennessee who had publicly campaigned for the Dixiecrat ticket despite being a Truman elector (Agrawal, 2016).

Truman's victory vindicated the advice of White House Counsel Clark Clifford. At the onset of the campaign, Clifford recommended that embracing civil rights reforms would boost African American votes enough in the North to offset any corresponding losses in the South. Truman's decision to call the Republican-led Congress into special session and demand it pass the agenda embraced at the Republican Convention won him national attention and gave his "Do Nothing Congress" attacks new credibility after it failed to pass any meaningful legislation (Feldman, 2015, p. 251). Rather than fight for the principles championed in the GOP's new platform, anti-poll tax legislation was killed by Southern Democrats, with Republicans putting up little fight, and conservative Republicans defeated progressive legislation regarding education, housing, and social security. To Dewey's dismay, Republicans largely failed to pass token or messaging bills dealing with these issues, with the exception of a minor housing bill (Karabell, 2000, p.167-168).

Truman also benefited from overconfidence on the part of the Dewey campaign. Based on the belief that Dewey's victory was all but assured thanks to solid poll numbers and Truman's coalitional problems, Dewey ran a lackluster, largely issueless campaign. Dewey's previous presidential bid had been heavily criticized for being overly aggressive and negative. The most infamous example being his insinuation that FDR had betrayed the nation and allowed the bombing of Pearl Harbor. As such, Dewey opted for a different strategy in 1948, rarely attacking Truman and sticking to broad generalities aimed at making him come off as presidential (Karabell, 2000, p. 189 and 200).

Ironically the Dixiecrat backlash may have also helped Truman by making his civil rights' commitment come off as sincere rather than election-year bluster. African Americans, urbanites, and civil rights proponents who may have otherwise voted for Dewey, Henry Wallace, or simply stayed home may have interpreted Truman's civil rights promises as meaningful if he was willing to risk splitting his party (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 496). Rhetorically, Dewey essentially ceded the civil rights issue to Truman by not campaigning on his sponsorship of state-level anti-discrimination laws and political patronage of African Americans (Smith, 2014, p. 525). This analysis was seemingly given credence by Gallup estimates suggesting that as many as one-third of Henry Wallace supporters broke for Truman (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 500). By virtually writing off the South aside from modest campaigning in North Carolina, the Truman team was also free to concentrate its efforts on the Midwest and farm country. Truman campaigned extensively in states like Iowa and Colorado, which flipped from the Republican column (Karabell, 2000, p.187 and 246). Once all the votes were tallied, Truman garnered 24, 105, 812 popular votes to Dewey's 21, 970, 065, or 303 electoral votes to Dewey's 189. On the down-ballot, Democrats also made considerable pickups regaining control of both bodies of

Congress (Karabell, 2000, p.254). This showing put Truman well ahead of the then 266 electoral votes needed to secure the presidency as Alaska and Hawaii had not yet been admitted as states (McCorvey, 1960, p. 92).

While Truman's victory looks fairly substantial at first glance, things could have turned out quite differently if one looks deeper. Five states were decided by less than a percentage point. Had Governor Dewey netted just 20,000 or so additional votes in Ohio and Illinois, with the other outcomes remaining the same, he would have emerged victorious in the Electoral College (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 114).

What if the House had Decided the Outcome in 1948?

The question of how a deadlock in the Electoral College would have been resolved merits investigation due to Thurmond boasting for years after the contest that he could have won a contingent election in the House (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 114). Gressner McCorvey, an architect of the Dixiecrat movement, also later argued that a reasonably well-informed political observer could see multiple pathways to a deadlocked Electoral College. He claimed Dixiecrat's miscalculation was overestimating Republican support in the Midwest and slightly misjudging Dixiecrat's strength in the South (McCorvey, 1960, p. 92).

If a contingent election had been triggered, Democrats would have gone into the process in a strong position. Democrats had won a massive victory in congressional elections picking up a total of 75 seats, thereby putting the ball in their court. Democrats were the majority in 25 House delegations compared to Republicans 20, with three states, Montana, Idaho, and Connecticut, split evenly. As the ultimate victor would require only 24 states without even looking at DW-NOMINATE scores, one can presume that unless Dewey had strong crossover

appeal, one of the two nominal Democrats would have emerged victorious (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 115).


It is, of course, impossible to know for sure if those ideologically closer to Thurmond would have gone through with supporting the Dixiecrat ticket in a contingent election or if national Democrats could buy off their support. Some historians, specifically Jack Bass and Marilyn Thompson, have argued that party loyalty would have won out, particularly in states like Louisiana and Alabama, where the governors and other power players supported Truman (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 115). Such arguments are not without merit, particularly concerning Louisiana, where the Long machine was better organized than the Dixiecrat movement. If Dixiecrat sympathetic Congressmen had followed through anywhere other than Mississippi and Thurmond's home state of South Carolina, it would have been Alabama. As previously noted, much of the Alabama delegation was already on record as endorsing Thurmond. The Dixiecrats were also very organized and committed in Alabama, with the state serving as one of the springboards for the movement.

To shed light on the viability of Dixiecrats' contingent election strategy the ideological preferences of members of Congress must first be determined. DW-NOMINATE will be employed in order to approach this question. The system estimates members of Congress ideology by tracking patterns in roll call votes. The parametric scaling procedure uses aye or nay votes in Congress to estimate specific parameters by utilizing maximum likelihood estimation. The procedure establishes ideal points representing members' most preferred outcomes based on observed behavior in roll call votes. Ideologically similar legislators are then separated from their opponents. Representatives' observed ideology based on roll call behavior is arranged on a plane ranging from negative one to positive one. Furthermore, the policy issues of roll call votes are

organized into two dimensions, with the first dimension relating to economic issues and the second dimension often capturing disputes involving race relations. Political observers have typically interpreted scores to the left of zero as conveying a politician's liberalism, scores to the right of zero as conveying conservatism, and scores clustered closer to zero as representing centrism (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). During the period in question, the first dimension is understood to refer to economics, while the second is associated with civil rights (Poole and Rosenthal, 2009, p. 59).

During the highlighted period, most members of Congress were negative on one dimension and positive on the other. The bulk of Republicans earned conservative scores on economics and liberal civil rights scores, with the reverse being the case for most Democrats. Only a small number of New England Republicans were liberal on both dimensions and will be referred to as Rockefeller Republicans. Meanwhile, a slightly larger number of mostly Southern Democrats earned conservative scores on both dimensions and will be referred to as Dixiecrats. The Republican ranks also contained a cohort of ultra-conservatives with positive scores along both the economic and civil rights dimensions. Representatives with scores ranging between 0.2 and -0.2 have lastly been labeled as Centrists. Per their DW-NOMINATE scores, the 81st Congress contained 289 Cross Pressured members with positive or negative scores along one of the dimensions, 13 Conservative Republicans, 3 Rockefeller Republicans, 20 Centrists, 39 Dixiecrats, and 66 Liberal Democrats (Figure 1).

Figure 1



81st United States Congress Factions


Fortunately, in the 1948 contest, all three presidential candidates who received electoral votes have either their own DW-NOMINATE scores or reliable proxies. Truman's score for the 81st US Congress was a liberal -0.276 on the economic dimension and a centrist 0.044 score on civil rights. As the Governor of New York rather than a member of Congress, Thomas Dewey lacks his own personal DW-NOMINATE score. A proxy for Dewey's preferences is available, in the form of Senator John Foster Dulles, who Dewey appointed to fill a vacancy in the state's Senate delegation (Smith, 1982, p. 552). Senator Dulles earned a centrist 0.029 score on economics and an extremely liberal score on civil rights of -1. At first glance, this may seem to place Dewey as far too progressive on civil rights matters. Unlike Truman, who largely ignored civil rights issues until running for president in his own right, Dewey pursued integration in his

state, African American political appointments, and catered to a sizeable pool of African American voters (Smith, 1982, p. 490). When averaged together, New York's Republican delegation was also quite progressive on the subject, with the average score being -0.52. Future Senators Jacob Javits and Kenneth Keating, for example, nearly earned a score of -1 as well. Due to Thurmond's status as a governor during the 1948 election cycle, he also lacks a proper nominate score. Six short years later, Thurmond would enter the United States Senate; thus, his score from his first term in the Senate is used as a proxy for his positions during the 1948 cycle. Thurmond's scores place him as the most conservative of the three candidates on both economics and civil rights, with a score of 0.107 on the first dimension and 0.797 on the second dimension.

Before proceeding, it is worth noting how the candidates compared to the House of Representatives overall (Figure 2). When looking at the body's overall score, it averages out to being centrist on both dimensions (-0.02, 0.08). As such, Truman would have gone into a hypothetical contingent election best reflecting the positions of the body. Like Truman, the body was center-left on economics and center-right on civil rights. Dewey's progressivism on the second dimension was wildly out of step with the body, as was Storm's intense conservatism. Due to Democrat's healthy ranks in general and control of twenty-five state delegations, the most pertinent question is which candidate best appealed to the majority faction. Overall, Democrats DW-NOMINATE average stood at a center-left -0.217 on economics and a centrist 0.077 on civil rights. Truman was thus somewhat to the left on economics compared to the Democratic caucus overall score but almost perfectly in line on civil rights. Thurmond, meanwhile, was well to the right of the party on both counts. Dewey, in contrast, was something of a poor fit for his party's congressional delegation as he was far more centrist on economics than the party's average of 0.25 on the first dimension and far more progressive on civil rights than the parties -0.34. As

such, while an alternative candidate who was more conservative like Senator Taft (0.246, -0.607) likely would have been out of step to the general electorate, he would have been better positioned to cater to the parties' congressional ranks in a hypothetical contingent election.

Figure 2



Visual Representation of the Candidates Positions Relative to the 81st House

Contrary to expectations, an estimation of sincere preference voting using DW-NOMINATE scores does not show the Dixiecrat ticket garnering sufficient support to deny Truman a first-ballot victory. Based on their members' DW-NOMINATE scores Dewey, is estimated to have the support of just two-state delegations. Four state delegations are estimated to have been split evenly thus forced to abstain from the first round of balloting. Thurmond is estimated to have 14 states, specifically the old Confederacy and a few peripheral states like Kentucky and New Mexico. Truman is estimated to carry 28 states and achieve victory on the

first ballot (Figure 3). Based on this estimation, Truman's relative centrism gave him far broader appeal than Dewey and Thurmond, who represented the left and rightmost poles on civil rights.

Dewey's poor showing may lend credence to conservative Republicans' charges that the so-called, Eastern Establishment of moderate to progressive Republicans was out of step with the party at large. While this rough estimation cannot control for the effect of party loyalty or political horse-trading, it should illustrate that while the Dixiecrats had significant fellow travelers in the House, their ranks were likely insufficient to deny Truman a first round victory. Thus while Thurmond could have potentially siphoned away enough electoral votes to trigger a contingent election, it is doubtful that he could have denied Truman a first-round victory. Even assuming every member of the House with ideological positions closer to Thurmond as judged by DW-NOMINATE defied their party hierarchy to support him, it is doubtful that it would have been enough. Truman's New Deal coalition in the House was simply too dominant. Under the assumption of sincere preference, voting for every hard-right Republican Thurmond is estimated to have potentially picked up Truman could pick up sufficient centrist Republicans to cancel out Thurmond's cross-party conservative appeal. Dewey was also simply a poor fit for his party and poorly positioned ideologically to pick up sufficient support to overcome Republicans' deficit in state delegations.

Figure 3

State	Truman	Dewey	Thurmond	Result
AL Delegation			9	Thurmond
AZ Delegation	1		1	Split Delegation
AR Delegation			7	Thurmond
CA Delegation	12	9	1	Truman
CO Delegation	4			Truman
CT Delegation	3	3		Split Delegation
DE Delegation		1		Dewey
FL Delegation			6	Thurmond
GA Delegation			10	Thurmond
ID Delegation	2			Truman
IL Delegation	23	3		Truman
IN Delegation	10	1		Truman
IA Delegation	7	1		Truman
KS Delegation	5		1	Truman
KY Delegation	4		5	Thurmond
LA Delegation			6	Thurmond
ME Delegation	2	1		Truman
MD Delegation	4	1	1	Truman
MA Delegation	7	7		Split Delegation
MI Delegation	12	5		Truman
MN Delegation	8	1		Truman
MS Delegation			7	Thurmond
MO Delegation	11		2	Truman
MT Delegation	2			Truman
NE Delegation	4			Truman
NV Delegation	1			Truman
NH Delegation	2			Truman
NJ Delegation	6	8		Dewey
NM Delegation			2	Thurmond
NY Delegation	27	18		Truman
NC Delegation			11	Thurmond
ND Delegation	2			Truman
OH Delegation	23	4		Truman
OK Delegation	2		6	Thurmond
OR Delegation	3	1		Truman
PA Delegation	18	16		Truman
RI Delegation	2			Truman
SC Delegation			6	Thurmond
SD Delegation	2			Truman
TN Delegation	2		8	Thurmond
TX Delegation			21	Thurmond
UT Delegation	2			Truman
VT Delegation	1			Truman
VA Delegation			9	Thurmond
WA Delegation	3	3		Split Delegation
WV Delegation	6			Truman
WI Delegation	6	4		Truman
WY Delegation	1			Truman
Totals	Truman 28 State Delegations	Dewey 2 State Delegations	Thurmond 14 State Delegations	4 State Delegations Evenly split

Estimated State Delegation Preferences for the 81st House of Representatives

The finding significantly undermines the boasts of the Dixiecrats like Thurmond, who were confident of their prospects in a contingent election. Dixiecrat politicians and academics alike likely misread their prospects. Governor Thurmond boasted that conservative Republicans would join with the Dixiecrats to block Harry Truman, who they both tarred as a socialist if the election was thrown into the House. The movement's intellectual architects like Alabama legal experts Gressner McCorvey and Charles Collins also argued that the era's Conservative Coalition would come together to block Truman if given the opportunity (Collins, 1947, p. IX). Looking at the election under the assumption of sincere preference voting based on DW-NOMINATE casts considerable doubt on these claims. Truman would have gone into a contingent election reflecting the House median with Thurmond and Dewey isolated at the far poles. Dixiecrats also misjudged the significance of their appeal among Republicans. DW-NOMINATE figures identify only a handful of anti-civil rights Republicans that Thurmond could have theoretically made common cause with. Furthermore, Truman is estimated to be ideologically closer to such healthy ranks of Democrats and centrist Republicans that the Dixiecrats could not have even leveraged concessions through denying Truman a first-round victory.

Would Members of Congress Really Defect?

Members of Congress, of course, do not always vote sincerely, with party loyalty and strategic voting also being major factors in a politician's voting behavior. As such, some members ideologically closer to a Dixiecrat candidate may prize party loyalty and the privileges gained by favorable party relationships over their ideological preferences. Members' DW-NOMINATE scores may also result from strategic voting rather than sincere policy preferences (Poole and Rosenthal, 2009, p. 17). For this reason relationships established through DW-NOMINATE matching may not hold up in the real world. Republican members of the Conservative Coalition,

who were ideologically closer to the Dixiecrats than their party's presidential nominee, may not have actually gone through with defecting. The same holds true for Democrats from western states who routinely worked with Dixiecrat types to block or water down civil rights legislation. This informal alliance resulted from western Democrats having few African American voters in their states and little in the way of a local civil rights movement. Southern committee chairmen thus would routinely trade support for western infrastructure projects in exchange for opposition to civil rights (Caro, 2002, 945-51). As such western Democrats found to be ideologically closer to a Dixiecrat presidential candidate may not have been sincerely committed enough to segregation to break with their party's official nominee. DW-NOMINATE matching does not necessarily reveal how many members of the House would actually defect in a hypothetical contingent election, but how many would have an ideological temptation to defect. Because party leaders would not wait to see what happened on the floor, but would be reading the room and surveying their members well in advance of a possible contingent election, this analysis simply illustrates how many members may need to be bought off individually or as a group due to their ideological dispositions beforehand.

Another critical question is if it is realistic to expect that a significant number of House members would risk party sanctions by defecting even if they thought they would be successful in the short run. Because the last contingent election did not occur under the modern party system, a one-to-one comparison is difficult to establish. A potential parallel is the experience of early twentieth-century Progressive Republicans who broke with party leadership. In 1910 a coalition of forty or so, primarily Progressive Republicans, worked with Democrats to weaken the powerful Speaker Joseph Cannon and suffered no formal sanctions. In the 1924 presidential contest, though, twelve Progressive Republicans backed the third party bid of Wisconsin Senator

Robert La Follette and were removed from prestigious committee assignments and stripped of seniority (Cheney and Cheney, 1996, p.134-135 and 152-153). Dixiecrats would thus have reason to believe that if they defected in mass, their cohort would be too large to punish, but if only a handful acted, they would be sanctioned by leadership.

1952 & 1956 Why No Significant Revolt?

Following the Dixiecrat bolt in 1948, it is somewhat surprising that the 1950s were something of a cooling-off period regarding the infighting between conservative southern Democrats and their northern counterparts. In 1960 Senator Harry Byrd unofficially picked up where Thurmond had left off. Governor Wallace, in turn, spent the two following presidential elections scheming to throw the election into the House of Representatives. During the 1950s, Democrats reunited for the most part. The reasons for this turn of events are many. While the Dixiecrats would continue in spirit through Senator Byrd and Governor Wallace as a formal organization, during the 1950s, the party would be stamped out. Democrat's left-wing splinter group, the Progressive Party, would similarly fade away. The rise of Dwight Eisenhower, an American hero and a political novice lacking firm connections to the Republican Party, also made supporting the GOP more palatable for some former Dixiecrats. Once out of power at the executive level for the first time since the Hoover administration, Southern Democrats generally rallied behind the national party as the Red Scare threatened Democrats of all stripes. The Eisenhower administration additionally proved unwilling to play ball on either civil rights or southern patronage. Although a historical footnote that garnered few votes, a small handful of segregationists resurrected the unpledged elector strategy laying the groundwork for Byrd's 1960 pseudo bid for the presidency.

