

THIS IS WHAT DEMOCRACY LOOKS LIKE: RACIAL IDENTITY, ANGER,
AND THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF WHITE WOMEN

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What are the relationships between strength of racial identification, anger, and the political behavior of white women? Building on the literature on white identity politics and anger in political behavior, I argue that white identity and anger have a conditional relationship that leads to changes in multiple aspects of white women's political behavior. This dissertation uses the 2016 American National Election Survey and the 2016 Comprehensive Multiracial Post-election Survey to explore these associations. The findings show that there is a relationship between white racial identity conditioned on anger or threat and the strength of white women's partisanship and their issue opinions. When there is no anger or threat measure included, the relationship with political participation is weaker than expected which supports the importance of anger and its predecessor threat in the political behavior of white women. Overall, this dissertation expands the areas of white political behavior that are associated with strength of racial identity and anger as well as finding these relationships specifically with white women.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 2017 and 2021, two events involving angry, passionate political white American women protesting the inauguration of a new president grabbed global headlines: the Women’s March (January 21, 2017) and the Capitol Insurrection (January 6, 2021). While these are hardly the only examples of protests involving activated white women, they were unexpected expressions of mass political dissatisfaction. The events took place against the backdrop of an America with rapidly changing racial demographics. Two key findings of the 2020 census were that nearly 40% of Americans identified as a race other than white and that the white population shrunk for the first time in the years between 2010 and 2020 (Frey 2020). The primary research questions asked in this dissertation is “what is the relationship between strength of racial identification and the political behavior of white American women?”

Building on the ideas of Jardina (2019) and Phoenix (2019), this dissertation considers how strength of white racial identity is associated with the political behavior of white women and if threat and anger are necessary a necessary component for this relationship. Phoenix (2019) describes a pathway where threat becomes anger which, in turn, leads to political participation for white women. Overall, I argue that white racial identity in the presence of threat or anger has a stronger association with white women’s political behavior. Below, I provide a brief overview of the value of this original contribution to the racial and ethnic politics research. Next, I explain the theoretical foundation for the use of anger, threat, and various measures of white racial identity. Finally, I provide a brief outline of each empirical chapter of this dissertation project and corresponding findings.

Because my primary data in each empirical chapter is from the year 2016, I think it is important to note that it would be wise to be cautious in how we generalize findings from that year. Gender and race were unusually salient in the 2016 presidential campaign with Hillary Clinton being the first woman to be nominated by one of the major parties and the particularly race- and gender-based rhetoric from Donald Trump and his campaign. These factors put attitudes about race front and center in the political debate which means will be important to replicate these results on other years to see if the findings hold. However, 2016 was also notable because it was a year that everyone noticed white womanhood. While white women as a group have routinely voted for Republican presidential candidates, this did not receive much public attention or scrutiny until 2016.

Contribution to the Literature

Work regarding white political behavior has become more frequent in recent years in both the popular press (Gest 2016; Hochschild 2016; Vance 2016) and in the academic literature (e.g. Feldman & Huddy 2005; Craig & Richeson 2018; Knowles & Tropp 2018; Mutz 2018; Jardina 2019). The literature about the determinants of political behavior in specifically white women is also growing (e.g. Junn 2017; Phillips 2018). The unique contribution of this dissertation is to explore the addition of the relationship of anger—as defined by anger expressed towards either the Republican or Democratic presidential candidate—and the political behavior of white women using various measures of racial identity, or the strength of one’s attachment to one’s racial group. The first empirical chapter examines the association between racial and economic threats and the partisanship of white women. The second empirical chapter compares the relationship between white consciousness and issue opinions of white men and women. The third empirical

chapter includes analysis of linked fate's role in the political participation of white women as well as women of other racial and ethnic groups.