Death of the Dixiecrats

Though unsuccessful, Thurmond's strong showing in 1948 produced a great deal of speculation that the Dixiecrats would endure as a formal party with leaders like Horace Wilkinson immediately began organizing for 1952 (Feldman, 1995, p. 154). Gallup polling of southerners showed roughly a fourth of respondents favoring the continuation of the Dixiecrat Party with over fifty percent opposed and twenty percent in favor of a formal States Rights Democrat and States Rights Republican alliance (Gallup, 1950, p.16). These predictions, however, did not come to pass. While the figures that promoted Senator Harry Byrd's 1960 pseudo presidential candidacy and promoted Wallace throughout the decade were ideologically almost indistinguishable from the Dixiecrats as a formal institution, they were quickly stamped out. As evidenced by their convention being held in the state's largest city, Alabama served as the nexus for the Dixiecrat organization. During the mid-1950s, party loyalists and the cohort of economically progressive figures in the state began to plot the Dixiecrats demise. Though normally a rather mild-mannered politician, compared to the state's firebrands and demagogues, Senator Hill went after the Dixiecrat faction with a rarely expressed maliciousness. Hill is said to have remarked to one of his intimates, "Ben our purpose is to cut the balls off of the Dixiecrat Party. History is not going to record whether we do it with a scalpel or a knife" (Hamilton, 1987, p.183).

In the lead-up to the 1952 presidential election, Democratic Party loyalists in Alabama like Senator Hill launched efforts to out-organize the Dixiecrat faction, which had remained relevant at the state level following the 1948 contest. Between the two presidential elections, loyalists and Dixiecrats jostled for control of state party machinery. Loyalists ultimately robbed Dixiecrats of Alabama as a base of operations when they were able to force a measure ensuring

that Democratic presidential electors were bound by oath to support the national party nominee. This ensured that, unlike in 1948, electors loyal to the national party nominee would appear on the ballot. Dixiecrats challenged the legality of the oath, but a federal appellate court upheld the measure (Feldman, 2015, p. 284). Gessner McCorvey, one of the leading architects of the Dixiecrats, blamed the party's defeat in 1948 on southern politicians caring more about patronage than opposing civil rights, and the loyalist victory strengthened this interpretation (Feldman, 2015, p. 252).

Several factors seem to have prevented the loyalty oaths from being seriously challenged. Democratic loyalists sought to eliminate the need for a splinter faction in the eyes of voters by going further right on civil rights and engaging in more racial demagoguery. Figures like Jim Folsom, who had carved out a niche as both an economic populist and moderate on issues related to race, became even rarer in southern politics. Southern moderates and New Dealers like Senator Hill and Congressman Albert Rains also doubled down on their efforts to make clear to voters that their version of economic progressivism, unlike that of Truman, did not include any advancement on issues of civil rights (Feldman, 2015, p. 280-81). Ironically Folsom's infamous protégée George Wallace learned this lesson too late. In his first run for governor, Wallace was defeated by the Klan's preferred candidate after his campaign largely eschewed racial demagoguery (Grafton and Permaloff, 2021). The Dixiecrats ranks were also diluted by some of the parties' most conservative members beginning to defect to the Republican Party. Tom Abernathy, a prominent newspaper editor and long-time member of the State Democratic Executive Committee, was one of a number of conservatives who left the party at this time (Hamilton, 1987, p. 185). Efforts to organize the Dixiecrats into a formal interest group to

counter liberal organizations like the ADA were undermined by financial difficulties as well as infighting (Henry, 1950, p. 3D).

Despite boasting that he had laid the groundwork for a permanent organization, Thurmond lost interest in third-party politics as he waged a series of Senate campaigns and drifted into the Republican camp in terms of national politics (Karabell, 2000, p. 226). Thurmond's initial defeat in his quest for a Senate seat by an anti-civil rights but otherwise loyalist Democrat Olin Johnson was also perceived by some contemporaries as a critical blow to Dixiecrat prospects (McGill, 1950, p. 1).

By the 1950s, conservative Democratic voters had also become more comfortable splitting their ticket with the almost universally beloved Eisenhower representing the GOP. Aside from Ike's immense popularity, his civil rights record was initially vague, and he proved reluctant to champion substantial civil rights legislation until near the end of his presidency. As such, southerners significantly disillusioned with the Democratic Party had less reason to look for an alternative candidate. While Democrats for Eisenhower organizations were plentiful across the country, those in the Deep South were often organized or funded by former Dixiecrats (Hamilton, 1987, p. 189). Eisenhower's civil rights record was initially so non-threatening to former Dixiecrats that the party's standard-bearer himself, Thurmond, endorsed his ticket (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 140). As for the Dixiecrat diehards who refused to reconcile with the Democratic Party or support Eisenhower, like Horace Wilkinson, they were left with no third option and merely advocated that voters abstain from supporting either candidate in the 1952 presidential election (Feldman, 1995, p. 168).

With the Dixiecrats' most committed activists defanged by factional disagreements in 1952, there was little serious talk of resuscitating the party. Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD), a leading figure in the informal Conservative Coalition, called on Senator Byrd to yet again seek the presidency under the banner of a new party consisting of Jeffersonian Democrats and States Rights Republicans to no avail (Heinemann, 1996, p. 302). A handful of former politicians and politicos like Albert Hawkes (R-NJ) began trying to organize such a party but little came from the efforts ("GOP-Dixiecrat League Is Advocated After '52, 1951, p. 2). At the 1951 National Governors Conference held in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, there was also loose talk of forming a new Dixiecrat-type party if Richard Russell was not on the Democratic ticket the following year. Supporters thought that if they could win over more moderate southern leaders who had not participated in the previous revolt, such as Governor Byrnes and Senator Russell, the movement would be more competitive (St. John, Oct, 7, 1951, p. 15B). Truman's decision to retire and the political maneuvering of Eisenhower and Stevenson sapped much of the enthusiasm away from such movements.

Arguably the Dixiecrats were a victim of their own success. Though they failed to dislodge Truman from the White House, for the most part, they stemmed the tide when it came to civil rights reform. Southern-dominated congressional committees remained a graveyard for civil rights legislation. Aside from minor executive actions, Truman largely pivoted away from civil rights after being reelected. Once Truman was out of the White House, Democrats' highest-profile Congressional leaders, Texans Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn were tepid civil rights advocates at best. Though personally an advocate of civil rights, Adlai Stevenson, the Democrats' 1950s standard-bearer, was more interested in maintaining party unity than

championing civil rights. In terms of policy, the Dixiecrat revolt was relatively successful at orienting the Democratic Party back toward catering to southern interests.

Death of the Progressive Party

Like the Dixiecrats, Henry Wallace's Progressive Party fizzled out during the 1950s as a formal entity. Henry Wallace ignored pleas by party loyalists to immediately seek office again. He also began to feel increasingly estranged from the party as most members returned home to the Democratic Party. This exodus left the party primarily in the hands of socialists and committed communists. Henry Wallace's view that America was largely behind the increasing tensions of the Cold War began to change. In 1952, Henry Wallace privately supported Adlai Stevenson over the Progressive Party's token presidential ticket. Following an anemic performance in 1952, the party formally dissolved three years later. Henry Wallace then flipped back and forth between supporting the Democratic and Republican presidential tickets until his death (Culver and Hyde, 2000, p. 506-508 and 520-522).

1952 and 1956 Democratic Nominations

During the 1950s, southern Democrats enjoyed enhanced prominence in presidential politics. As Truman's star faded, his two chief rivals for the party nomination in 1952 were southerners. Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN), the region's most progressive legislator, gained national standing following a highly publicized congressional investigation into organized crime. Meanwhile, Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) represented southerners whose politics were not so far removed from those of the Dixiecrats. While Senator Kefauver boasted grassroots support, Senator Russell enjoyed the support of much of the southern Democrat establishment regardless

of ideology, with liberals like Senator Hill (D-AL) and moderates like Senator Sparkman (D-AL) being vocal supporters (Hamilton, 1987, p. 187). Russell's candidacy never truly got off the ground. Kefauver dominated the handful of primaries, but the 1952 Convention turned to Adlai Stevenson (Kura, 2001, p. 135).

Governor Stevenson's personal record on civil rights was solid, but to mute opposition, his camp twice agreed to a weak civil rights plank in exchange for southern acquiescence to his candidacy (Hamilton, 1987, p. 218). His platforms tended to support civil rights in principle while rejecting most forms of federal enforcement in order to maintain party unity (Mann, 1996, p.178). Stevenson's choice of running mates also seemed to have helped keep Southern Democrats within the fold. In both of his presidential bids, he selected southern running mates seemingly to prevent the party from fracturing again. In 1952 Harry Truman reportedly lobbied heavily on behalf of Senator John Sparkman. Sparkman was seen as an ideal candidate to both satisfy southerners while offending liberals as little as possible. Unlike the caricatures of southern leaders embodied by the likes of aging conservative patricians such as Byrd, Senator Sparkman was young, from a humble background, relatively progressive on issues not dealing with civil rights, and boasted a mild southern accent. Supporters like President Harry Truman thought he would add a touch of populism to the ticket in contrast to Stevenson's cerebral nature. These moves led to some ill feelings among Southern New Dealers like Senator Hill, who thought they were unfairly passed over after decades of party loyalty (Hamilton, 1987, p. 189). Despite some misgivings among the various party factions regarding the ticket, the 1952 Convention ended with the party far more unified than it was four years prior. Stevenson's attempts at reconciliation had some success with Mississippi Governor Fielding Wright, the Dixiecrat candidate for vice president four years prior, and some other Dixiecrat leaders

reluctantly supporting the official Democratic ticket (Strong, 1955, p. 363). The addition of Sparkman to the ticket also likely headed off plans by Dixiecrats in the Deep South to place unpledged or third-party electors on the ballot if they were unhappy with the ticket that emerged from the convention (UP, May 7, 1952, p. 8). Regardless of this party unity, Stevenson suffered a crushing defeat against Dwight Eisenhower.

In 1956 Adlai Stevenson, who had again emerged as the Democratic nominee, opted to allow the convention to select his running-mate, and again a southerner was chosen. Personally, Stevenson favored the selection of Senator Hubert Humphrey or Senator John F. Kennedy. The advancement of either candidate presented Governor Stevenson with baggage. Humphrey was viewed as too liberal in general for most southerners, and some still harbored ill will toward the Senator for pushing for the civil rights plank in 1948 that sparked the southern bolt. On the other hand, JFK's Catholic faith was seen as a liability, and some party elders regarded him as an upstart or, in the words of Sam Rayburn, a "little piss-ant" (McKeever, 1989, p. 376). Ever concerned with party unity and in the minds of some observers suffering from bouts of indecisiveness, Stevenson opted to leave the decision up to the convention delegates but was confident that JFK would emerge the victor (McKeever, 1989, p. 377).

In a twist of fate, many of the southern conservatives who later opposed Kennedy supported him for vice president. Still, in the progressive populist phase of his political career, Kennedy's supporters included such future foes as Alabama's George Wallace (Leshner, 1994, p. 114). Senator Byrd and his political machine were also firmly in Kennedy's corner for what would be the first and last time (Sweeney, 1991, p. 4). JFK's leading rival for the position was Senator Estes Kefauver, who had given Stevenson a spirited challenge in the primaries. Despite his southern heritage, Kefauver's maverick streak, penchant for sanctimony, and somewhat

progressive views on civil rights resulted in him being loathed by most of his fellow southerners. Sam Rayburn and LBJ, for example, considered him "...the most hated man to serve in Congress for many years" (McKeever, 1989, p. 357). For this reason, the 1956 vice-presidential nomination ironically saw southerners primarily line up behind a fairly liberal New Englander rather than one of their own.

Once the balloting began, JFK was initially in a strong position thanks to a smattering of favorite son candidates siphoning away votes. Kefauver was also squeezed between a rump of liberal supporters for Humphrey and southerners who did not support JFK favoring Tennessee's other Senator Albert Gore, Sr. Gore ultimately threw much of his support to Kefauver, and as the favorite sons and Humphrey pulled out, the overwhelming bulk of delegates shifted to Kefauver. After the second round of balloting, the tally stood at 755 ½ for Kefauver, 589 for JFK, with a dozen or so remaining diehards sticking with Gore and Humphrey. Some in Kennedy's inner circle blamed Stevenson for not stumping on his behalf. Given Eisenhower's landslide victory in November, Kennedy's presidential aspirations likely benefited from not being associated with the defeat (McKeever, 1989, p. 377). JFK's firm support among southern moderates and conservatives left an impression on the young senator. Kennedy joked to reporters that he would be whistling "Dixie" for the rest of his days in gratitude to southern leaders. The experience kicked off Kennedy's long courtship of the South, culminating in his eventual selection of LBJ as his running mate (Sweeney, 1991, p. 4).

In the final analysis, Adlai Stevenson's southern running mates gave him little competitive advantage. Just seeing their native sons get the respect from the national party that many southern voters thought they were owed, though, went a long way in serving Stevenson's goal of maintaining party unity. The presence of a southerner on the Democratic ticket also likely

limited Eisenhower's southern inroads as well as sapped demand for another breakaway campaign. The failed campaigns of Senators Russell and Kefauver also gave segregationists and southern progressives alike the opportunity to compete for power within the party rather than plotting a repeat of previous splinter efforts.

Adlai Stevenson & the South

Adlai Stevenson's approach to politics infuriated some southerners while reassuring others. Unlike some liberals of his era, he was deeply committed to holding the wings of the party together. This project came at the expense of his ardent support for civil rights. While he was willing to modulate his stances, he did not completely reverse them to court southern voters. At the cost of enthusiasm from civil rights advocates for his campaigns, Stevenson was often eager to point to local efforts at rolling back Jim Crow laws and tepid advances in the area of race relations in general. He was also eager to meet with and assuage southern power brokers. He put considerable effort into making allies with relative moderates like Virginia Governor John S. Battle and securing neutrality from figures like Senator Harry Byrd. Southern politicians and voters in general also showed some respect for his promises to be forthright about differences with the region's prevailing opinions, rather than saying one thing on the trail while in the South and another in the rest of the country (McKeever, 1989, p. 222 and 384).

Stevenson also sought to avoid overstepping his bounds as an informal leader of the party. With Democrats out of power for the first time since 1932, the 1950s were an especially fractious time for the coalitional party. Truman retained some influence amongst party bosses and party regulars. He became a figurehead for the liberal wing of the party and intellectuals to rally behind. Congressional Democrats, meanwhile, were dominated by two Texans, Speaker

Sam Rayburn, and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Despite calls to play an active role as leader of the party in exile, he shied away from moves that could be interpreted as challenging Rayburn and LBJ's leadership specifically or the party's southern wing in general. Stevenson also seemed to double down on his go-along-to-get-along approach after some of his liberal allies opposed LBJ as Majority Leader (McKeever, 1989, p. 268- 269).

Eisenhower & the South

Eisenhower's approach to politics similarly attracted some southerners while repelling others. A combination of respect for Eisenhower's war record, discomfort with northern liberals, desire to be on the winning team, and underestimating his commitment to civil rights allowed him to attract southern votes in a way previous Republicans could not. In 1952, for example, 54 major southern newspapers endorsed Eisenhower compared to 24 that supported Dewey four years prior (Nichols, 2007, p. 18). This support stemmed from his reputation and status as the first GOP nominee to campaign in the South in a meaningful way. Nixon later argued that the so-called Southern Strategy really originated from Eisenhower rather than himself (Carter, 1996, p. 26).

Though raised in Kansas, Eisenhower had also been born in the South and spent various periods of his military service in the region, resulting in regional connections and sympathy for southern culture. Eisenhower also cultivated relationships with southerners whose political concerns did not solely revolve around the issue of civil rights. Robert B. Anderson of Texas was one such Southern Democrat who served Eisenhower as Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Treasury. President Eisenhower thought so highly of the Texan that following Anderson's switch to the GOP, he seriously considered elevating him to the position

of vice president and shifting Nixon to Secretary of Defense (McKeever, 1989, p. 378). Such outreach paid political dividends, and by 1956 nontrivial numbers of southern conservatives began to think of themselves as Republicans, at least when it came to presidential politics.

Eisenhower's relative success in the South compared to previous Republicans was due to a variety of factors ranging from his immense personal popularity to Cold War issues decreasing the focus on civil rights. Despite being a committed civil rights supporter, Eisenhower had some skill at massaging southerner's concerns and coming across as a conservative on the matter. Occasionally Eisenhower was not above indulging in racial bigotry himself. When around southern intimates, he showed a tendency to speak the language of the sort of southerner who could accept desegregation in theory but was alarmed by interracial mingling in practice. Despite such episodes, Eisenhower's record on advancing the cause of civil rights was clear. As a military leader, he repeatedly made efforts to mitigate the doctrine of separate but equal within the service as well as supported professional progress for African American troops. Eisenhower's steps toward promoting equality in the armed forces came even as many in the federal government and swaths of the armed forces opposed such measures. In his capacity as the postwar Army Chief of Staff, he began the process of integrating troops before Truman's famed executive order. If Eisenhower had been allowed, it was generally believed that he would have gone further in promoting equality in the forces under his command. These efforts earned him the respect of figures such as Walter White of the NAACP. Reflecting his appeal to both civil rights supporters and opponents alike, Eisenhower also voiced skepticism regarding the merits of total military integration and voiced skepticism that federal legislation could do much to mitigate the problem of racism (Nichols, 2007, p. 9-12).