Theory

Two popular explanations of white political behavior have been prominent in the years after Barak Obama won the White House in 2008. One explanation, set out mainly in the popular press, is that intense economic anxiety was driving protective behaviors in less affluent white voters (Gest 2016; Hochschild 2016; Vance 2016). The other explanation is found more often in the empirical literature and is focused on a more complex relationship with whites' attachment to their own race and finds that economic disenfranchisement is not exclusively or not even primarily driving white political behavior (Cramer Walsh 2012; Mutz 2018; Jardina 2019). Mutz (2018) tests these two explanations but uses measures that muddle economic and racial anxieties. In this dissertation, I test the relationships between economic anxiety, white racial attachment, and partisanship using explicit measures. Additionally, if the white group attachment is associated with partisanship, it may be impacting other aspects of white political behavior. Thus, I explore the links between the strength of white racial identity and additional facets of political behavior—issue opinion and political participation.

Choice of Measures of White Identity Aspects of Political Behavior

For each substantive chapter of this dissertation, I chose to use a different measure of white identity as an independent variable of interest and a different aspect of political behavior for dependent variables. As measures of the strength of white identity, I chose white identity importance, white consciousness, and linked fate. White identity importance is the self-reported

importance of being white to a respondent's identity. White consciousness is a scale developed by Jardina (2019) with that includes identity importance, a measure of group orientation, and a measure of perception of an unjust external force working against the group. Linked fate is the degree to which an individual believes their personal life chances are linked to those of their group. These variables were also chosen to speak to Phoenix's threat to anger to political participation pathway. Chapter 2 includes a measure of political anger as an additional independent variable of interest. Chapter 3's white consciousness is constructed from three questions one of which asks about perception of an outside, unjust threat against the group. because Chapter 4's linked fate measure does not include anything on the anger pathway. This allows the comparison of the relationship between the strength of white racial identity and white women's political behavior in the presence and absence of anger and threat.

As with the measures of white identity, each substantive chapter of this dissertation uses a different aspect of political behavior as its dependent variable(s). Political behavior is complex and has many facets. The choice to examine partisanship stemmed from my interest in the similarities and contrasts in the 2017 Women's March and 2021 Capitol Insurrection. Could white identity be a driving force behind participation in both of these events? Overall, I made the choice to use different measures for each chapter because if the sets of measures held similar relationships, the overall results would indicate a stronger, broader association between the strength of white women's racial identity and their political behavior. I consider political opinion to be more granular than partisanship and to allow more variation within an individual; examining it allows the determination of whether certain issues are more prone to the influence of strong white racial identity. Finally, political participation is the outcome of Phoenix's anger

pathway that inspired much of this dissertation. By examining it among non-angry white women in a comparative context, I am able to grapple with the strength of the relationship of simple racial identity and partisanship. Furthermore, comparing a primary group of interest to other groups is more informative than restricting our analysis to one group.

Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 examines relationships among anger, economic anxiety, and racial threat with partisanship among white women. I used individual and contextual levels of both racial threats (strength of white identity and percent non-white population) and economic threats (household income and contextual income quartile) and interact all four of those measures with anger. I argue that racial threat conditioned on anger will be associated with stronger Republican partisanship. There were no statistically significant findings for either the individual or contextual level economic factors. The results suggest the strength of a woman's white identity and anger have a conditional relationship that shifts her partisanship to the right making her more likely to consider herself a Republican and less likely to identify as a Democrat. Interestingly, there is little relationship between contextual diversity, anger, and white women's partisan identification except for angry women who live in highly diverse areas who are more likely to be Democrats.

Chapter 3 examines how white consciousness is related to political opinions of white men and white women. I argue that white consciousness is associated with disapproval of racialized policies (operationalized as support for government aid to Blacks and raced based affirmative action), but that relationship will be weaker for women than for men if an issue is gendered as well as racialized (here aid to Blacks). Similarly, I argue that white consciousness should not be associated with opinion on non-racialized issues (operationalized as abortion and government

action on climate change). The results indicate that white racial identity does is associated with the policy opinions of both white men and women. When an issue is both racialized and gendered, the association of strength of white consciousness is less for women than for men. For issues that are neither racialized nor gendered there was not a relationship for white consciousness for either men or women. Unexpectedly, white consciousness did have a relationship with white men’s opinions on abortion which suggests avenues for further research.