As a presidential candidate, Eisenhower was skilled at modulating his position on civil rights. On the trail, he simultaneously reached out to African American groups while also describing actions taken by bodies like the Fair Employment Practice Committee or FEPC as being akin to establishing a police state. These statements echoed Thurmond's Dixiecrat rhetoric. When southern supporters produced advertising that overplayed Eisenhower's opposition to civil rights reforms, the campaign opted to ignore it, much to the horror of the General's African American supporters (Nichols, 2007, p. 18). Democrats for Eisenhower groups, particularly in the South, were ready and willing to court the segregationist vote and overplay his devotion to states' rights. Segregationist sentiments were not uncommon in pro-Eisenhower literature and pamphlets in the South. On rare occasions, these efforts veered into Dixiecrat territory with the Memphis chapter of Citizens for Eisenhower using the Confederate battle flag as their insignia. Former Dixiecrats played prominent roles in these organizations, with the highest-profile being the former Dixiecrat standard-bearer Strom Thurmond himself (Mason, 2013, p. 532)

Such episodes did not prevent Eisenhower from praising the efforts of African American Republicans like campaign staffer E. Fredrick Morrow as well as paying close attention to their political advice. The most prominent of these recommendations was to advocate for fully desegregating the District of Columbia, which Truman claimed he lacked the power to do unilaterally. In response, Eisenhower vowed to end racial segregation in all settings where the federal government's authority was supreme. The fact that such civil rights-related pledges came late in the campaign was potentially strategic. Southerners like Governor Byrnes, who crossed the aisle, to support Eisenhower were dismayed by such announcements. Despite their disappointment, it seemed too late in the game to gain anything politically by retracting their endorsements. Once in office, Eisenhower's support for civil rights was also made clear through

low-level appointments of African Americans. Prestigious appointments were awarded to vocal civil rights supporters such as Herbert Brownell and various associates of Governor Earl Warren. Additionally, he retained arguably Truman's most important civil rights-related appointee Phillip Elman who crafted the administration's brief in the case of *Brown v. Board of Education* (Nichols, 2007, p. 20-25).

Once in office, in addition to desegregating the District of Columbia, Eisenhower completed the desegregation of the armed forces. Despite Truman's famed executive order, large swaths of the military slow-walked reform, and it took until roughly 1954 for full integration. Civilian facilities on bases located in the South held out as long as possible. During the 1956 GOP Convention, Eisenhower also intervened to ensure that the Republican platform was as progressive as the Democrats on the issue of civil rights, if not more so. Eisenhower's decision overruled voices in the party who thought civil rights commitments would threaten pickup opportunities in the South and Midwest (Nichols, 2007, p. 135). These efforts earned Eisenhower the enthusiastic endorsement of New York Democratic Congressman Adam Clayton Powell as well as low-level African American officeholders and civil rights advocates in his reelection campaign (Nichols, 2007, p. 42-43 and 50). Congressman Powell's support for Eisenhower resulted in Democrats stripping him of his seniority and committee assignments. This was a punishment leadership did not apply to either the Democrats who supported Thurmond in 1948 or Eisenhower previously (Nichols, 2007, p. 141).

In addition to Eisenhower's support for civil rights, other factors contributed to southern leader's decisions to return to the Democratic fold or stay neutral. The red scare tactics of Republicans like Senator McCarthy helped hold Democrats' various factions together, including Southern Democrats that may have been inclined to support Eisenhower. Eisenhower's

relationship with Governor Jimmy Byrnes, previously one of his strongest southern backers, soured partly due to charges that FDR and Truman era appointees like Harry Dexter White were Soviet collaborators. Byrnes' reputation and support for Eisenhower did not prevent his being called to testify before the House of Un-American Activities Committee on the subject of White and other alleged traitors within the previous Democratic administrations. While southerners like Byrnes were avid anti-communists, these moves were generally seen as political theater and attempts to tar Democrats rather than seriously investigate the presence of Soviet sympathizers in government (McKeever, 1989, p. 320).

Governor Byrnes was not the only Democrat to feel that their reputation was slandered. Red-baiting Republicans cast doubt on the loyalty of all who served in the two previous Democratic administrations, with Senator McCarthy characterizing the era as representing “twenty years of treason.” Moderates like Governor Dewey also charged that the word Democrat should be considered synonymous with “...death and tragedy”. Governor Stevenson seems to have used such heated language to try and hold the northern and southern flanks of the party together by pointing out that all Democrats, regardless of ideology, were under siege. While addressing the Georgia legislature, which was made up almost exclusively of Democrats, Stevenson earned accolades from his audience by accusing the GOP of “...waving not the Bloody Shirt, but the Red Shirt at a former President of the United States.” in reference to harsh attacks on Truman (McKeever, 1989, p. 321-322). Such charges against Democrats’ patriotism likely assisted him in maintaining party unity and blunted Eisenhower’s inroads among cross-pressured Democrats.

Southern Democrats who expected political payoffs for openly or passively supporting Eisenhower in 1952 were generally disappointed. Virtually Eisenhower's only political favor for a southern segregationist supporter was the appointment of South Carolina Governor and former Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes to represent America in 1953 as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. Despite Byrnes' immense qualifications, the appointment of a segregationist Democrat sparked backlash among partisan Republicans, civil rights supporters, and liberals alike. Following the criticism Eisenhower received for this appointment, Byrnes remained something of an intimate. Their relationship, however, became increasingly strained. Eisenhower ignored Byrnes' lobbying for the administration to slow walk integration or carve out exceptions for the South. Byrnes responded by publically opposing Eisenhower's reelection (Nichols, 2007, p. 36 and 53). Louisiana Governor Robert Kennon, who endorsed Eisenhower previously, also broke with him after his anti-integration lobbying fell on deaf ears (Nichols, 2007, p. 59). Eisenhower was said to have mourned the deterioration of his friendships with southern leaders following the *Brown* decision. Though Eisenhower seemed to hold some sympathy for their point of view, he was unwilling to break with the Supreme Court on the matter (Nichols, 2007, p.104-106).

Southern support for Eisenhower among southern elites also declined during his reelection due to disputes over patronage. Southern senators who largely supported Eisenhower on issues like foreign policy came to loath the administration for giving no quarter for segregationists in terms of appointments or other patronage (Buchanan, 1956, p. 355). Long accustomed to being able to dole out judicial appointments to their friends' southern senators learned that Eisenhower enforced a near blanket embargo on appointing known or former segregationists to the judiciary. Almost every Eisenhower appointment to a southern court was

protested by their home state senators. His southern friends, like Byrnes, argued that the embargo punished those who truly believed that doctrines such as separate but equal were sound Supreme Court precedent that had to be respected. Arguments such as these failed to sway Eisenhower on the matter. The small number of exceptions Eisenhower made regarding the appointment of southern Democrats included figures that at the time were considered moderates on race-related issues. This vetting process, however, was not perfect. Judges like Clement F. Haynsworth's rulings later garnered controversy (Nichols, 2007, p. 77, 83, and 88). Conservatives like Senators James Eastland or John Stennis had little love for liberals such as Stevenson or Kennedy, but they could stomach supporting their campaigns to restore their patronage opportunities.

1956 Unpledged Electors

While the strategy amounted to little, a small number of former Dixiecrats who felt burned by both the national Democratic Party and the Eisenhower administration revived the unpledged elector strategy. The ploy gained ballot access in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. In these states, supporters generally had modest resources to spread their message through news-paper editorials, direct mail, along with some radio and television advertising (Taylor, 1956, p. 17E). A rump contingent of Dixiecrats additionally secured ballot access in Kentucky and put forward Senator Byrd as their nominee without his explicit permission (Heinemann, 1996, p. 370).

Organizers of the movement, former federal bureaucrat Thomas Andrews and former California Republican Congressman Thomas Werdel, attempted to expand the movement beyond the South. Andrews and Werdel gained ballot access under various monikers, including the States Rights Party in a handful of northern states with low ballot access requirements (Taylor, 1956, p. 17E). Ultimately the plan accomplished little with the unpledged electors garnering just

shy of two hundred thousand votes and the Andrews and Werdel ticket receiving only a few thousand votes outside of the South. The extent of these Dixiecrats' coordination is unknown, but multiple actors seemed to be in contact with South Carolina Governor Jimmy Byrnes, who they hoped to inspire to expand his unpledged elector advocacy beyond his own state. The groundwork, however, was laid for Senator Byrd's pseudo candidacy four years later, which secured electoral votes and nearly put the outcome of the presidential election in doubt (Heinemann, 1996, p. 370).

The only state where the unpledged slate of electors potentially played a determinative role was South Carolina, where the third option perhaps siphoned away enough conservative voters that Stevenson was able to carry the state. This outcome was the result of Governor Byrnes falling out with Eisenhower over civil rights. At the start of the 1950s, Byrnes had hoped to clean up public perception of the southern faction as more libertarian and intellectual in nature compared to the rabble-rousers and racist demagoguery that defined the Dixiecrats. His efforts to promote Senators Russell and Byrd as presidential contenders, though fizzled out (Stokes, 1951, p. 4).

Byrnes next gravitated to Eisenhower, who he incorrectly perceived as leaning toward the states' rights point of view regarding civil rights. In 1952 Byrnes was instrumental in Eisenhower coming within a few thousand votes of carrying the state. Not only had Byrnes endorsed Eisenhower, but the governor helped implement a brilliant strategy that allowed South Carolina Democrats to support Eisenhower without having to technically cast a ballot for the party of Lincoln. At the time, South Carolina was such a Democratic stronghold that a state Republican Party hardly existed. As a result, Eisenhower's South Carolina supporters lobbied to have him placed on the ballot as an independent. Originally the plan called for having Governor

Byrnes placed on the ticket as his running mate rather than Nixon. Had that aspect of the plan come to pass, Stevenson likely would not have carried the state by the skin of his teeth (Nichols, 2007, p. 140). Nominally Democratic politicians in other southern states also explored placing Eisenhower on the ballot under a different label than Republican (St. John, July 21, 1952, p. 3). The strategy was carried out only in South Carolina and Mississippi, where Eisenhower performed better than any Republican candidate in decades but was still defeated by Stevenson (UP, 1952, p. 79).

By 1956, Byrnes and other Dixiecrat types soured on Eisenhower. Byrnes Instead supported placing a slate of unpledged electors on the ballot that planned to support Senator Byrd for president if they carried the state (Nichols, 2007, p. 140). For vice president, the electors planned to support Mississippi Congressman John Bell Williams, one the most conservative Democrats in the House and a longtime supporter of Dixiecrat politics (Latimer, 1956, p. 13F). For his part in 1956 and 1960, Byrd did not consider himself an active candidate for president. If schemes to promote him truly caught fire, it was also unclear to what degree, if any; he would embrace his status as a pseudo candidate. His backers were undeterred by his reluctance. Supporters like Governor Byrnes, for example, took to comparing him to early American leaders who had office thrust upon them rather than aggressively seeking it themselves (Byrnes, October 26, 1956).

As a result of the plot, down-ballot Democrats dominated their races, and Eisenhower lost the state to Stevenson suffering the indignity of coming in third place in the Palmetto State running behind the unpledged slate (Heinemann, 1996, p. 370). This result was achieved at the expense of a mere 18,000 dollars to promote the state's independent slate of electors (T. Carter, personal communication, November 13, 1956). The episode also marked a major evolution in the

state's political development as such ticket-splitting had long been impossible as the state utilized party rather than secret ballots (Lesesne, 1948, p. B3). Organizers of the unpledged elector movement like Governor Byrnes considered Stevenson's plurality victory less than ideal. In public statements figures like Byrnes took solace in the belief that the unpledged electors' disruptive role would force candidates from the major parties to work harder to cater to the views of South Carolina voters going forward (James F. Byrnes, November 7, 1956).

1956 Faithless Elector

Although the unpledged elector strategy failed to garner any electoral votes in 1956, one Alabama Dixiecrat left his mark by becoming a faithless elector. A series of legal battles were waged regarding whether electors in the state were bound to uphold their pledges or were essentially free agents. In 1956 an elector tested the proposition that the states' electors were free agents. The Alabama Supreme Court previously ruled that the states' electors were empowered to vote their conscience rather than be forced to pledge their support to a victorious ticket. As a result, W.F. Turner refused to cast his ballot for the Stevenson ticket and instead supported one of his local judges Walter Burgwyn Jones for president and Senator-elect Herman Talmadge (D-GA) for vice president (Kura, 2001 p.18). Turner acted independently, and his decision was not a part of some larger strategy to shift the election outcome. The episode illustrated that despite the Dixiecrats dissolving as a formal group, segregationists' desire for an alternative to the two major parties endured. Turner's actions additionally may have inspired Henry Irwin, who four years later launched an effort to change the outcome of the presidential election by lobbying his fellow electors.

1960 Presidential Election

1960 Democratic Presidential Primaries

The 1960 Democratic primaries featured a contest between two upstart liberals aggressively contesting the primaries and two candidates pursuing an insider strategy. The primaries largely pitted Senator John F. Kennedy (D-MA) against Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN). Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson (D-TX) firmly believed that nominees were decided at conventions and restricted his politicking to the sort of backroom horse-trading at which he excelled. Meanwhile, Governor Adlai Stevenson was still highly regarded by party activists and held out some hope that he would be drafted at the convention if no dominant frontrunner emerged.

Following Senator John F. Kennedy's near selection as Stevenson's running-mate, the young senator developed national ambitions. While JFK had a number of strengths ranging from his charisma and family connections, he also had liabilities. Kennedy's Catholic faith, youth, and rumors of poor health meant that he was unlikely to be elevated at a convention. Kennedy thus needed to prove himself through an aggressive primary campaign that would caution insiders against passing him over for a party elder like Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson or Adlai Stevenson (Dallek, 2013, p. 15-16).

Since his time as Mayor of Minneapolis and leader of the ADA, Humphrey was viewed in some liberal circles as worthy of a spot on a presidential ticket. Back in 1948, a handful of politicians considered him vice-presidential material if Truman decided to extend an olive branch to the party's left flank. During the 1950s, Humphrey had been on Stevenson's shortlist of potential running-mates. By 1960 Humphrey's service in the Senate gained him prominence as

he positioned himself as an ardent liberal when it came to economics and civil rights. Humphrey had also proven himself as a pragmatist capable of passing legislation and becoming LBJ's unofficial ambassador to the parties' liberal wing. Humphrey entered the contest as the parties' most liberal candidate and with the grassroots support of younger party activists. That said, he was far from a household name and needed to prove himself against Kennedy in the dozen or so state primaries (Mann, 1996, p. 262).

After a relatively swift rise from backbench member of the House to Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson developed national ambitions. While the most conservative of the serious candidates, LBJ staked his candidacy on his legislative accomplishments, with the most high profile being the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Though rather weak, the Act represented the first major piece of civil rights legislation to pass Congress since Reconstruction and demonstrated LBJ's ability to balance both his parties' liberal and Dixiecrat-style factions. Due to his belief that nominees were selected via conventions, not primaries, and his duties as Senate Majority Leader being a full-time job, LBJ was not an official candidate during the primary stage. Behind the scenes, he solicited delegates to middling success. LBJ's choice of venue when he officially entered the running just days before the Convention epitomized his insider strategy. Rather than announce his home state to great fanfare, he opted for a low-key kick-off at the Senate Auditorium. Though LBJ sometimes described himself as a south-westerner rather than a southerner when the distinction suited him, his campaign was additionally undermined by the fact that since the Civil War, southerners had been all but locked out from serious consideration as presidential candidates (Valenti, 1975, p. 15 and p.49).

To maximize his influence within the party as a policy entrepreneur Stevenson announced that he would refrain from seeking the nomination again shortly after his 1956 defeat (McKeever, 1989, p. 394). Despite this pledge, a rump of liberal supporters never gave up on the dream of a Stevenson presidency. These supporters argued that he deserved the opportunity to take on a Republican that lacked Eisenhower's status as a war hero. Thus a sizeable draft Stevenson campaign consisting of activists and members of Congress siphoned support and energy away from the campaigns of the main contenders. Stevenson, for his part, opted for a path that pleased neither supporters nor rivals in which he refused to campaign for the nomination actively but made it known that he would gladly accept if called on by the 1960 Democratic Convention (McKeever, 1989, p. 416 and 425).

LBJ's role as Senate Majority Leader and his long status as a party insider earned him endorsements. Even former Dixiecrat Senator Thurmond offered LBJ his support, making him the last Democratic presidential candidate he would embrace before leaving the party (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p.189). Similarly, he was the final Democratic presidential candidate that Senator Harry Byrd (D-VA) supported in any significant way (Sweeney, 1991, p. 7). Byrd offered LBJ his support due to both his status as the least liberal of the serious candidates and his close relationship with LBJ's wife Ladybird, with the Texan often joking that the two were secretly dating (Heinemann, 1996, p. 401). Johnson wagered that by calling in chits owed to him by various senators, they would be pressured to round up delegates in their respective states on his behalf. This extended to Republican Senators like Young (R-ND), whom he assumed had some friends within his state's local Democratic machinery. The gamble had only moderate success as LBJ generally overestimated how much pull the average senator had among their states' delegates and politicians (Mann, 1996, p. 263-264).

Because contenders like LBJ played the delegate game, the 1960 Democratic primaries were essentially contests between Senators Kennedy and Humphrey. Given its proximity to his home state of Minnesota, victory in the Wisconsin primary was seen as a given for Humphrey. Kennedy proved this conventional wisdom wrong, however, as he scored a respectable victory. The Humphrey campaign took some solace in the defeat. Humphrey's campaign reasoned that Wisconsin was a state with a significant Catholic population, and Kennedy would not repeat this success later in the primary calendar (McKeever, 1989, p. 438).

Following Kennedy's unexpected victory in West Virginia, the only other primary of note was held in Oregon. Senator Humphrey exited the race shortly after his defeat in West Virginia, making JFK's primary competition the states Senator Wayne Morse. Morse was a maverick who, after leaving the Republican Party to protest McCarthyism and Eisenhower's selection of Richard Nixon as his running-mate, became the chamber's most liberal member. Morse declared his candidacy late, and his organization paled in comparison to JFK's fine-tuned machine. Kennedy carried the state easily, but many insiders felt that Stevenson would have emerged victorious had he only allowed his name to be placed on the ballot. The Kennedys took this chatter seriously enough that a sit-down with Stevenson was arranged. During the meeting regarding his presidential ambitions, Stevenson's lack of candor left the Kennedys believing that he indeed hoped to emerge as a consensus candidate at the upcoming convention (McKeever, 1989, p. 448-449).