In Chapter 4, I examine the association between linked fate and four modes of political participation in white women and women of color using the 2016 Comprehensive Multiracial Postelection Survey (CMPS). Because there is no anger or threat measurement in this analysis, it allows the dissertation as a whole to implicitly test the idea that anger is necessary for white racial identity to motivate political behavior change. I hypothesized that linked fate would have the smallest association with the political participation of Latina and Asian American women. I find that contrary to my expectations, linked fate has the strongest relationship with Latina and Asian American women’s likelihood to participate politically and the weakest relationship with that of white women. This chapter adds to our knowledge of Latina and Asian American women—two of the groups we know least about in the political behavior literature—and adds evidence to the idea that threat or anger is needed too for the strength of racial identity to be associated with changes in political behavior for white women.

Notes on Wording and Style

In this dissertation, I capitalize the word Black but not white when referring to the racial groups. This follows the June 2020 AP style decision (Bauder 2020), but against the choices made by some Black scholars (for example Lockett et al. 2021). Like being Asian American or Latino—

groups whose names are already capitalized when using accepted grammatical standards,—being Black in the United States entails a shared set of experiences, history of subjugation and discrimination that does not exist in the same way for people who are white. Over the process of writing this dissertation, I have had discussions with friends and colleagues who are members of various racial groups about what race means to them specifically. Never once has a Black person not had an easily accessible answer to the variations of the question “What does being Black mean to you?” The responses from white people are vastly different. Some people take several minutes to formulate an answer. Others attempt humor and equate being white to things like camping and monograms. Still more seem to conflate being white with being American. Furthermore, white supremacists often capitalize white, and I do not wish to associate my work with white supremacy. Finally, the difference in using a capital B for Black and a lowercase w for white is a visual reminder of the fact that not everyone is cognizant of their own race in the same way.

Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the difference between the terms sex and gender, and the difficulties posed by a field that has not yet caught up with changing societal understandings of these terms. I understand that sex is biological and has variations while gender is socially constructed and based on human expression, identity, and behavior. The questions explored in this dissertation center around gender and the societal norms and expectations placed on those perceived as women. At times, the wording in this document appears slippery especially when quoting other scholars. I have chosen not to change some of these phrases either because I believe them to be intentionally chosen by the original authors (i.e. Junn’s (2017) description of white women being first in race and second in sex appears to be a reference to de

Beauvoir.) Empirically, the survey data that is currently available does not allow the parsing out of the variations of gender. In fact, the 2016 ANES, uses the terms sex and gender interchangeably having screeners record the respondent's "gender" with the categories of male and female while asking online participants for their "sex" leaving us unable to address the complexities of gender and sex. The 2016 CMPS did provide male, female, and other options for its gender question, but the number of respondents who answered "other" was less than one percent which makes analysis prohibitive. At this point in time, though I recognize the differences between gender and sex, quantitative analysis that fully embraces their complexities is impossible.

Finally, I will note that I intentionally try to avoid using the word intersectionality and related terms in this dissertation. While race and gender are overlapping identities that impact lived experience and political behavior, whiteness is not an identity of subordination in the power hierarchy as Crenshaw (1989) originally discussed her theory of intersectionality. I am more comfortable using it in the context of Chapter 4 because Black, Latina, and Asian women do have multiple marginalized identities. Some uses of terms related to intersectionality may have slipped through in reference to white women, but I do recognize the original meaning of the term and theory.

Overall, this dissertation examines the role of racial identity in the role of the political behavior of white women. While each substantive chapter contributes to the literature there is an additional contribution made when taking the results from the three substantive chapters as a whole. The results support and build on Phoenix's (2019) findings that threat, anger, and political behavior by showing the effect by disaggregating the white population by gender.