1960 Democratic Convention

Following JFK's sweep of the primaries, his campaign went into the convention in a strong position. LBJ had staked his candidacy on an insider approach, and while there was some concern that insiders may defect due to JFK's youth or religious faith, the wind was at his back. Kennedy's intimates, like his brother Robert, felt that the only serious threat was the lingering Draft Stevenson movement. Stevenson's supporters predicted that JFK was about a hundred delegates short of securing the nomination on the first ballot. As long as the other candidates refused to drop out and a fair number of delegates supported Stevenson, his supporters reasoned that party insiders would turn to him as a consensus pick after multiple ballots. Some in his camp even believed that much of both JFK and LBJ's support was soft, and delegates would quickly turn to Stevenson to deny their rival victory. The biggest obstacle to these machinations proved to be Stevenson himself. After explicitly stating he would not seek the nomination again, he felt declaring himself as a candidate would mean breaking his word. He felt that he could not overtly seek the nomination but only accept it if the convention turned to him. As a result of this conviction, Stevenson declined many overtures by delegates and party insiders who could throw support his way if only he would formally declare (McKeever, 1989, p. 441, 451, 454, and 456).

The Draft Stevenson movement endured numerous stops and starts as the convention moved forward. Stevenson's supporters like Senator Humphrey made moves to secure delegates, but only so many were willing to take the plunge for an undeclared candidate. The night before balloting began, advisors believed that Stevenson would finally declare or at least work the phones and court delegates himself after he warmly addressed his diehard supporters. After making the address, Stevenson simply went to bed. The next day Speaker Rayburn nominated LBJ to modest fanfare (McKeever, 1989, p. 460 and 461). LBJ had formally declared his

candidacy shortly before the convention. His only formal campaign activity was a debate between himself and Kennedy. The debate allowed both candidates to trade barbs but was largely cordial. This single clash offered Johnson no real opportunity to halt JFK's momentum or build himself up in the eyes of delegates (McKeever, 1989, p. 462 -463).

In contrast to the other candidates who received modest fanfare, Senator Eugene McCarthy's nomination of Governor Stevenson was followed by an outpouring of support, with around 2,000 fans pouring into the convention hall. Among the pomp and circumstances, supporters carried a papier-mâché snowball reportedly assembled from over a million Draft Stevenson petitions. After Chairman and Florida Governor LeRoy Collins called for order, the celebration resumed following Eleanor Roosevelt seconding Stevenson's nomination. While Stevenson had numerous fans, he had secured few delegates. As the first ballot played out, JFK amassed 748 delegates of the minimum 761 with Teddy Kennedy on hand lobbying the Wyoming delegation, who broke entirely for Kennedy. Once the dust settled, LBJ came in a respectable second with roughly half as many delegates. Adlai Stevenson, meanwhile, was a distant fourth with less than a hundred lagging slightly behind Senator Symington (McKeever, 1989, p. 462 - 464). LBJ failed to line up much support beyond the South and was unable to lock up the region. Kennedy earned a modicum of support in the region from his years' worth of political and ostensibly nonpartisan visits to the South. There JFK would remind voters that his father was an adopted southerner, having resided in Florida for twenty-five years. Southern favorite sons such as Mississippi's Ross Barnett and Florida's George Smathers also prevented LBJ from dominating the southern bloc vote (Land, 1979, p.49 and 57).

In an attempt to satisfy all factions of the party, the South's leading favorite son Lyndon Johnson was added to the ticket. The South was seen as JFK's biggest liability, and after witnessing Stevenson's poor showings, victory in Texas was viewed as essential (Dallek, 2013, p.57). To balance Kennedy's explicit southern outreach a platform was adopted, including calls for a host of civil rights reforms. Reforms included federal legislation banning the literacy test and poll tax (Sweeney, 1991, p. 14). Additional measures ranged from empowering the attorney general to file civil injunctions against those who denied any American their civil rights, the establishment of a fair employment practices commission, permanent standing for the Civil Rights Commission, and the requirement that every school district in the nation submit their own desegregation plan before the next presidential election. Remembering how Truman had exposed much of the Republicans' 1948 platform as insincere, Eisenhower challenged Democrats that he was amenable to signing much of their platform into law if advanced by the Democratic-controlled Congress. After Democrats failed to submit said legislation, the Kennedy campaign had to deal with some of the same embarrassment that Dewey endured in the 1948 contest (Nichols, 2007, p. 257).

1960 Republican Convention

Nixon's status as vice president all but cemented him as Ike's political heir. His only threats came from the parties' far left and right flanks. On the left was New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller served minor roles in the FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations. After deciding to seek elected office himself, Rockefeller led a Republican sweep in New York during the Democratic-leaning 1958 election cycle. Rockefeller was the epitome of the so-called GOP Eastern Establishment thanks to his fabulous wealth, liberal social views, support for civil rights, and advocacy for internationalism. Rockefeller briefly challenged

Nixon in the primaries but was swamped by the vice president. The threat on Nixon's right flank came from Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. A relatively small but passionate movement of supporters launched a Draft Goldwater movement to challenge Nixon. With his best-selling work *Conscious of a Conservative*, Goldwater emerged as the champion of the party's most conservative activists as well as those opposed or indifferent to advancing meaningful civil rights legislation (Edwards, 1995, p.104 and 111).

Nixon's advocacy for civil rights both in the Senate and as part of the Eisenhower administration resulted in him being loathed by most southerners across party lines. Senator Goldwater, in contrast, had established a long track record of speaking up for states' rights on libertarian grounds and opposing far-reaching civil rights legislation earning him admiration among southerners. The fact that Goldwater had long been affiliated with the Arizona NAACP, worked to foster integration and supported modest civil rights legislation was either little known in the South or ignored. Goldwater entered the convention with a handful of southern and western delegates but was far from a threat to Nixon. Emphasizing his kinship with southern conservatives, the band played "Dixie" during Goldwater's nomination (Edwards, 1995, p. 27, 106, 119, 122, and 131).

While Goldwater was hardly a challenge to Nixon, conservatives believed their display of political strength, followed by Goldwater's magnanimous withdrawal and call for party unity, would earn them a say in the party's platform. This assumption proved a miscalculation as Nixon sought to win over Rockefeller through a progressive platform, particularly on civil rights. This angered conservatives as Nixon had previously informed Goldwater that he would not bend over backward for Rockefeller's support. Meanwhile, Goldwater and his camp were convinced that a conservative platform would help Republicans carry the South and make other new inroads.

Rather than courting conservatives, Nixon spent the Convention trying to win over Governor Rockefeller and reassure civil rights supporters after Martin Luther King, Jr., led a well-publicized march around the Convention (Edwards, 1995, p. 127-130).

Nixon's decision to select Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., as his running-mate also angered the party's conservatives. Lodge was a liberal Rockefeller Republican and quite progressive on civil rights-related issues when he represented Massachusetts in the Senate. After his defeat by JFK, Eisenhower had appointed Lodge to the position of UN Ambassador. As a leading figure in the successful Draft Eisenhower campaign of 1952, Lodge was popular among establishment Republicans (Mason, 2013, p. 519). The foreign policy minded Nixon also thought that his experience would be valuable to the future administration. Electorally though, Lodge was a lackluster campaigner and expanded the tent of the GOP ticket little.

Senator Byrd's Pseudo Candidacy

Despite LBJ's place on the Democratic ticket and JFK's years of maneuvering to become acceptable to Southern Democrats, some segregationists and former Dixiecrats schemed. Though his political career was long behind him, former Alabama Governor Frank Dixon publically discussed how the Electoral College could be used as the trump card of the Dixiecrats (Hamilton, 1987, p. 218). Former Dixiecrat Gessner McCorvey also wrote extensively about how the South could use the Electoral College to veto candidates who opposed segregation (McCorvey, 1960, 89).

Deep South liberals, meanwhile, were split over whether to keep their heads down or speak out against the Dixiecrat's plot. Despite having recently been on the national ticket as a vice-presidential nominee, Senator Sparkman opted to stay neutral during the 1960 cycle. While

remaining relatively mum regarding his thoughts on the national ticket, Senator Hill warned voters that the state would risk losing vital federal projects and other pork if they again left the Democratic fold. Other prominent southerners openly embraced the party ticket, such as Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas, Senator Russell Long (D-LA), and Senator George Smathers (D-FL), and actively campaigned for the ticket in the Deep South. Since 1948, Harry Truman's reputation had been rehabilitated enough among southerners that he was warmly received at limited campaign events within the region (Hamilton, 1987, p. 236 and 238).

Dixiecrats largely united around a scheme to promote unpledged electors tacitly bound to Senator Harry Byrd during the 1960 electoral cycle. Going into the cycle, the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, at minimum, had state laws that placed presidential electors on the ballot rather than the candidate they had pledged to support. Aside from obscuring vote choice, it was believed that these policies made electors pledges' tacit and opened the door to electors choosing to defect or being pressured to do so by state leaders. This meant that a minimum of 47 electoral votes from reliably Democratic states could not be fully trusted to support the party's official candidates even if a majority of voters intended to support the official Democratic ticket (Pou, 1960, p. 18A). Contemporary election analysts at the time cast doubt forty-odd electoral votes proving determinative, noting that a presidential election had not been that close since the 1916 cycle (Associated Press, 1960, p. 7).

Senator Byrd had a long history as both a champion of the South and the business community following his stint as governor, in which he modernized Virginia without significantly raising taxes or increasing regulations. While an adamant supporter of segregation, Byrd also garnered some goodwill among southern progressives for slightly relaxing the poll tax and cracking down on the Ku Klux Klan and other such groups who engaged in vigilantism.

Byrd's well-regarded tenure as governor and his network of well-connected supporters, including his brother, a decorated Rear Admiral in the Navy, led to loose talk that FDR would select him as his running mate. FDR ultimately selected John Nance Garner, but Byrd was an enthusiastic supporter of FDR during the 1932 campaign. Upon Byrd's election to the Senate, he supported the majority of the New Deal agenda. After about 1936, Senator Byrd steadily drifted away from the National Democratic Party in general and New Deal specifically. By the 1950s, his voting record had become conservative enough that when Republicans controlled the Senate, he was allowed to keep his chairmanship over his pet project the Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures. Furthermore, Senator Taft, the leader of the conservative flank of the GOP, considered Byrd a more reliable ally than most Republicans. This political profile earned him the nickname "Mr. Demopublican" by Harry Truman (Heinemann, 1966, p. 47, 82, 154, 160, 255, 287). By 1960 virtually the only areas in which he was a reliable Democratic Party ally were foreign policy as well as issues related to the environment and conservation (Heinemann, 1996, p. 299 and 391).

While Byrd preferred to coax voters toward the Republican ticket in his own state, he was on the ballot in a roundabout way. The Virginia Conservatives, a minor third party, gained ballot access in the state. Initially, the party sought to present voters with a ticket made up of Senator Byrd for president and Senator Goldwater for vice president. After the candidates refused to give the ticket their blessing, they put forth a ticket of C. Benton Coiner and Edward Silverman. If successful, their delegates were pledged to support Senator Byrd and Thomas J Anderson, a future leader of Governor Wallace's American Independent Party. The effort was largely moot, however, as it garnered a mere 4,204 votes (Sweeney, 1991, p. 21-22).

Byrd, for his part, did little to overtly advance the cause of the unpledged electors loyal to him and was instead focused on denying JFK a victory in Virginia. Despite his personal fondness for both of the Democrats on the ticket, Byrd and his organization soured on them politically regarding issues like civil rights and labor (Sweeney, 1991, p. 7). Byrd all but broke his policy of golden silence regarding presidential candidates as he had done during Stevenson's 1956 campaign. Byrd attacked the Democratic standard-bearer and praised the Republican ticket shortly before the election. Byrd's office distributed literature to supporters associated with the states Democrats for Nixon efforts which explained Byrd's many political and philosophical differences with JFK. Additionally, Byrd's appearance alongside President Eisenhower shortly before the election was treated as an informal endorsement of the Republican ticket by local media. Despite Nixon's long advocacy for civil rights, the Byrd-aligned Democrats for Nixon organization in the state were quite willing to play on the Democratic tickets' progressivism on civil rights to garner votes. Nixon's narrow victory in the state was viewed as a win for the Byrd Organization as it demonstrated that Byrd could put his finger on the scale for Republican presidential candidates without hurting the Democrats within his political machine (Sweeney, 1991, p. 2-3, 26, 32 and 37).

In Alabama's race for presidential electors, six Dixiecrats emerged victorious compared to five party loyalists (Hamilton, 1987, p. 236). Dixiecrat types in the state tried to advertise to voters that their preferred electors hoped to try and leverage their support if given the opportunity. The electors appeared on the actual ballot absent any distinguishable characteristic to allow voters an idea of where they came down on the issue of supporting the national ticket or defecting. Unless voters were extremely cued into state politics, they were likely to simply favor the most prominent names on the candidate list. Although five of the state's electors ultimately

remained loyal to the Kennedy ticket, only a single elector was willing to go on the record early to unconditionally support the national ticket (Hall, 1960, p. 5E). In contrast, the state of Mississippi gave voters the option of explicitly supporting electors loyal to the National Democratic ticket or unpledged Democratic electors with sitting Governor Ross Barnett stumping for the unpledged slate (AP, Aug 10, 1960, p. 3). Unpledged electors gained ballot access in Louisiana as well but were listed as States Rights electors rather than Democrats (Bass and DeVries, 1995, p. 164).

1960 General Election

For all the romance surrounding Camelot and the Kennedys, the 1960 election was hyper-competitive. JFK only defeated Nixon by 119,000 popular votes, and many states were extremely close, with less than ten thousand votes separating the candidates in ten states. Hawaii shifted to Kennedy only after a recount, and Nixon only carried his native California after absentee ballots were counted. Unsubstantiated rumors of fraud hovered like black clouds over both Illinois and Texas (Kallina, 1985, p. 113-114). Despite Kennedy's years of work courting the South, Nixon retained three states which had previously voted for Eisenhower Virginia, Tennessee, and Florida. Democrats' southern defections would have likely been worse had Kennedy not left campaigning in the South to Johnson. After troubling signs for the Kennedy ticket, the tide seemed to turn with Johnson's whistle-stop tour through the region where Johnson was not only greeted by friendly crowds but picked up endorsements and appearances from other Southern Democrats along the way (Land, 1979, p. 59).

In the eyes of the Eisenhower camp, the election came down to African Americans returning to the Democratic fold and southerners showing less openness to Nixon than they did for Eisenhower. African American voters' shift toward the Democratic ticket despite JFK and

LBJs mixed records on civil rights is often considered to have resulted from Kennedy's inroads with the family of Martin Luther King late in the campaign. When MLK was arrested in Georgia following a sit-in, the Kennedy brothers quickly reached out to the family and lobbied Governor Vandiver for a speedy release. As a member of the executive branch, Nixon reasoned that such actions would be inappropriate, which allowed for the Kennedys to ingratiate themselves with the King family who had tended to favor Republicans when it came to electoral politics (Nichols, 2007, p. 262).

His running-mate also damaged Nixon's potential inroads with southern voters. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Lodge was not a dynamic campaigner and did little to broaden the GOP tent. Lodge was, however, a rather outspoken proponent of civil rights. While Nixon's record was solid, he was reluctant to take positions that would hurt his broader appeal. During a campaign event in Harlem, Lodge issued a promise without Nixon's approval that a Nixon-Lodge administration would go further than Eisenhower in placing African Americans into positions of power, including a cabinet position. Eisenhower later lamented that this ill-considered proclamation destroyed Nixon's chances in the Carolinas and other pockets of the segregationist South where Eisenhower had been successful (Young, 1994, p. 565).

While LBJ's place on the ticket helped ensure that there was no large-scale southern bolt in 1960, Johnson's junior status did not satisfy the entire right flank of the party. Despite supporting his presidential candidacy, Senator Thurmond renounced the ticket as he perceived JFK as too liberal on civil rights. Out of respect for Johnson, Thurmond was publicly neutral in the race despite voting for Nixon or at least saying he had after switching parties (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p.189-190).

Though ultimately unsuccessful, Byrd's pseudo campaign was the closest to being in a position to extract concessions from the Democratic Party in exchange for votes in either the Electoral College or the House. In the immediate aftermath of the election, when there was still some uncertainty regarding the victor, JFK's campaign reportedly lobbied Senator Byrd to ask the unpledged electors loyal to him to stay neutral until it was clear who had won the election. Privately there was also talk within the Kennedy camp that Byrd would need to be placated if his electors were needed to put JFK into the White House (Heinemann, 1996, p.381). During the interim between the election and the Electoral College meeting, Dixiecrat forces also plotted to either change the outcome of the process or leverage concessions. In Louisiana, Dixiecrats in the state legislature debated revoking the regular Democratic electors pledged to JFK and substituting a slate of unpledged electors (Edwards, 2004, p. 17). The strategy was explored despite the fact that voters rejected a slate of States Rights electors during the general election by a wide margin (Bass and DeVries, 1995, p.164). Such a move would have been insufficient to change the race's outcome but could have potentially begun a domino effect with other southern states doing the same. Had this occurred, JFK and Nixon would have needed to court these electors for loyalty or face a contingent election. Louisiana Dixiecrats ultimately did not go through with the scheme because of the high probability that the courts would have invalidated the action due to requirements that electors be chosen on a uniform date. If segregationist forces in the Louisiana legislature acted prior to the election, however, the tactic would have likely proven successful (Edwards, 2004, p. 17).

Once the absentee ballots were counted, recount efforts exhausted, and it became clear that JFK had secured the presidency, Georgia's electors decided to put political observers on edge. Thanks to a 1952 law, Georgia electors pledge to the presidential ticket they were attached

to was tacit, and electors were, in fact, encouraged to leverage their position if it could help the state. In contrast to 1948, the ballot simply listed party electors rather than the parties' official candidate. Due to Adlai Stevenson's landslide defeats in the two previous races, the Georgia electors were in no position to gain concessions. The 1960 election, however, represented very different circumstances. If Georgia's Democratic electors bucked Kennedy, there was some belief that this could create a cascade effect with other southern electors becoming faithless. At a minimum, if the Georgia electors bucked Kennedy, this would further erode his electoral mandate, which was already faint given the race's competitiveness. Some beyond the typical Dixiecrat fold, such as the sitting governor who was ostensibly a Kennedy backer, supported the Georgia electors trying to leverage some kind of concessions (Novotny, 2004, p. 379 and 383).