Additionally, I find a relationship between threat, anger, and additional aspects of political behavior—specifically partisanship and issue opinions. When considering what this research means for real-life American politics, these findings suggest that the continued use of racialized policy positions and emotional appeals by politicians and parties could lead to deeper fractures within the Republican party, possible realignment of the parties, and even-in the extreme—increased instances of political violence. Normatively, restructuring of parties is a much-preferred outcome than political violence.

CHAPTER 2

DON'T FORGET WHITE WOMEN VOTED FOR TRUMP: WHITE WOMEN, THREAT, AND PARTISANSHIP

Introduction

From the abolitionists and the suffragettes to Second Wave feminism in the 1960s and 1970s, there is a rich history of American women participating in what would be classified today as progressive movements involving protest. This history continued on 21 January 2017 when the Women's March attracted approximately four million protesters in at least 653 places across the United States (Chenoweth & Pressman 2017). Many of the protesters wore pink "pussy hats" and carried signs expressing outrage at the election of Donald Trump as president. Though it was criticized for prioritizing the interests of white women over those of more marginalized women, and the majority of the participants were white (Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood 2017; Brewer & Dundes 2018), the organizers of the Women's March intended it to be inclusive and to represent intersectional interests (Heaney 2021). Millions of angry white women demonstrating in the streets in opposition to Trump's election is a stark contrast to the election returns from two months prior. The gender gap between Trump and his opponent, Hillary Clinton, who was the first female presidential nominee from a major party, was the largest in history at 13 points (Philpot 2018). Women as a group voted 55%-44% for Biden in the 2020 election (Igielnik, Keeter, & Hartig 2021), but only 46% of white women voted for Biden while 53% of them voted for Trump (Igielnik et al. 2021). In contrast, 95% of Black women voted for Biden (Igielnik et al. 2021). Not only did white women not vote like women of color, but there were also differences between their choices and those of white men who supported Trump with a 57-40% margin (Igielnik et al.

2021). Why do we see this contrast in the political behavior of white women in which we see millions of white women showing up to protest a candidate that the group actually voted for? We know the overlapping identities of race and gender do not operate the same way for white women as they do for women of color, but we do not know exactly how they do operate (Phillips 2018). What role does racial identity play in white women's political behavior? Is it true, as Brittney Cooper (2018) posits, that white women prioritize their race in their voting behavior? We know when white Americans are threatened, they become angry which incites higher levels of political participation (Phoenix 2019). Does racial threat change the direction of participation in addition to the likelihood of participation?

I hypothesize the individual-level perception of a racial threat, as measured by importance of a respondent's whiteness to their identity, leads to stronger partisan identification among both Republican and Democratic white women and that this relationship is conditioned on anger. Furthermore, I hypothesize white women who live in more diverse areas are less likely to be Republicans and anger increases this effect. While this last assertion may seem counterintuitive, I expect this at because of the mitigating effect of higher socioeconomic status on racial threat suggested in previous literature (i.e. Branton & Jones 2005; Velasquez & Eger 2002). The theory I present is different from the previous literature because I am only applying it to white women, measuring racial threat individually by using the importance of white identity and contextually as level of local diversity, and adding the conditional relationship between anger and white identity. To test the effects of racial threat on political behavior using a sample of exclusively white women, I employ data from the 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES) and the 2015 American Communities Survey (ACS). I test individual and contextual-level racial

threat along with the presence of political anger for respondents. To measure individual and contextual-levels of racial threat, I use self-reported importance of white identity and the proportion of the minority population in the respondent's area respectively. I use ordered logistic regression models for both Democratic and Republican identifiers to test the relationships between these variables and the strength of white women's partisan identification.