Many Georgia politicians during the 1960 campaign were active or at least passive Kennedy supporters, with most denouncing the governor for so blatantly endorsing the use of a loophole in the process (Novotny, 2004, p. 380 and 383). The criticism proved strong enough that the decision was placed in the voters' hands via a nonbinding referendum vote in the fall over whether electors pledged to the Democratic ticket would be bound full stop. The ballot labeling arguably confused voters, though, as they were asked to vote yea or nay regarding the existence of "For Free Presidential Electors" rather than describing them as unpledged electors (Novotny, 2004, p. 387). The vote was close, but the free elector plan carried the day. In addition to the phrasing of the referendum, the outcome was considered the result of Kennedy's allies putting little effort toward conveying to voters the stakes of the question. Others viewed the result as segregationist Democrats taking advantage of an opportunity to undermine the official ticket for the adoption of an especially progressive platform (Galphin, 1960, p. 1 and 8). As Election Day neared, local reporting put the number of these technically unpledged Democratic

electors loyal to Kennedy and the national ticket as between two and four. Reporting was also a bit unclear as to whether the various electors were lobbying one another to swing a particular way. In the weeks from the tail end of the campaign season to the meeting of Georgia's Electoral College, these electors were heavily lobbied through both newspaper editorials and letter-writing campaigns to buck Kennedy and support a segregationist like Harry Byrd. The tone of some of this correspondence to electors verged on threatening (Novotny, 2004, p. 375, 387, 288, 290).

Despite not officially campaigning in 1960, the memo reached enough people that those who lobbied the Georgia electors with a candidate in mind tended to support Senator Byrd. Byrd's pseudo-running-mate Senator Thurmond being the second most frequently mentioned (Novotny, 2004, p. 392). As the Georgia electors were leaving political observers wondering, Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett rallied his state's unpledged electors and charged that a vote for either Nixon or Kennedy would be a de-facto vote authorizing integration. Meanwhile, Alabama's unpledged electors gathered in Birmingham, announced their intention to vote in favor of a Southern Democrat, and issued statements pledging to cooperate with the other unpledged electors to block JFK. White Citizen Councils and other segregationist groups also lobbied Louisiana's electors to defect from Kennedy. In early December, Alabama's six unpledged electors and Mississippi's eight convened in Jackson, Mississippi, to discuss strategy and potential methods to persuade pledged Democratic electors to become faithless and support Senator Byrd. Governor Barnett attended and reported on his attempts to lobby electors in at least six southern states to defect. The Governor received polite responses from a number of electors, but none formally pledged to become faithless (Novotny, 2004, p. 394-395).

The Georgia electors remained coy until the end but took no active role in the plotting of the Alabama and Mississippi electors. Enthusiasm to defect also began to wane as JFK prevailed in the Illinois recount and no other challenge shifted things significantly in Nixon's favor. As a result, Kennedy retained a buffer that the Georgia electors alone were insufficient to reverse. Evidence that other electors would jump ship if Georgia's moved first did not materialize. Kennedy was also aided by most of Georgia's high-profile politicians like Senator Russell actively supporting the ticket and arguing against the unpledged elector scheme. This stance was not universal. Senator Talmadge, a soft Kennedy supporter, at times, voiced tepid support for the unpledged electors. After roughly two months of drama and handwringing, none of the Georgia electors ultimately defected (Novotny, 2004, p. 396).

Efforts to use faithless electors to change the election outcome were not limited to the Deep South. California electors were also lobbied to either join with the Byrd electors or to make a statement by supporting the more conservative Senator Goldwater. These efforts were reportedly widespread enough that former California Governor Goodwin Knight felt compelled to use his clout to remind his fellow electors that they were duty-bound to support Nixon. Oklahoma Republican elector Henry Irwin instigated a wide-ranging plot to block or force concessions from Kennedy. Irwin wrote letters to every Republican elector lobbying them to join with him in becoming faithless and voting for Senator Byrd for President and Senator Goldwater for Vice President (Edwards, 2004, p. 50 and 56). This hypothetical ticket is not as outlandish as it may appear at first glance. The two senator's small-government libertarian positions had considerable overlap, and the two were friendly enough that Goldwater refused to campaign against Byrd when he led the 1964 GOP ticket (Edwards, 1995, p. 282). Most electors either ignored Irwin or felt bound to support Nixon but forty or so electors indicated interest in the plot.

Irwin then lobbied the Republican National Committee and state Republican chairmen to give GOP electors cover by offering their blessing to his plan. Irwin received a few sympathetic replies. The strongest was from a New Mexico GOP committeeman who offered his personal encouragement but said no official party apparatus could participate in such a plot (Edwards, 2004, p. 56). Allegedly Irwin was also told by numerous Republican electors that they would support the plan, but only if several dozen Democratic electors went public first (AP, 1961, p. 26).

After the election, Irwin was called to testify before Congress and revealed he was not exactly a rogue actor. If his testimony was honest, he had political contacts in Alabama and Louisiana. These contacts allegedly planned to leverage concessions from Kennedy if Irwin's plan gained momentum among other Republican electors. His contacts in the Louisiana legislature hoped to call a meeting of the southern governors prior to the Electoral College vote where they would demand Kennedy appear in order to bid for the support of the various faithless and unpledged Byrd electors. The conspirator's objectives included the reduction or elimination of foreign aid to communist nations, the appointment of a southern attorney general, and for Kennedy to affirm that the 10th Amendment gave the southern states the authority to deal with civil rights however they saw fit (Edwards, 2004, p. 56). Whether JFK would have ever agreed to attend such a meeting is impossible to know. Due to the competitiveness of the election, segregationists would not have needed to win over that many electors to put Kennedy's path to the White House in jeopardy.

When the votes were eventually finalized, JFK prevailed with 34, 220, 984 raw votes and 303 electoral votes. Nixon amassed 34, 108, 157 popular votes and 219 electoral votes. Byrd technically received few popular votes, but the unpledged Democratic electors who supported

him earned 610,409 along with a scattering of write-ins (Heinemann, 1996, p. 381). Dixiecrats had also arranged for Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus to be placed on the ballot in several Rim South states in a bid for delegates, but the ploy garnered few votes (AP, Dec 16, 1960, p. 11). Byrd garnered 14 electoral votes, encompassing all of Mississippi's votes and six of Alabama's eleven, with the other five electors pledged to JFK. The actions of a faithless Republican elector Henry Irwin of Oklahoma, brought the total up to 15 (Kura, 2001, p. 4).

What if the House Decided the 1960 Outcome?


Despite Democrats losing seats in the House of Representatives during the 1960 election cycle, they would have been heavily favored in the event of a contingent election. Democrats would have gone into the process controlling 262 seats to the Republicans 175. In terms of state delegations, Democrats enjoyed majorities in twenty-nine compared to Republicans seventeen, with the remaining four states being divided evenly. As such absent substantial crossover appeal Nixon would have been virtually shut out of the process with the outcome decided within the Democratic House caucus. Had such a scenario transpired, Byrd's Neo-Dixiecrats might have given JFK's liberals cause for concern.

Nixon's moderation on economics and progressivism on civil rights may have given Byrd some appeal among the GOPs' rightmost flank. Kennedy would also have dealt with a slightly different Democratic majority than Truman going into a hypothetical contingent election. The Democratic majority of the 87th Congress somewhat resembled the Democratic majorities of the pre-New Deal era. Democrats' ranks in the southern and western states were very robust. Under Eisenhower, Nixon, and Governor Rockefeller, the GOP had recovered in New England and the Midwest. The Democratic majority of the 87th Congress contained fewer pro-civil rights New

Deal liberals and was a more southern-oriented party. Nixon was also a better reflection of his party than the especially progressive Governor Dewey, making defections by centrist Republicans less likely.

Unlike the 1948 contest, all three of the candidates who received electoral votes held DW-NOMINATE scores, meaning that there is no need to resort to proxies (Figure 4). Senator Kennedy's score places him as a solid liberal on both the economic and civil rights dimensions, with a score of (-0.261,-0.284) respectively. Due to his status as Vice President, Nixon's score was slightly out of date. However, there is little reason to believe that his politics shifted significantly after transitioning from the Senate to the executive branch. Nixon's scores place him as center-right on economics with a first dimension score of 0.14 and solidly progressive on civil rights with a score of -0.412. All three candidates' various scores across their time in the Senate have been averaged to create an overall career score. Scores have been averaged rather than simply using the most recent score as voters and politicians both lack perfect knowledge about a candidate. Additionally, some supporters may have been loyal to them due to previous iterations of their political personas rather than their most recent policy positions. Due to their relatively short political careers, this decision has little impact on the scores of Senator Kennedy or Vice President Nixon. However, this decision does moderate Senator Byrd as he entered the Senate as a half-hearted New Dealer and shifted further to the right in every subsequent Congress. Despite this moderating effect, Byrd remains the most conservative candidate on both metrics, with scores of (0.192, 0.284). While the second dimension figure may appear low compared to Senator Thurmond, it is worth noting that in public life, Byrd was more occupied by the pursuit of balanced budgets and fiscal conservatism than his support for Jim Crow.

Figure 4




Visual Representation of the Candidates Positions Relative to the 87th House

The prospect of a contingent election deciding the 1960 race is interesting as no ticket was particularly reflective of the average member of Congress whose DW-NOMINATE score was a left-leaning -0.05 on economics and 0.13 or center-right on civil rights. Given the Democrats' overall numerical superiority and control of the most state delegations, the more pertinent question is who best reflected the preferences of the Democrats. The DW-NOMINATE score of the Democratic delegation stood at (-0.28, 0.44), indicating liberalism on economics which was almost exactly in line with JFK but civil rights preferences to the right of Senator Byrd. As for Nixon, he faced similar issues to Dewey. Nixon was somewhat out of step with the Republican median, which stood at (0.22, -0.34), putting them closer to Byrd on economics and slightly closer to Kennedy on civil rights. Using the same metrics as the 1948 analysis, the

factional strength of the 87th Congress stood at 325 Cross-pressured members of Congress, 16 Conservative Republicans, 5 Rockefeller Republicans, 18 Centrists, 40 Dixiecrats, and 33 Liberal Democrats (Figure 5).

Figure 5



87th United States Congress Factions

This cursory matching of members of Congress based on their DW-NOMINATE scores with the three presidential candidates initially shows an opportunity for Harry Byrd to deny both Kennedy and Nixon a first-ballot victory. This initial estimate puts the state delegations as 23 favoring Byrd, 15 favoring Nixon, 4 favoring JFK, and 8 state delegations split. This distribution is largely the result of JFK's -0.284 score on the civil rights dimension being wildly out of step with the average House Democrat during the 87th Congress. This is not to say that twenty-three state delegations would go through with rejecting JFK but illustrates that his record was out of


step with many of his parties' Congressional representatives. Due to the small number of Americans who voted for Senator Harry Byrd either directly or indirectly, it is hard to imagine him emerging from the scramble as the thirty-fifth president with any public legitimacy. Thus his pseudo status is better understood as a reflection of Dixiecrat's distaste for the national Democratic ticket rather than a true bid for the presidency. The resulting findings suggest had a contingent election been triggered, Kennedy's liberals and the sizeable number of segregationist Democrats would have first needed to reach an understanding. The segregationists' numerical superiority also suggests that they would have been in a strong bargaining position to extort concessions. The finding lastly suggests that if the House could ignore the will of the voters and simply select a president based on their own ideological preferences there may have been considerable appetite for a figure who was center-right on both economics and civil rights.

Due to the unexpectedly strong showing found for Harry Byrd (D-VA), two robustness checks are made. As every candidate's running-mate possesses a DW-NOMINATE score, the two scores are averaged together to account for how the House members may have behaved if they genuinely saw each ticket as an amalgamation of the tickets positions. The estimation is also made using only the three candidate's most recent DW-NOMINATE scores rather than using their career average up to that point.

JFK's selection of LBJ as his running mate seems to reflect an understanding that he needed to cater to a large swath of his party who were more conservative on civil rights issues. If the Kennedy and Johnson tickets DW-NOMINATE scores are averaged together, the ticket better reflects the Democratic Party overall. As their contemporaries simultaneously credited LBJ and Lodge as contributing to the outcome of their running-mate, it seems warranted to combine their separate DW-NOMINATE scores to account for how politicians viewed the various

tickets (Mann, 1996, p. 288). Because Byrd’s electoral votes were for a Byrd and Thurmond ticket, Thurmond is treated as Byrd’s running-mate for the purposes of this analysis. Combining the tickets DW-NOMINATE scores results in a score of (-0.189, 0.032) for the Democratic ticket, (0.08,-0.657) for the Republican ticket, and (0.211, 0.538) for the pseudo-Dixiecrat ticket. Combining the scores moderates the Democratic ticket while pushing the Republican ticket to the far left on the civil rights dimension and pushing the pseudo-Dixiecrat ticket to the far right on both the economic and civil rights dimension (Figure 6).

Figure 6



Visual Representation of the Party Tickets Relative to the 87th House of Representatives

Under this analysis, JFK’s ticket is estimated to have been in line with 20 state delegations based on House members’ DW-NOMINATE scores. Meanwhile, 15 delegations are in line with the Dixiecrat ticket, 8 in line with the Republican ticket, and 7 state delegations split

(Figure 7). It is estimated that had the 1960 presidential election gone into a contingent election, JFK may have needed to court several states with either split delegations or members ideologically closer to Byrd to secure an absolute majority.


Figure 7

State	Kennedy	Nixon	Byrd	Result
AL Delegation			9	Byrd
AK Delegation			1	Byrd
AZ Delegation	2			Kennedy
AR Delegation			6	Byrd
CA Delegation	16	11	3	Kennedy
CO Delegation	2	1	1	Kennedy
CT Delegation	4	2		Kennedy
DE Delegation	1			Kennedy
FL Delegation	2		6	Byrd
GA Delegation			10	Byrd
HI Delegation	1			Kennedy
ID Delegation	1		1	Split Delegation
IL Delegation	14	9	2	Kennedy
IN Delegation	10	1		Kennedy
IA Delegation	4	2	2	Kennedy
KS Delegation	5	1		Kennedy
KY Delegation	2		6	Byrd
LA Delegation			8	Byrd
ME Delegation	1	2		Nixon
MD Delegation	6	1		Kennedy
MA Delegation	8	6		Kennedy
MI Delegation	11	7		Kennedy
MN Delegation	4	5		Nixon
MS Delegation			6	Byrd
MO Delegation	5	1	5	Split Delegation
MT Delegation	1		1	Split Delegation
NE Delegation	2		2	Split Delegation
NV Delegation			1	Byrd
NH Delegation		2		Nixon
NJ Delegation	6	8		Nixon
NM Delegation	1		1	Split Delegation
NY Delegation	19	23		Nixon
NC Delegation			12	Byrd
ND Delegation	1		1	Split Delegation
OH Delegation	11	12		Nixon
OK Delegation	1		5	Byrd
OR Delegation	2		2	Split Delegation
PA Delegation	17		13	Kennedy
RI Delegation	2			Kennedy
SC Delegation			6	Byrd
SD Delegation	2			Kennedy
TN Delegation	2		7	Byrd
TX Delegation	2		20	Byrd
UT Delegation	2			Kennedy
VT Delegation		1		Nixon
VA Delegation	2		8	Byrd
WA Delegation	3	4		Nixon
WV Delegation	5		1	Kennedy
WI Delegation	6	4		Kennedy
WY Delegation	1			Kennedy
Totals	Kennedy 20 State Delegations	Nixon 8 State Delegations	Byrd 15 State Delegations	7 State Delegations Evenly Split

Estimated State Delegation Preferences for the 87th House of Representatives

Last, the analysis is conducted using only the candidates' most recent DW-NOMINATE scores going into the hypothetical contingent election. Due to the consistency of Nixon and Kennedy's scores, the approach changes their position little. The approach places Harry Byrd in a much more conservative light across the board as he would have stood at (0.335, 0.732), placing him in a less viable position (Figure 8). Under this analysis, JFK is estimated to garner the support of 11 state delegations, Nixon 18, Harry Byrd 15, and 6 state delegations split (Figure 9).

Figure 8



Visual Representation of the Candidates Positions Relative to the 87th House

Figure 9

State	Kennedy	Nixon	Byrd	Result
AL Delegation			9	Byrd
AK Delegation			1	Byrd
AZ Delegation	1	1		Split
AR Delegation			6	Byrd
CA Delegation	14	13	4	JFK
CO Delegation	1	2	1	Nixon
CT Delegation	4	2		JFK
DE Delegation	1			JFK
FL Delegation	1	1	6	Byrd
GA Delegation			10	Byrd
HI Delegation	1			JFK
ID Delegation	1		1	Split
IL Delegation	14	11		JFK
IN Delegation	4	7		Nixon
IA Delegation	1	6	1	Nixon
KS Delegation	1	5		Nixon
KY Delegation	2	1	5	Byrd
LA Delegation			8	Byrd
ME Delegation		3		Nixon
MD Delegation	6	1		JFK
MA Delegation	8	6		JFK
MI Delegation	7	10	1	Nixon
MN Delegation	3	6		Nixon
MS Delegation			6	Byrd
MO Delegation	4	2	5	Byrd
MT Delegation		1	1	Split
NE Delegation		3	1	Nixon
NV Delegation			1	Nixon
NH Delegation		2		Nixon
NJ Delegation	9	5		JFK
NM Delegation	1		1	Split
NY Delegation	22	23		Nixon
NC Delegation			12	Byrd
ND Delegation		1	1	Split
OH Delegation	7	15	1	Nixon
OK Delegation		1	5	Byrd
OR Delegation	2	2		Split
PA Delegation	14	16		Nixon
RI Delegation		2		JFK
SC Delegation			6	Byrd
SD Delegation		2		Nixon
TN Delegation		2	7	Byrd
TX Delegation	1	1	21	Byrd
UT Delegation		2		JFK
VT Delegation			1	Nixon
WA Delegation	2	5		Nixon
WV Delegation	4	1	1	JFK
WI Delegation	4	6		Nixon
WY Delegation			1	Nixon
Totals	Kennedy 11 State Delegations	Nixon 18 State Delegations	Byrd 15 State Delegations	6 State Delegations Evenly Split

Estimated State Delegation Preferences for the 87th House of Representatives

Regardless of the approach employed, Democrats are estimated to have gone into a contingent election with sufficient state delegations to win outright but only if JFK made peace with the segregationists more closely aligned with the positions of Harry Byrd. Nixon, meanwhile, had much more ground to make up and would have needed cross party support in order to emerge victorious. The findings suggest that during the lag time between the meeting of the Electoral College and January 6, 1961, Kennedy would have needed to assuage Dixiecrats with the carrots of policy concessions, count on party loyalty to trump ideological differences, or rely on the sticks of party leadership to maintain unity. As such, Dixiecrats' efforts to position themselves as kingmakers regarding the 1960 presidential contest potentially came much closer to fruition than is generally assumed.