I find support for my hypotheses that white identity conditioned on anger has a relationship with stronger partisanship. Models for both Republicans and Democrats show an association with the interaction of white identity and anger with stronger reported partisan affiliation. Taken together, this aligns with the idea of duality in white identity suggested in the literature in which whiteness can be something that one feels gives their life privilege or something that one sees as being a source of discrimination. I do not find support for the hypothesis that the interaction of anger and contextual diversity will lead to a higher likelihood of stronger Democratic partisanship. Instead the results suggest that both Republican and Democratic white women who are angry have a higher likelihood of being Independents in the context of high diversity. In short, race matters for the partisanship of white women, but it is a complex relationship.

Threat and Anger

The feeling of anger is a negative valence emotion that emerges when either we ourselves or our group is under threat or has already been harmed (Lambert, Eadeh, & Hanson 2019; Phoenix 2019). Anger is experienced by all people, but there are gender differences in how it is evoked and expressed. The literature regarding female anger suggests it is evoked when women's core values are violated—specifically when they feel powerlessness or there has been injustice

or irresponsibility (Thomas 2005). The primary physiological response to anger—commonly known as fight-or-flight—is the same across gender, race, and culture (Taylor et al. 2000; Phoenix 2019). However, the expression of anger and who is allowed display it openly varies by society (Cooper 2018; Chemaly 2019; Phoenix 2019) and the relative privilege of the individual within their society (Thomas 2005; Cooper 2018). Women suppress more of their anger than men do even though they feel it just as strongly (Thomas 2005). When women do express anger, they tend to act on their fight-or-flight responses in a way that is more protective of themselves and those in their care than men (Taylor et al. 2000). White women in the United States are in a privileged group because of their race, but a marginalized group because of their gender (Junn 2017). In addition to race and gender, white women will have other overlapping identities that can encourage or dissuade their expressions of anger. This is true based on social status (Fischer et al. 2004), their level of educational attainment, and occupational status (Thomas & Atakan 1993).

Just as one person's freedom fighter can be another's terrorist, the upsides and downsides of anger in political behavior are two sides of one coin depending on how one views of the root cause of the anger and its results (Lambert et al. 2019). We know anger and politics are intertwined. Anger shapes how Americans view government institutions (Webster 2018) and is associated with lower levels of trust in government, higher perceptions of corruption, and lower levels of belief that the government cares about people like them (Dunn & Schweitzer 2005; Webster 2018). Anger is a primary motivator for action (Lambert et al. 2019) and leads to higher levels of political participation (Valentino et al. 2009; Phoenix 2019). Additionally, anger has been shown to cause people to fall back on preconceived ideas (MacKuen et al. 2010), and

for racially conservative people, anger triggers systematic racism (Banks 2014). It has also been shown to lead to less support for affirmative action, to serve as a root of racial resentment and symbolic racism (Banks & Valentino 2012), and to drive political participation for white Americans (Phoenix 2019).

Partisanship and Identity

We know political polarization in the United States is strong and has been getting stronger over the past decades (Bartels 2000; Abramowitz & Saunders 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope 2008; Iyengar & Westwood 2015). Polarization is related to anger because the activation of anger following threat can shift political attitudes either right or left depending on the nature of the threat (Lambert et al. 2010; Lambert et al. 2019; Eadeh & Chang 2020). This shift in partisanship is related to the fact that certain issues in American politics are “owned” by different parties (Petrocik 1996; Egan 2013; Eadeh & Chang 2020). If someone finds issues traditionally associated with one political party to be important, they are more likely to identify with that party (Eadeh & Chang 2020). The literature suggests there is also a duality in white identity that can lead to different partisan outcomes depending on how the identity is conceptualized (Feldman & Huddy 2005; Powell, Branscomb, & Schmitt 2005; Croll 2007; Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta 2007). This refers to the concept that there are some white people who see their race as a source of privilege and there are others who see it as a reason they are discriminated against. Those who see whiteness as a source of in-group advantage are more likely to experience guilt and a reduction of racism when compared with those who conceptualize it as outgroup disadvantage which correlates with avoiding negative psychological implications (Powell et al. 2005). Depending on how one understands their whiteness, being exposed to the white privilege frame of group