Approaching the Kennedy administration with the understanding that JFK was reliant on states' whose Congressional delegation was more closely aligned with Dixiecrat-style politicians than the National Democratic Party in part explains the administration's approach to civil rights-related issues. Once in office, JFK refused to openly support many civil rights-related legislative proposals he had previously endorsed. During the first year of the Kennedy administration, the only successful legislation related to civil rights was a two-year extension of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. A handful of measures that had support among southern liberals also had some success. The highest-profile item that split southerners was the passage of a constitutional amendment to outlaw the poll tax after years of debate. The White House played little role in the achievement and Dixiecrat types took solace in the lag between passage in Congress and ratification by the necessary thirty-eight states (Mann, 1996, p. 301, 315, and 322). It took until the summer of 1963 for Kennedy to make good on his promises to civil rights advocates and

support what would eventually become the 1964 Civil Rights Act though he would not live to see its passage (Dallek, 2013, p. 391).

When it came to executive action, the Kennedy administration could be both forceful and accommodating with the southern bloc. Kennedy ended the Eisenhower administration's embargo on appointments for segregationists on a wide range of offices, particularly judges. In addition to restoring southerners' patronage opportunities, Kennedy was also reluctant to cross the southern bloc regarding civil rights-related legislation. Kennedy's approach to civil rights was at various times described as maximalist on executive action and minimalist on legislation as the administration could ill afford to cross its southern allies who chaired powerful committees. In terms of appointments that touched on civil rights issues, the Kennedy administration was also constrained by a need to select candidates that southerners would generally vote against but not actively obstruct. When the administration sought to appoint noted civil rights proponents or African Americans, this was generally done after placating southern senators with patronage (Dallek, 2013, p. 122-123).

Wallace Testing the Waters

Since the 1948 Democratic Convention, when a young populist state representative by the name of George C. Wallace refused to participate in the Dixiecrat walkout, much had changed. Wallace had been a liberal populist of the Jim Folsom mold and known as evenhanded and at times sympathetic to African Americans during his time as a circuit judge. Future civil rights leader Fred Gray even noted that he was unusually progressive by Alabama standards on matters relating to race (Leshner, 1994, p. 92). At a time when the state's economic liberals were doubling down on racial demagoguery and opposition to civil rights, Wallace changed little. His

political brand underwent a wicked turn, however, following a contentious 1958 race for governor in which his opponent in the Democratic primary was publicly endorsed by the Ku Klux Klan, whom Wallace had previously spoken out against. This move earned Wallace the support of the NAACP and the handful of African Americans that could clear the many hurdles put in their path when exercising their right to vote (Leshner, 1994, p. 125). Few white voters were swayed, and Wallace was defeated. In the aftermath, Wallace reinvented himself as the generalissimo of the politics of rage and racial resentment (Carter, 1996, p. 3).

The 1964 primary season was a low-key affair on the Democratic side. LBJ had not made his intentions known publically regarding his decision whether to run for a full term in his own right following JFK's assassination. Despite LBJ's official silence on the matter, it was generally treated as a given that he would stand for reelection. In what amounted to more of a vanity project to raise his name recognition than a serious challenge Governor Wallace launched a last-minute campaign in a handful of states. Of the seventeen states that held primaries, Wallace only secured ballot access in three of them. In Wisconsin, Wallace received about 25% of the vote against sitting Governor John W. Reynolds, who was on the ballot as a Johnson supporting favorite son. This margin shocked political observers who had largely dismissed Wallace as a rabble-rousing nut (Leshner, 1994, p. 284-85). Wallace was unable to attract many endorsements for his quixotic campaign, even among conservative southerners. That said, his control over Alabama Democratic politics was strong enough that Wallace was able to enlist the state's entire House delegation to support him on the trail. Figures like Congressmen Carl Elliott and Albert Rains, who were liberal party loyalists on non-civil rights issues, still felt compelled to support the governor (Carlson, 1981, p. 35).

Wallace's campaign proved a harbinger of things to come as he would repeatedly be a player in presidential contests. The performance served as a dry run for his 1968 independent bid and presence in the 1972 and 1976 Democratic presidential primaries. His 1964 effort, though, was so last minute and ramshackle that he was unable to garner the overt support of many other Dixiecrats, with even his home state Senators Hill and Sparkman declining to get involved (Leshner, 1994, p. 300).

1964 Presidential Election

Although he was essentially a footnote in the race, Governor Wallace played a small role in the 1964 general election. Wallace toyed with a full-fledged third-party campaign or a coordinated unpledged elector movement. Wallace boasted at that year's National Governors Conference that he could sweep enough of the South to amass between 50-70 electoral votes in his judgment sufficient to throw the election into the House (Mazo, 1964, p. 1). Wallace believed siphoning away six or seven southern states would be sufficient to give the South enough leverage to force concessions regarding civil rights (Jenkins, July 1, 1964, p.1). Limited polling in the summer of 1964 also suggested that among southerners, support for Wallace and Goldwater was about equal (Gallup, 1964, p. 1). Despite those boasts, Wallace realized his plans were premature as he lacked time to organize a proper campaign and gain widespread ballot access due to the difficulties navigating wide-ranging deadlines and access requirements. Wallace learned from this disappointment, and his future campaigns thoroughly studied the deadlines and access laws across the country. Wallace's candidacy was also made redundant to some degree by Barry Goldwater securing the GOP nomination. Wallace withdrew shortly after

the 1964 Republican National Convention, and the move was generally viewed as tantamount to an endorsement of Goldwater (Jenkins, 1964, p. 5).

Goldwater had supported modest civil rights legislation such as the 1957 Civil Rights Act and desegregation efforts in his state. His full-throated opposition to the stronger 1964 Act on libertarian grounds made Goldwater incredibly popular in the Deep South. During the 1960 campaign, Goldwater traveled the South extensively on Nixon's behalf and strongly supported the region's handful of Republican politicians like Senator Tower (R-TX) (Edwards, 1995, p. 27, 133, and 142). Dixiecrats like Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi and future Governor of Georgia Lester Maddox quickly endorsed Goldwater instead of waiting to see if a challenger to LBJ emerged from their own ranks (Carlson, 1981, p. 40). Goldwater's aversion to segregation went so far that he would avoid staying overnight in the South to prevent supporting segregated lodging. These views were either lost on his Dixiecrat-type supporters or irrelevant (Edwards, 1995, p. 282).

Rather than continue to challenge the party from the inside, some conservative southerners formally began switching their partisan affiliations to support Goldwater. The most high profile of these switches was former Dixiecrat leader Strom Thurmond who joined his Senate colleague on the campaign trail to charge that liberal Democrats were in his eyes leading the nation toward socialist dictatorship (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 202). The Goldwater campaign, taking inspiration from Wallace's talking points or being on the same general wavelength on issues such as state's rights, rendered his potential candidacy redundant (Leshner, 1994, p. 294 and 308). Recognizing this, Wallace reportedly plotted to become Goldwater's running-mate in a bizarre scheme in which he enlisted future Republican Congressman James Martin as a go-between with the Goldwater campaign (Carlson, 1981, p. 40).

1964 Unpledged Electors

After the scare Byrd's unpledged electors gave him four years prior, Kennedy worked behind the scenes to try and prevent a repeat in the 1964 cycle. Dixiecrat-types in the Florida legislature considered introducing an unpledged elector law along the lines of Georgia's empowering electors to defect if they could gain concessions for their state. The Kennedy White House was so alarmed by this chatter that JFK was prepared to personally lobby legislators to oppose the bill if it came up for a vote with his allies in the state, assuring him that it was not popular enough to pass both chambers. A similar bill cleared the State House in Louisiana, but Kennedy allies voted it down in the State Senate. The unpledged elector movement also died out in Georgia. Governor Carl Sanders, a Kennedy ally, vowed to oppose such a movement if it materialized and the bill originally empowering electors to break with their pledges expired (Murphy, June 23, 1963, p. 20).

Though relatively few in number, some Democratic members of Congress were worried by how close Byrd's electors came to disrupting the process. Several Republicans also recognized that absent a third choice, a portion of segregationist Democrats may start voting Republican. Senator Kefauver, in particular, championed a constitutional amendment aimed at forbidding unpledged and faithless electors. Goldwater meanwhile ingratiated himself with Byrd supporters by defending these policies on state's rights grounds despite his faction arguably standing the most to gain from such a ban (Murphy, June 6, 1963, p. 13). Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield meanwhile had begun advocating for the outright elimination of the Electoral College and simply switching to a popular vote (Feasible Electoral College Reform, 1960, p. 14).

Former Dixiecrats and supporters of Senator Byrd continued to promote unpledged electors as a strategy to gain concessions for the region if the 1964 contest was close, but their ranks and power were dwindling. Southern leaders showed little enthusiasm for the ploy compared to previous cycles (Eubanks, 1964, p. B12). One leading segregationist, though, was still interested in the tactic. Hoping that he may fulfill a similar role as Senator Byrd in 1960, Wallace supported a slate of independent unpledged electors in his home state. Wallace argued that giving voters the third option of unpledged electors was Democrats' only hope of preventing Goldwater from carrying the Deep South (Murphy, 1963, p. 20). This argument largely fell on deaf ears. Unlike previous races, electors pledged to the national ticket gained a modicum of institutional support within the state, with both Senators Hill and Sparkman supporting them (Leshner, 1994, p. 295). Despite opposition by party loyalists, Wallace's unpledged electors easily prevailed over those pledged to support LBJ (Leshner, 1994, p. 266 and 296). As a result of this victory, Alabama was the only state in 1964 where voting for the national Democratic ticket was not an option aside from writing in LBJ (Carlson, 1981, p. 44). When later asked about his administration blocking LBJ from the ballot Wallace argued that he had done no such thing. The voters had rejected Johnson-aligned electors, and Johnson could have gained ballot access under a third-party label (Byran, Donnahoe, Kilpatrick, and Hall, 1967).

Wallace's unpledged electors were also floated in part as a means of influencing LBJ's running-mate selection. Wallace held a grudge against Attorney General Robert Kennedy dating back to their standoff over the desegregation of the University of Alabama. Wallace's electors were said to be under orders to refuse to back LBJ in the general election if he selected RFK as his running mate. If LBJ chose a more moderate running mate Wallace's electors could support the official Democratic nominee (Carlson, 1981, p. 34). Some intimates of Wallace speculated

that regardless of what happened within the Democratic Party, Wallace would induce his unpledged electors to support Goldwater (W.D. Malone, 1964). It is unknown whether National Democratic Party insiders paid any mind to Wallace's hopes to leverage the state's electoral votes. The plot was complicated by most of Wallace's electors. Figures like Bull Connor refused to sign formal loyalty pledges to vote in accordance with Wallace's wishes (Carlson, 1981, p. 42). As Goldwater's prospects in the Deep South improved, Wallace toyed with asking the unpledged electors to resign and be replaced by party loyalists. This was due to fears that a Goldwater victory would tarnish Wallace's perceived lock on state politics (Jenkins, 1964, p. 5). Due to Goldwater's landslide victory in the state, Wallace's unpledged electors ultimately played no role in the outcome. In Mississippi, Democrats loyal to Wallace also explored getting unpledged electors onto the ballot. Between Wallace formally ending his challenge and Goldwater's prospects of winning the state being high, the strategy was not pursued (Leshner, 1994, p. 306).

The failure of Wallace's plot to be added to Goldwater's ticket put him in a political bind. He was in no position to mount a credible third-party challenge, and it seemed likely that Goldwater would be the first Republican to carry significant portions of the Deep South despite his poor prospects in the rest of the country. If Goldwater's looming victories had down-ballot coattails, he would lose his local and regional Democratic allies. Wallace was also too economically liberal to change parties if Goldwater brought about a Republican resurgence in the South. Perhaps hoping to keep his options open if he did need to change parties before his next election, Wallace adopted a cautious strategy for the 1964 cycle. While he verbally supported his local Democratic allies, he did not seriously campaign on their behalf. This calculation arguably

contributed to Goldwater's statewide landslide and left bitter feelings among local Democrats who were washed out of office by Goldwater's regional victory (Carlson, 1981, p. 43-44).

1968 Presidential Election

1968 Democratic Primary

The 1968 Democratic primary season was a political roller coaster. LBJ won the opening New Hampshire primary but Senator Eugene McCarthy running in opposition to the Vietnam War and the imperial presidency, received 42.2% of the vote. Due to McCarthy's better geographic vote allocation and byzantine state rules, the result earned him a solid majority of the delegates (Schlesinger, 1978, p. 886). This display of weakness led to Johnson announcing that he would not seek nor accept re-nomination as the party's standard-bearer. Senator Robert Francis Kennedy (D-NY) jumped into the race soon after. Vice President Hubert Humphrey followed to little fanfare. RFK positioned himself as a passionate civil rights advocate and champion of the downtrodden. In some liberal circles, RFK was criticized for waiting until LBJ had was from the race and previous rejections of liberal orthodoxy during his time in the Justice Department. After entering the race, things quickly shifted in RFK's favor. Humphrey, now an elder statesmen rather than upstart liberal, had establishment support as well as decades of chits to call in from party elites. Humphrey's establishment support even extended to the emerging ranks of New South southern liberals. Humphrey's strengths, though, did him little good in the remaining primaries (Schlesinger, 1978, p. 923).

In the primaries contested by the three rivals RFK generally came out ahead aside from a stinging loss in Oregon to McCarthy. The race culminated in the high-stakes California primary, where RFK prevailed. While Humphrey led in pledged delegates, the RFK campaign believed

that through their display of strength in the primaries and by brokering an alliance with McCarthy, they would arrive at the Convention in a stronger position than the Vice President. Such plans never came to fruition as RFK was struck down by an assassin's bullet after addressing supporters at a victory party (Schlesinger, 1978, p. 947 and 953-955). Following the tragedy, the Democratic Convention turned to Vice President Hubert Humphrey rather than Senator McCarthy, who had performed best in the primaries out of the remaining candidates.

1968 Republican Primary

The 1968 Republican primary was unusual in that for the majority of the primary season, Nixon was unopposed, but other candidates jockeyed for support behind the scenes. Due to indecision or fear that he would not do well in the primaries, Governor Rockefeller mainly played an insider game until just before the GOP Convention. Like Rockefeller, Governor Reagan also hinted at a bid without going public until just before the Convention. The few primaries that took place amounted to shadowboxing with Richard Nixon rather than taking his candidacy on directly.

Following the one-two punch of his 1960 defeat in the presidential election and his failed bid for the governorship of California, many had written Nixon off politically. In the interim, Nixon slowly reestablished himself. During the 1964 campaign, Nixon hoped to emerge as a compromise nominee at the GOP Convention. After Goldwater secured the nomination, Nixon became an enthusiastic supporter, unlike many of the moderate and establishment leaders of the party. Nixon seemed to harbor no delusions regarding Goldwater's presidential prospects but recognized that he had more to gain politically by championing his party rather than distancing

himself from Goldwater. The calculation, for example, helped to ingratiate him among his party's ascendant conservative wing (Aitken, 1993, p.378-379).

While there has been much political debate regarding whether Republicans, so-called Southern Strategy associated with Nixon, was a formal plan or more of an ad hoc reaction to events on the ground, it seems unquestionable that Nixon's political resurrection owed a debt to the South. Nixon's early courting of southerners proved critical to securing his parties' nomination and ultimately his general election victory. Nixon made his first inroads among Southern Republicans and the growing ranks of southern ticket splitters through his support for Goldwater, the first Republican to crack the Deep South. Nixon also set about building alliances with the South's handful of prominent Republicans.

This decision was due in part to fear that a potential Wallace third-party candidacy complicated Republicans' inroads in the region. Nixon and former Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond struck up a working relationship years before the election. Senator Thurmond agreed to try and prevent southerners from voting for Wallace in the general election and help Nixon secure southern delegates before the 1968 GOP Convention. In exchange, Thurmond would have an ally in the White House for the first time in his long political career. Thurmond's efforts proved crucial as most Southern Republicans were recent converts who may have voted for Eisenhower but never felt much warmth for Nixon due to his civil rights record (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 227). Nixon also won over the South's only other high profile Republican Senator Tower (R-TX) (Edwards, 1995, p. 355). To carry, or at least mollify these new southern Republicans, Nixon also sought to make clear that while he was committed to the civil rights initiatives he had supported previously, he would draw a line in the sand regarding future civil rights programs (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 229). Nixon allies also lobbied Deep South delegates who favored

Reagan by assuring them that a Nixon administration would move slowly to integrate schools (Danielson, 2009, p. 94). That said, Nixon was not overly fond of Republicans who engaged in segregationist rhetoric. Even as Nixon was cultivating relationships in the region, he publicly warned against resorting to Dixiecrat-style tactics (Aitken, 1993, p. 381).