relationships leads to progressiveness for some and defensiveness in others (Croll 2007). Using the white privilege frame means race relations are discussed focusing on the advantages that white people have in American society rather than focusing on the disadvantages that non-white groups experience. If you extend the idea that someone who sees their whiteness as a source of in group advantage can experience negative psychological implications (Powell et al 2005), it logically follows that receiving information in the white privilege could increase guilt and lead to racially progressive policy preferences (Croll 2007) that could reduce the extent of white privilege. Demographics and public conversations about race have changed over the decades. The white privilege frame has become more common in the public discourse relative to the framing of discrimination against minority groups (Powell et al. 2005; Lowery et al. 2007; Hartzel 2018). The literature suggests when people feel their traditionally dominant identities, like male, white, and Christian, are threatened their likelihood to vote for Republican candidates increases (Mutz 2018; Cassino & Besen-Cassino 2021). It would follow that women who are more cognizant of their whiteness as a privileged part of their identity could be pushed into a more racially progressive direction—which in the current political climate is associated with Democratic partisan affiliation—or into one that is more defensive of traditional racial constructs—which aligns more with the GOP.

Previous research finds when a white woman feels threatened, she will turn to her whiteness for security rather than her identity as a woman because her race is a more advantaged identity (Abascal 2015, 2020; Junn 2017). Further literature posits protective white identities tend towards conservative partisan affiliation (Valentino & Sears 2005), and these types of defensive white identities, which seek to protect ingroup status, have been increasing in their

anti-outgroup character (Hughey 2014). Phoenix (2019) argues when whites perceive threat, they become angry and fight against the source of the threat which manifests in higher levels of political participation. In comparison, Black anger is seen as dangerous in American society, which limits their ability to take the fight response to anger. Black Americans are forced into a state of resignation or into belief change when provoked to anger by threat rather than into greater participation (Phoenix 2019). Similarly, as previously discussed, research suggests women have a different expressed response to anger than men.

Theory

While we know threat leads to anger which, in turn, stimulates higher levels of political participation by white Americans (Phoenix 2019), we do not know if specific types of threat drive participation in partisan directions. The literature also finds support for the idea that people do not want their group to be in last place and will oppose policies they feel could move groups of currently lower status ahead of themselves (Kuziemko et al. 2014).

There are two popular explanations for how threat leads to partisan participation among white Americans: economics and race. The non-academic literature suggests there is intense economic anxiety within the white population that drives political behavior (Gest 2016; Hochschild 2016; Vance 2016). However, the empirical literature finds this relationship is more complex and whites' attachment to their own race is not exclusively or not even primarily driven by economic disenfranchisement (Cramer Walsh 2012; Mutz 2018; Jardina 2019). Mutz (2018) sets out to test the relative weights of these competing factors, but there are issues with the measurement on the racial threat side of the equation. Mutz (2018) conceptualizes economics as pocketbook issues, but the group threat measures combine racial group threat with the threat

posed by globalization and competition from China. I argue this is a muddled test of racial group threat because, by adding the threat of globalization and the context of China, the measure inherently includes an aspect of economic anxiety and could pick up xenophobia, as well. To accurately test if whites are responding to a racial group threat, the variables should not entangle the two.

The theory presented here is different from the previous literature because it only applies to white women, measuring racial threat individually by using the importance of white identity and a contextual level of local diversity, and adding the conditional relationship between anger and white identity. The distinction between whites as a group and white females specifically is relevant because the literature shows partisan affiliation differs by gender (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999; Kaufmann 2006; Ondercin 2018). Furthermore, anger operated differently based on social status. White women occupy a different place in the societal hierarchy than white men do. As Junn (2017) writes, white women are second in sex, but first in race to people of color. In other words, white women's privilege comes from their race, where white men have power drawn from both race and gender. If the changing racial dynamics in the United States are what is motivating white women to participate politically, white identity will lead to stronger expressed partisan affiliation. Also, the effect on white women should be different from that of white men. This leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: White women with higher levels of white identity express a stronger partisan identification conditioned on levels of anger.