Nixon's biggest threat during the primary stage was the allure California Governor Ronald Reagan had among southern conservatives. Reagan's political evolution was not so different from that of many conservative southerners. Reagan had been a strong Democrat until the 1950s when he became a Democrat for Eisenhower, followed by a Democrat for Nixon (Cannon, 2003, p. 83 and 112). He then formally switched his partisan affiliation to Republican shortly before Goldwater's 1964 campaign in which he was virtually Goldwater's only Hollywood supporter. In addition to Reagan's natural charisma and forceful anti-communist rhetoric, the governor was attractive to southerners because, unlike Nixon, he had never voted in favor of a civil rights bill. Reagan was also a largely blank slate on the issues, with his recent governorship having taken no particularly positive or negative stances (Aitken, 1993, p. 419).

1968 Republican Convention

Reagan proved popular enough in the Deep South that even Senator Thurmond's political clout could not silence Reagan's admirers in the South Carolina Republican Party. Nixon only won the entirety of the South Carolinas delegation due to Thurmond hashing out a compromise. The delegation's votes would be awarded to him as a favorite son candidate. Thurmond would then step aside to transfer his votes to Nixon. If Nixon failed to secure the nomination on the first ballot, however, Reagan's South Carolina admirers would be released to support him on subsequent ballots (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 228). At the time, there seemed

to be a decent possibility of the Convention going through multiple ballots. Nixon's camp feared that his candidacy could be caught in a pincer with Reagan on his right and Rockefeller on his left. Once the roll was called, Nixon's strategy paid off as he carried the day with 692 delegates to Rockefeller's 277 and Reagan's 182 (Aitken, 1993, p. 419). This outcome was due in no small part to Senators Thurmond and Tower working southern delegates on Nixon's behalf. Additionally, Nixon won over cross-pressured delegates by promising to appoint strict constructivists to the Supreme Court who were not likely to advocate for civil rights from the bench, oppose busing programs, and to generally defer to a state's rights approach to education policy (Edwards, 1995, p. 259).

After clinching the nomination, Nixon faced a modicum of resistance regarding his running-mate selection. Keeping with his Southern Strategy, Nixon wanted to select a southerner but went with a figure who hailed from just below the Mason-Dixon Line Maryland Governor Spiro Agnew due to the thin bench. Agnew had been a Rockefeller ally and was at the time considered a moderate to liberal Republican (Smith, 2014, p. 517). Having recently defeated a segregationist Democrat and future member of Wallace's third-party, Agnew was initially considered progressive on civil rights and respected within the African American community. This assessment was in the process of changing, however, as Agnew adopted a harsh law and order approach to dealing with the ongoing urban unrest and mass protests of the year. Supporters of the failed presidential candidates opposed this selection, but Agnew was acceptable to most factions of the party (Aitken, 1993, p. 421-22).

1968 American Independent Party

Initially, Wallace vowed to stay out of the 1968 contest if a candidate from one of the major parties ran on a platform favorable to the segregationist South (AP, 1967, B-9). After no candidate came forward acceptable to Dixiecrat types, Governor Wallace shook up the campaign by launching a bid as the standard-bearer of the newly formed American Independent Party. Unlike Thurmond or Byrd before him, Wallace's racially charged and populist rhetoric garnered him a vocal following beyond the Deep South. In states as far removed from the South as coastal California, Wallace had admirers. Over one hundred thousand Californians, most previously registered Democrats, proved willing to change their party registration to that of the American Independent Party for Wallace to secure ballot access in the state (Leshner, 1994, p. 387-388 and 400).

Like Thurmond in 1948 and Byrd's pseudo candidacy in 1960, Wallace and his backers did not think outright victory was likely. Instead, they believed that they could pull enough votes away from the major party candidates to throw the outcome of the race into the House of Representatives (Carter, 1996, p.18). With his sympathizers in Congress holding the balance of power, Wallace theorized that he could leverage various concessions from the victor, such as a veto over potential cabinet appointments, Supreme Court nominations, or even an appointment to the office of Attorney General (Leshner, 1994, p. 401). Wallace had reason to think that such a scenario was not simply a pipe dream as early Gallup polling showed him as garnering as much as 13% of the vote in a hypothetical three-way matchup between himself, LBJ, and Governor George Romney, who were initially considered likely standard bears for their parties (Leshner, 1994, p. 392). While Wallace was not likely to overtake the standard-bearers of either major party, his polling was considerably better than Thurmond's twenty years prior. This dynamic

legitimately raised the specter of a deadlock in the Electoral College. Political observers beyond the usual Dixiecrat fold also took his challenge seriously. Senator Charles H. Percy (R-IL) feared that Wallace's candidacy would indeed force the outcome into the House of Representatives (Leshner, 1994, p. 401).

Since Wallace's abortive campaign in 1964, his staff had spent years studying the history of competitive presidential elections, third party campaigns, and the minutia of the Electoral College. Wallace's literature and speeches sought to inform potential supporters of the history of contingent elections as well as the presidents who had secured the office with only a plurality of the vote. The campaign additionally stressed its confidence in earning a plurality victory in every state south of the Mason-Dixon Line. If progressives unhappy with Vice President Humphrey ran their own candidate turning the race into a four-way contest, the campaign expressed confidence in plurality victories across the country. The campaign further stressed its belief that electors were independent agents who could be courted in the event of a hyper-competitive race. Campaign literature noted that only a dozen states had laws penalizing faithless electors, which the campaign believed could be challenged as unconstitutional if triggered. Wallace recognized that a backroom political deal determining the next president would not be viewed favorably by the American people. Wallace instead spoke of the need for the winning candidate to make a solemn covenant to represent voters who shared his viewpoints rather than entering a one on one negotiated deal (Franklin, 1968, p.1 and 40).

The possibility that Wallace's candidacy would disrupt the electoral process was taken seriously in many circles. Numerous newspaper columns were published beyond the South seeking to explain to voters what could happen if no candidate received the necessary 270 electoral votes. Scholarly papers were also published exploring the possibility and generally

finding it possible though unlikely. Unsubstantiated rumors spread that representatives of the Humphrey and Nixon campaigns had approached southern members of Congress. These inquiries alleged that campaign operatives wished to know if representatives could vote for Wallace on the first ballot to satisfy their constituents and then change their position if multiple ballots were needed to determine the next president (UPI, July 22, 1968, p. 20).

Fearing the chaos of an election determined by faithless electors, a contingent election in the House, or worse yet, a Wallace victory, a number of politicians stepped forward hoping to broker an agreement between Nixon and Humphrey. Activists pushed for both major parties to adopt resolutions in their party platform, agreeing to recognize the winner of the popular vote. Sitting Governors Chaffee, Romney, and Hoff specifically solicited a bipartisan pledge to respect the winner of the popular vote rather than deal with Wallace if neither candidate earned a majority in the Electoral College. The agreement called for the loser of the popular vote to do everything in his power to push a sufficient number of his electors to back the winner of the popular vote to avoid a contingent election. Some in Wallace's camp were receptive to the proposal. These figures believed Wallace was more likely to win a plurality of the popular vote than be able to command the support of enough members of Congress to win a contingent election or force the concessions he desired (Mears, 1968, p. 1 and 23). In the House, Congressmen Goodell and Udall similarly stepped forward to make a bi-partisan plea. The duo lobbied the three parties to adopt pledges at their respective conventions to respect the popular vote winner rather than risk a contingent election (UPI, July 22, 1968, p. 30). Intimates of both Humphrey and Nixon showed openness to a deal, but no campaign opted to limit its options by making any formal agreement (Mears, 1968, p.1 and 23). This concern was not shared by all

national figures. Governor Reagan was critical of Republicans agreeing to any such deal with Democrats and had faith that the voters would not make a deal necessary (Weaver, 1968, p. 25).

Wallace's prospects were further enhanced by just how prominent a figure he had become in American politics. A Gallup poll released during the campaign of most admired men in America placed Wallace ahead of Nixon, with Vice President Humphrey not even included (Leshner, 1994, p. 423). This admiration resulted in him regularly drawing raucous crowds of more than ten thousand people well beyond his base of support in the Deep South. In addition to his politics of racial grievance, Wallace's attacks on the political establishment and overall machismo expanded his southern base to include swaths of working-class white men under the age of thirty-five (Carter, 1996, p. 19 and 22).

Unlike Thurmond in 1948, Wallace was able to garner support from high-profile individuals from beyond the Deep South. Wallace attracted a hodgepodge of supporters ranging from hard-right conservatives to economically liberal populists, including such figures as Ezra Taft Benson, a leader in the Church of Latter-day Saints and former Secretary of Agriculture under President Eisenhower (Leshner, 1994, p. 406). Outside of politics, Wallace enjoyed some popularity among Hollywood's aging Western stars such as Chill Wills of *Gunsmoke* and Walter Brennan of *The Real McCoys*. Despite publically endorsing and campaigning on behalf of Richard Nixon, the Duke himself, John Wayne, reportedly donated to Wallace's campaign (Leshner, 1994, p. 409). That said, Wallace struggled to gain endorsements from elected officials from outside of Alabama. Due to the adoption of internal Democratic Party rules punishing those who explicitly supported a different candidate than the official party standard-bearer, few risked explicitly supporting Wallace (Pine, 1967, p. 3). This reluctance extended to state officeholders a survey taken at the 1968 Southern Governors Conference showed only Alabama Governor

Albert Brewer and Mississippi Governor John Bell Williams willing to openly endorse the American Independent Party ticket. Governor Maddox stopped short of an explicit endorsement, and the remainder outright opposed Wallace (Rugaber, 1968, p. 31).

By the summer of 1968, Wallace was on track to secure ballot access in all fifty states. The campaign appeared poised to be the most significant third-party challenger for the presidency since Theodore Roosevelt's bid under the Progressive Bull Moose Party. For all these advantages, Wallace's American Independent Party was little more than a vehicle for his personal advancement. As late as September of 1968, the American Independent Party lacked a proper party platform (Leshner, 1994, p. 416). Filing inconsistencies and conflicting deadlines also left the party with many different names depending on the state (Carlson, 1981, p. 74). In some ways, this worked to Wallace's advantage. Focusing on the candidate rather than those who organized the party obscured from voters just how far outside the political mainstream its operatives were. According to investigations by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Independent Party was rife with members of White Citizens Councils and the John Birch Society. Wallace, for his part, only forbade those with explicit ties to the American Nazi Party from membership (Kihss, 1968, p.51).

Wallace also struggled to secure a prominent running mate. After his wife Lurleen's successful election to succeed him in office, Wallace initially garnered attention by entertaining the idea of selecting a female running-mate (Bryan, Donnahoe, Kilpatrick, and Hall, 1967). Wallace considered a slew of bizarre choices ranging from KFC founder Harland Sanders who was said to have donated to the campaign, to John Wayne, who declined the offer (Leshner, 1994, p. 424). Wallace also reportedly hoped to offer the position to FBI Director J Edgar Hoover. Among the more traditional considerations was Texas Governor John Connally, who was

uninterested (Carlson, 1981, p. 83-84). To secure ballot access, former Georgia Governor Marvin Griffin served as a placeholder for filing paperwork and appeared on the general ballot as Wallace's running-mate in a number of states (Here Are Georgia's Major Contests, 1968, p.12C). Griffin had little interest in actually running alongside Wallace and played only a minor role on the campaign trail (Libbey, 2009, p. 77-78).

Happy Chandler, a former Governor and Senator of Kentucky, was seriously considered for the position. Chandler was also no stranger to aggressive Dixiecrat-style campaigns against liberal Democrats, having unsuccessfully challenged Senator Barkley from the right (Libbey, 2009, p. 77-78). A slew of Wallace's hard-right electors, staff, and volunteers threatened to resign due to Barkley's consideration because of his role in integrating Major League Baseball during his time as Commissioner and his status as a fair-weather friend of civil rights supporters while in political office. Following this internal revolt, the campaign sought to smooth things over by asking Chandler to issue a statement denouncing or walking back previous positions, which Chandler refused (Franklin, 1968, p. 32). Absent a retraction; the campaign deemed Chandler unacceptable. Chandler felt this snubbing was a significant error. Chandler believed that his relative moderation on civil rights issues and a fairly liberal voting record could have theoretically broadened Wallace's appeal (Leshner, 1994, p. 424). The snubbing also turned Chandler into a vicious critic of Wallace and was viewed as responsible for derailing his chances in Kentucky (Hill, 2002, p. 679). This delay in designating an official running-mate resulted in nonpartisan voter guides being forced to leave boxes reserved for the American Independent Party vice presidential candidate blank (The Official Voters Guide 1968, p. 36).

Wallace ultimately selected United States Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay based on donors' arguments that the move would expand his appeal among veterans and servicemen (Kozak, 2011, p. 372). LeMay, who feuded with both JFK and LBJ for, in his eyes, being insufficiently aggressive against the Soviets in general and in Vietnam specifically, seemed on paper a perfect fit for the aggressive Wallace. It soon became apparent that, in practice, they were a poor political match. Despite his friendship with figures like Senator Goldwater and his status as an ardent Cold Warrior, LeMay was in some regards quite liberal for his time (Kozak, 2011, p. 357).

The most prominent of the many issues they disagreed on was the subject of integration. While in uniform, LeMay actively supported the integration of the Air Force (Kozak, 2011, p. 372). LeMay was also liberal on reproductive issues such as contraceptives, abortion, as well as being an avid environmentalist. LeMay was apprehensive about the campaign from the start and feared he would be labeled a racist for working with Wallace. LeMay initially turned down the offer but was eventually persuaded by the idea that his presence on the ticket would hurt Humphrey, who he felt would continue the mistakes of the two previous administrations. Wallace was so unsure that LeMay would show up to their first formal event that he had former Louisiana Governor and award-winning country and gospel singer Jimmie H. Davis on standby to assume the position as his running-mate. Their political differences resulted in apparent unease on the trail, with Wallace often reinterpreting LeMay's answers to reporters. Wallace ultimately used a fact-finding mission in Vietnam to justify removing LeMay from the campaign trail after his colorful language about war and seeming eagerness to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam corresponded with a drop in the polls (Kozak, 2011, p. 373-376 and 379-380). LeMay

also proved a drain on much needed campaign resources as he insisted on his own campaign airplane and other expenses (Hill, 2002, p.682).

1968 General Election

Ironically Wallace's dreams of siphoning off enough votes to throw the election into the House may have been thwarted by his spiritual predecessor. During the closing weeks of the election, Senator Thurmond embarked on a vigorous campaign throughout the South to oppose Wallace and encourage voters to pull the lever for Nixon. Having sought the presidency under the banner of a third party, Thurmond was uniquely positioned to make a credible argument that if conservative southerners stuck with Wallace, there was a strong possibility that they would ease Humphrey's path to the White House (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 219). Importantly Thurmond's recent party switch had likely done little to diminish him in the eyes of his intended audience. Despite now having an R beside his name, a number of Deep South Democratic Senators had endorsed him in his first race as a Republican, such as Senators Russell, Talmadge, and Stennis. Thurmond had also reportedly been sharpening his attacks against Wallace for some time. When Nixon was laying the groundwork for a campaign two years prior, he was supposedly nervous that a potential Wallace candidacy would split the conservative vote and ensure a Democratic victory in either the general or a contingent election (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 223).

Nixon's concern was shared by Congressman Bob Wilson (R-CA), Chair of the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), who issued pleas to donors to invest in House races that could turn the tide in a contingent election. This plea reportedly went out to over a million registered Republicans. The solicitation reflects either a genuine concern by the party of

a contingent election or recognition that the fear of this outcome was sufficient among rank and file Republicans that it could be leveraged for donations (Lofus, 1968, p. 18). Nixon also had reason to fear that recent southern converts to the GOP would prefer to support Wallace rather than the nominee of their new party. South Carolina journalist and occasional Republican political candidate W.D. Workman exemplified this concern. Despite Workman's status as an active Republican, the former Dixiecrat was acquainted with the Wallace family and occasionally sent their campaigns unsolicited advice and suggestions (W.D. Workman, April 22, 1964). A smattering of Deep South Republicans had also shown interest in supporting Wallace at the recent GOP Convention (Jenkins, May 7, 1964, p. 3). In light of these concerns, Thurmond stepped forward to serve as a hedge against a potential Wallace candidacy dominating the South (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 223).

In addition to numerous live appearances, Thurmond's attacks on Wallace became a staple of regional country music stations. Thurmond's attacks corresponded with a drop in Wallace's polling and potentially cost him states where there was some evidence that he was leading like North Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, and Thurmond's home state of South Carolina (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 232). After the election, the executive director of Wallace's campaign acknowledged that in the eyes of the campaign, Thurmond's attacks had killed their prospects of dominating the region (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 219). Once Nixon was in office, Thurmond was rewarded for his efforts. A disproportional number of South Carolinians received federal appointments, and enough pork projects flowed into South Carolina that Thurmond earned a reputation as "Santa Clause in South Carolina and Scrooge in Washington" (Bass and Thompson, 1998, p. 233 and 264).

Wallace's third-party bid is often seen as having doomed the prospects of Democrat Hubert Humphrey. Politically Wallace disliked both Humphrey and Nixon for their civil rights advocacy in the Senate and as vice president. Wallace also portrayed Nixon as the federal force behind the various school integration standoffs of the 1950s rather than Eisenhower on the campaign trail. On a more personal level, Wallace loathed Nixon for having described his deceased wife Lurleen, who briefly succeeded him as Governor as an unqualified dime store girl (Leshner, 1994, p. 367).

The Nixon campaign, like Goldwater's, previously either took some inspiration from Wallace's rhetoric or tapped into the same general zeitgeist. As the campaign wore on, Nixon cast aside his 1950s brand as a political moderate and champion of civil rights in favor of a more conservative persona as a champion of law and order. This was evidenced in his selection of Governor Spiro Agnew of Maryland, who had undergone a similar political shift. Agnew was initially perceived as a Rockefeller Republican with a strong civil rights record. Following the protests and riots of 1968, Agnew shifted much further to the right. Agnew responded harshly to the unrest. His actions and heated rhetoric cost him the support of the civil rights movement and much of his state's African American community. The Nixon campaign, particularly when using Agnew as a surrogate, occasionally matched Wallace's heated rhetoric and even outflanked him on issues such as busing (Leshner, 1994, p. 403).