Additionally, I propose contextual racial diversity will operate differently than the individual importance of white identity for two reasons. First, there is a degree of self-selection in settlement patterns. People are generally able to choose the broad

geographical areas in which they would like to work and live. The specific amount of choice in where an individual wants to live varies with their other choices. For example, someone in the military may have no choice about where to live, but a remote worker or an elementary school teacher would have far more choice. Furthermore, within constraints such as budget, they choose their specific residence based on factors such as perceived quality of schools, location of family and friends, proximity to amenities, or what commute they are willing to tolerate. Historically the practice of redlining, or discriminatory practices that prevented people of color from living in certain neighborhoods, meant that housing was segregated in the United States, and it remains so today (Archer 2019). The racial make-up of neighborhoods does determine where people choose to live with whites often leaving an area when people of color move in, which is known as “White Flight” (Frey 1979; Woldoff 2011). Women living in highly diverse areas can be assumed to have chosen to move to or remain there. Second, while there is a degree of foreshadowing about changing demographics and power structures in individual white identity importance, white women living in highly diverse areas are already living in contexts that mirror what demographics suggest will be the norm in coming decades. This leads to my second hypothesis:

H2: White women residing in areas with higher levels of contextual diversity express stronger Democratic partisan identification conditioned on levels of anger.

Data and Methods

The data to test these hypotheses is drawn from the 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES) and the 2015 US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). I am using

the 2016 ANES because there is a wider range of questions about white racial identification and importance than on the 2020 iteration of the survey. Furthermore, the 2016 election is unique with the presence of Hillary Clinton as the first viable general election candidate for the presidency who is also a female and the salience of racial issues in both elite and public debate leading up to the election. After dropping men and women of color, the data provides a sample of 1285 white women.

My dependent variables are measures of partisan self-identification. The original ANES measure is a question that allows people to place themselves on a 7-point partisan spectrum ranging from 1 for a strong Democrat to 7 for a strong Republican. I separate this variable into Democrats who were coded as 1-4 in the original variable and Republicans who were coded 4-7. I include independents in both dependent variables as a type of reference category and because these respondents are not expressing affinity for either party, they serve here as a comparison to the stronger partisans in each dependent variable. I recoded each variable on a scale of 1-4 for the strength of their partisanship. Independents were coded as 1; leaning partisans were coded as 2. not very strong partisans were coded as 3, and strong partisans were coded as a 4. This classification led to sample sizes of 967 Democrats and 953 Republicans.

The key independent variables for this analysis are anger and racial threat measures. When psychologists measure anger they often rely on self-report of how angry an individual is on a numbered scale but also have more labor-intensive techniques such as measuring word usage or facial expression (for a discussion of psychological anger measurement see Lambert et al. 2019). The 2016 ANES asks respondents how often they feel angry about the president and the presidential candidate from each major party. I use the questions that ask how often the

presidential candidate from each major party makes the respondent feel angry. Phoenix (2019) employs these questions and one about the respondent's level of anger at the incumbent president to measure political anger. Webster (2018) uses the same set of questions to measure anger but only measures it for the presidential candidate of the opposite party of the respondent. Using a measure that combines the affect towards both major presidential candidates allows me to measure anger at both sides of the political spectrum. It is reasonable to assume a person who identifies as a Republican would be angrier with Barak Obama in 2016 than a person who considers themselves a Democrat even if both respondents are similarly dissatisfied with the American political situation. Furthermore, one could feel anger at the candidate for the political party with which they identify and feel the other major party is not a reasonable alternative. Using these questions that ask how often the respondent is angry about Donald Trump and how often they are angry about Hillary Clinton, I construct a 3-point scale. Respondents choose how often they are angry at each candidate on a 5-point scale that ranges from never to always. If the respondent answered they were angry "most of the time" at either Clinton or Trump, they are coded as a 1 (34.43% of the respondents). If the respondent answered that they were "always" angry at one of the two candidates, they were coded as a 2 (39.88% of the sample). Otherwise, the respondent is coded as a 0 (25.69% of the respondents).