The 1968 election initially looked like as much of a nail-biter as the 1960 campaign. Early returns reflected a close race with Nixon and Humphrey seesawing, back and forth until about midnight (Aitken, 1993, p. 434). Once the dust had settled and the votes fully tabulated, Wallace earned 9.9 million votes or 13.5% of the popular vote to Nixon's 43.4% and Humphrey's 42.7%. Out of the more than 71 million ballots cast, just half a million votes

separated Nixon and Humphrey's popular vote totals. Wallace carried 5 states, Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, for a total of 45 electoral votes compared to Nixon's 32 states and 301 electoral votes and Humphrey's 13 states and 191 electoral votes (Kozak, 2011, p. 381). Wallace's electoral margin was enhanced to 46 by a faithless elector from North Carolina pledged to the Republican ticket. This performance would award Wallace the distinction of being the last third-party candidate for the presidency to earn votes in the Electoral College (Kura, 2001, p. 14 and 18). Accusations that Wallace's candidacy had siphoned away disgruntled Democrats who would have probably come home to Humphrey were buttressed by exit polling. Wallace voters surveyed in Kentucky, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Illinois, and Ohio would have largely backed Humphrey in a two-way race. On the other hand Humphrey likely only carried Texas, which had been trending Republican at the presidential level for some time, due to Wallace splitting the conservative vote (Leshner, 1994, p. 428). American National Election Survey data further complicates the question of which candidate Wallace hurt more as those surveyed who planned to vote for Wallace did not feel particularly warm toward liberals or conservatives as a group. Wallace voters were also only slightly more likely to identify as Democrats compared to Independents (Carlson, 1981, p. 85-86, and 89).


What if the House Decided the 1968 Outcome?

Because Wallace never held federal office, he lacks a proper DW-NOMINATE score. Senator James B. Allen, though, represents a good stand-in. In addition to serving as Wallace's Lieutenant Governor, Allen was viewed as a strong Wallace loyalist due to his abstention from challenging Lurleen Wallace as her husband's heir in Alabama's 1966 gubernatorial election (Hamilton, 1987, p. 277-78). James and his wife Maryon also stood for election as Wallace

electors during the 1968 presidential campaign. Senator Allen's ideology as measured by DW-NOMINATE was also only slightly to the right of senators that Wallace viewed as potential cabinet members if he were successful. Wallace cited Senator John Stennis (D-MS) as a potential Attorney General and Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA) as his possible Secretary of Agriculture (Leshner, 1994, p. 469). While Allen was more economically conservative than most Southern Democrats, this also makes him an appropriate proxy for Governor Wallace. Wallace's presidential campaign rhetoric rarely drew attention to his liberal spending programs in Alabama, and the campaign explicitly sought to market the candidate as a conservative. For the purposes of this analysis, Senator Allen's DW-NOMINATE score of (0.008, 0.993) from his first term in the 91st Congress is employed as a proxy for Wallace as it reflects his policy preferences at the time closest to when he was a protégée of the Alabama Governor.

While Hubert Humphrey served as Vice President during the 1968 election cycle, he served in the Senate only four years prior. As with Nixon and Byrd, Senator Humphrey's various DW-NOMINATE scores prior to the presidential election were averaged to reflect his evolution from a liberal firebrand to a somewhat more moderate statesman. This evolution puts Humphrey at (-0.376, -0.06) or quite liberal on economics and center-left on civil rights. As for Nixon, his score of (0.14, -0.412) from the 1960 analysis is carried over (Figure 10).

Figure 10




Visual Representation of the Candidates Positions Relative to the 91st House of Representatives

The prospect of a contingent election following the 1968 presidential election is fascinating because, despite Nixon's decisive victory in the Electoral College, Democrats retained a solid majority in the House. Democrats held 243 seats to the GOP's 192. While this was Democrats' smallest margin in the three elections examined, Democrats were geographically distributed well enough to put them in a strong position. The Nixon campaign had also expressed fears of Wallace's candidacy leading to such an eventuality. Going into a contingent election, Democrats would have held majorities in 26 states the bare majority needed to place one of their own into the White House. Republicans meanwhile held majorities in nineteen state delegations, with five states divided evenly.

The DW-NOMINATE score for the body going into a hypothetical contingent election stood at (-0.06, 0.07) or center-left on economics and center-right on civil rights. The Democratic coalition meanwhile stood at (-0.276, 0.335) or relatively liberal on economics and fairly conservative on civil rights. The GOP delegation meanwhile stood at (0.202, -0.253). The GOP delegation meanwhile stood at (0.202, -0.253). Nixon thus would have gone into a contingent election roughly reflecting the preferences of his party coalition. On the other hand, Humphrey was to the left of his caucus on both economics and civil rights, while Wallace would have been significantly to the right of the Democratic Party across the board. Based on their DW-NOMINATE scores, the factions of the 91st Congress stood at 274 cross-pressured members, 57 liberal Democrats, 37 conservative Republicans, 32 centrists, 27 Dixiecrats, and 8 Rockefeller Republicans (Figure 11). This factional distribution reflects the gradual sorting of the parties as the number of Congressmen with liberal scores on one dimension and conservative scores on the other diminished, as did the ranks of Dixiecrat types. The number of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats meanwhile increased.

Figure 11



91st United States Congress Factions

If the outcome had been placed in the hands of the 91st Congress, the estimated groupings of state delegations are 21 aligned with Nixon, 13 with Humphrey, 11 with Wallace, and 5 delegations split (Figure 12). Thus, Wallace could have theoretically denied Nixon and Humphrey a first-ballot victory if House members with similar policy preferences backed him. That said, a hypothetical third place position severely undercuts supporter's hopes that Wallace could have emerged from such a scramble as the next commander in chief. The estimates do suggest that Wallace supporters could have been in a position to force some form of concessions. Humphrey would have needed every Wallace-aligned state delegation as well as a couple of the split delegations to emerge victorious. Though closer to an absolute majority, Nixon may still have needed to deal with either Humphrey or Wallace-aligned legislators to emerge the victor.

Nixon may well have been willing to deal with Wallace types in the House. After becoming president, he showed a tendency to remain neutral in southern races where the GOP candidate was unlikely to be competitive, and the Democrat was supportive of his agenda (Danielson, 2009, p. 96). As such, it is conceivable that Wallace's faction could have accomplished its goal of forcing concessions from the eventual administration.

Figure 12

State	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	Result
AL Delegation		3	5	Wallace
AK Delegation		1		Nixon
AZ Delegation	1	2		Nixon
AR Delegation	1	1	2	Wallace
CA Delegation	20	17	1	Humphrey
CO Delegation	2	1	1	Humphrey
CT Delegation	4	2		Humphrey
DE Delegation		1		Nixon
FL Delegation	4	3	5	Wallace
GA Delegation	2		8	Wallace
HI Delegation	2			Humphrey
ID Delegation		2		Nixon
IL Delegation	11	12	1	Nixon
IN Delegation	3	8		Nixon
IA Delegation	2	3	2	Nixon
KS Delegation			5	Nixon
KY Delegation	1	3	3	Split Delegation
LA Delegation	1		7	Wallace
ME Delegation	2			Humphrey
MD Delegation	4	4		Split Delegation
MA Delegation	7	4		Humphrey
MI Delegation	7	12		Nixon
MN Delegation	3	5		Nixon
MS Delegation			5	Wallace
MO Delegation	6	1	3	Humphrey
MT Delegation	2			Humphrey
NE Delegation		3		Nixon
NV Delegation			1	Wallace
NH Delegation		2		Nixon
NJ Delegation	9		6	Humphrey
NM Delegation		2		Nixon
NY Delegation	25	16		Humphrey
NC Delegation	1	4	6	Wallace
ND Delegation		2		Nixon
OH Delegation	6	18		Nixon
OK Delegation	1	2	3	Wallace
OR Delegation	2	2		Split Delegation
PA Delegation	14	13		Humphrey
RI Delegation	2			Humphrey
SC Delegation			6	Wallace
SD Delegation		2		Nixon
TN Delegation	2	4	3	Nixon
TX Delegation	1	2	20	Wallace
UT Delegation		2		Nixon
VT Delegation		1		Nixon
VA Delegation		5	5	Split Delegation
WA Delegation	5	2		Humphrey
WV Delegation	2	1	2	Split Delegation
WI Delegation	4	6		Nixon
WY Delegation		1		Nixon
Totals	Humphrey 13	Nixon 21	Wallace 11	Evenly Split Delegations 5

Estimated State Delegation Preferences for the 91st House of Representatives

Fearing the prospect of a contingent election, some members of Congress publicly vowed to simply support the candidate who carried their district and refuse to change their stance regardless of how many ballots were required to produce an absolute majority of state delegations. Based on data from the *Congressional District Data Book for the 93rd Congress*, which includes the performances of the 1968 presidential candidates broken down by congressional district for most of the country, Nixon had a comfortable majority of state delegations. According to the study, Nixon won the majority of congressional districts in 29 states, Humphrey 11, Wallace 5, and 2 state delegations split evenly (Figure 13). The remaining two states New York and Washington, are not applicable due to cross-filing by minor parties, the redrawing of districts, and local peculiarities making the outcomes murky. That said, the two states likely belong in the Humphrey column. A different result in just a handful of states could have produced a deadlock in the Electoral College regardless of the popular vote in the individual congressional districts. Nixon would have needed to severely underperform his actual results to leave things in doubt. Wallace's potential bargaining position would have likely been fragile if the vast majority of the House had formally pledged to back the candidate that carried their district.

Figure 13

State	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	Result
AL Delegation			8	Wallace
AK Delegation		1		Nixon
AZ Delegation		3		Nixon
AR Delegation		1	3	Wallace
CA Delegation	22	16		Humphrey
CO Delegation	2	2		Split Delegation
CT Delegation	5	1		Humphrey
DE Delegation		1		Nixon
FL Delegation		9	3	Nixon
GA Delegation	1	1	8	Wallace
HI Delegation	2			Humphrey
ID Delegation		2		Nixon
IL Delegation	7	17		Nixon
IN Delegation	1	10		Nixon
IA Delegation		7		Nixon
KS Delegation		5		Nixon
KY Delegation	3	4		Nixon
LA Delegation	1		7	Wallace
ME Delegation	2			Humphrey
MD Delegation	3	5		Nixon
MA Delegation	12			Humphrey
MI Delegation	11	8		Humphrey
MN Delegation	7	1		Humphrey
MS Delegation			5	Wallace
MO Delegation	3	7		Nixon
MT Delegation		2		Nixon
NE Delegation		3		Nixon
NV Delegation		1		Nixon
NH Delegation		2		Nixon
NJ Delegation	5	10		Nixon
NM Delegation		2		Nixon
NY Delegation	NA	NA	NA	NA
NC Delegation		7	4	Nixon
ND Delegation		2		Nixon
OH Delegation	8	16		Nixon
OK Delegation	1	5		Nixon
OR Delegation	1	3		Nixon
PA Delegation	14	13		Humphrey
RI Delegation	2			Humphrey
SC Delegation	1	4	1	Nixon
SD Delegation		2		Nixon
TN Delegation	1	4	4	Split Delegation
TX Delegation	13	9	1	Humphrey
UT Delegation		2		Nixon
VT Delegation		1		Nixon
VA Delegation		8	2	Nixon
WA Delegation	NA	NA	NA	NA
WV Delegation	5			Humphrey
WI Delegation	6	4		Humphrey
WY Delegation		1		Nixon
Totals	Humphrey 11 State Delegations	Nixon 29 State Delegations	Wallace 5 State Delegations	2 Evenly Split Delegations

1968 Presidential Election Results by Congressional District

Nixon's Southern Strategy suggests that the candidate understood that he needed to cater to voters and politicians with Dixiecrat style views to win and govern successfully. Under the Nixon administration, school integration accelerated compared to the previous administrations (Aitken, 1993, p. 467). By rhetorically denouncing overzealous judges, making appointments acceptable to conservative southerners, and using a light touch when it came to overt federal interventions, Nixon was able to finesse his support for civil rights with his outreach to the South. Nixon and Wallace's overlap regarding law and order rhetoric also suggests that the Nixon campaign, to some degree, sought to convey to southern voters that he would deliver Wallace's conservative policies without the racist baggage.

Chapter III. Conjectures & Conclusions

Why the strategy was only pursued in the South?

It has long been documented that southern politicians were unique in their concern for party unity because the region's congressional delegation was tasked foremost with protecting the region's peculiar institutions. Before the Civil War, this referred to the institution of slavery, and after Reconstruction, this referred to the region's Jim Crow legal system. Said Jim Crow policies also served to limit the voting-eligible population to a relatively small and manageable bloc in much of the South. While demagogues and political machines were once common across the country, they were especially prevalent in the South during the Jim Crow era. Southern state's long-enduring practice of only allowing voters to select between slates of electors rather than candidates directly facilitated political intrigue. The South was uniquely positioned to manipulate the Electoral College due to the region's political unity, small voting population, handful of like-minded leaders, and byzantine electoral system.

Why did these efforts end after 1968?

The 1968 cycle represented the death rattle of segregationist Democrats' efforts to utilize the Electoral College as a means to preserve Jim Crow. In contrast to previous eras, the usual Dixiecrat approach of being conservative or center-right on economics and far-right on civil rights garnered virtually no support in the House beyond the South. In a hypothetical contingent election by 1968, a Dixiecrat-style candidate's cache was limited outside of the South. Even in the Deep South, segregationist Democrats' grip was loosening, with state delegations having dueling factions rather than being all but universally loyal to Dixiecrat style leaders. By the 1970s, the effects of the Voting Rights Act, the gradual rollback of Jim Crow, and inroads by the

Republican Party transformed southern politics. Slowly, the Dixiecrat-style politicians of old retired were replaced by Republicans or evolved with the times. Even the generalissimo of the politics of rage himself, George Wallace, began to reposition himself after nearly losing to a more pro-civil rights Democrat in the 1970 contest for governor (Harvey, 2020). Though the unrepentant Lester Maddox types of the South retained some influence for years to come, by the 1970s, their ranks eroded to the point that a contingent election was no longer a long-shot strategy but a hopeless fool's errand.

Conclusions

Congressional seniority, committee chairmanships, the filibuster, and voter registration policies that ranged from strict to discriminatory, have long been recognized as tools in the arsenal of southern segregationists (Buchanan, 1956, p. 352). The manipulation of the Electoral College should be included due to recognition that the process could be gamed with the hope of coercing concessions. The Dixiecrats did so with three goals in mind. They hoped that their preferred candidate could emerge from the scramble as the next commander-in-chief through a contingent election. Such an outcome was never particularly likely, nor did it ever come close to fruition. Failing in this, the Dixiecrats hoped that by denying the major candidates a first-round victory in the House, they could leverage concessions from the eventual winner. Though unsuccessful, they came much closer to accomplishing this goal in 1960 and 1968 than is generally appreciated and greatly intensified discussion of Electoral College reform. Lastly, they hoped that by obstructing the normal political process, they could force presidential candidates to cater to the region's interests. This goal was arguably successful as Democratic Party leaders labored to maintain party unity, and Republican candidates learned to court state's rights southerners.

The Dixiecrats' actions should serve to illustrate the precarious road that presidential candidates continue to navigate on their way to the oval office due to the porous construction of the Electoral College as an institution. Rather than simply appealing to the median voter, presidential candidates must appeal to median voters in critical swing states while also maintaining their factional coalition. Maintaining coalitions going into the general election is necessary to prevent the rise of splinter parties and political subterfuge. The aforementioned elections and history illustrate that securing the necessary 270 electoral votes on election day may not bring the contest to a complete conclusion. The reappearance of faithless electors in 2016 and unrest surrounding the certification process in 2020 should remind political observers that the nation's electoral system is vulnerable to disruption by committed political factions. Lest Americans risk seeing another presidential transition of power disrupted, detailed attention must be paid to the technicalities of the electoral system.

Political factions have periodically viewed the lag between election day, the meeting of the Electoral College, and Congress's largely ceremonial certification of results as an opportunity for mischief. Though efforts at subterfuge have repeatedly failed to change the outcome of an election or garner explicit concessions, sufficiently committed factions continue to try. Presidential candidates who have not achieved an overwhelming victory in the Electoral College must contend with the small but not inconceivable possibility of a disrupted process. Faithless electors, as well as sincere or cynical objections during the certification process, may reduce electoral mandates and erode legitimacy in the eyes of the public even as they fail to change the outcome. Thus the Electoral College institution has distorting effects beyond the commonly discussed disparities between the popular and electoral vote.

Future Research

As illustrated by the recent disruptions by both rioters and members of Congress regarding the certification of the 2020 election, efforts to interfere with the Electoral College remain alive and well. The most recent example, though, was not politicians seeking to engineer a contingent election but instead raised objections to the certification ostensibly in the hopes of inspiring members of Congress to vote to recognize alternative electors. The Republicans who employed this peculiar strategy were correct in pointing out that Democrats had made halfhearted attempts at similar protests in the recent past. Future research may focus on how those who seek to exploit wrinkles in the Electoral College have now settled on this strategy and if there is reason to believe that this tactic will fill the void left by Dixiecrats' repeated attempts to trigger a contingent election.

Another threat that merits exploration is how America's political institutions would resolve a presidential election tainted by widespread manipulation or fraud. An implication often glossed over in the coverage of the charges made by Republicans regarding the legitimacy of the 2020 election is that had widespread fraud occurred, it is doubtful that only the presidential ballot line would be tainted. Congressional members hailing from states with tainted results would presumably not be sworn into office and seated. Because the House and Senate both require a quorum of two-thirds of the body in the event of a contingent election, widespread enough fraud could prevent the possibility of a contingent election. This Gordian knot would need untangling before the January 20th deadline, or the speaker of the House would assume the presidency provided the sitting speaker's election was not also tainted. A sufficient majority quorum would then be required to select a new speaker. As the threat of foreign or domestic election meddling

is real, albeit unlikely, academics and political leaders would benefit from gaming out just how such a crisis could be resolved.

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