To operationalize racial threat, I use individual and contextual measures. For the individual-level race-based threat, I rely on the single item white identity measure used by Jardina (2019).¹ This is based on the question "How important is being white to your identity?" which is

¹ Jardina (2019) suggests a three-item white identity scale is preferable to the single item question. In addition to the importance question used here, she the addition of items asking "To what extent do you feel that white people in this country have a lot to be proud of?" and "How much would you say that whites in this country have a lot in

a version of a standard identity measure in the racial and ethnic politics literature. I also preferred this measure from others that are frequently used to measure racial affinity because it gives the most possibility to capture the duality of white identity posited in the literature. It allows people who see their whiteness as something that has imbued their life with privilege and someone who feels they have been discriminated against and lost opportunities because they are white to answer this question on the same scale. This measure tells us how aware someone is of their race, but not how they view that identity allowing variation in the way someone sees their whiteness. This choice should have less effect on partisan identification than other options like the more politicized white consciousness measure (Jardina 2019). I reversed the coding of the original ANES item, so the value of the variable increases as the expressed importance of being white to the respondent increases. With my coding, a score of 1 means someone reports that being white is “not at all important” to their identity while a score of 5 means the respondent says being white is “extremely important” to their identity. The most common response is being white was not at all important which was given by 404 individuals. In contrast, 157 respondents say it was extremely important. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of responses for this variable.

common with each other?.” However, surveys rarely include the second two questions. The identity importance or salience question is commonly used alone in the Racial and Ethnic Politics literature following McGuire et al. (1978). In addition to identity salience or importance, there are two other frequently used measures of individual racial identity that are used in the political science literature: consciousness, and linked fate (for more see Davenport, Iyengar, and Westwood 2021). I use white consciousness (which is available from the 2016 ANES) and linked fate as independent variables elsewhere in this dissertation, but did not want to use them here because they do not express the dual conceptions of whiteness that are addressed in the literature. Using one of the other measures would not allow the variation between seeing one’s whiteness as a privilege or as a detrimental factor to be answered on the same scale. Consciousness includes not only identification with the group but also requires an awareness of where the relative position of the group in society and a commitment to working with other members of the group to further shared interests (Miller et al 1981). Linked Fate (Gay, Hochschild, & White 2016) measures the degree to which and individual feels what happens to them is impacted by what happens to their group as a whole and stems from Dawson’s (1994) Black Utility Heuristic.

Figure 2.1: Distribution of the Importance of White Identity



For aggregate-level racial threat, I use the percent minority population at the congressional district level from the 2015 ACS. I divide this into quartiles such that a woman who lives in the most homogenously white area is in the first quartile and coded as a 1, while one who lives in one of the most diverse area is in the fourth quartile and coded as a 4. The literature supports the idea that the localized non-white population levels activate a sense of racial threat among whites, and it is commonly used as a measure of such (Carey et al. 2016; Craig & Richeson 2018; Knowles & Tropp 2018; Reny & Newman 2018).² I chose to divide this into quartiles rather than use the original ACS variable because the proportions of non-white residents were separated to the hundred-thousandths place. This makes post-modeling estimation difficult as there are so few observations in each category. To test the conditionality of anger and racial threat, I create interactions between both white identity and contextual diversity and anger.

² Contextual variables are used at the congressional district level due to limitations from the ANES. Ideally a unit such as county or census tract would be used, but the availability of data does not allow this.


As control measures, the model includes respondent age, income, education, the importance of religion, and the median income of their Congressional district. The individual controls are all from the ANES, while the contextual control is from the ACS. Age is a continuous variable, which ranges from 18 to 90 or older. Education is a categorical variable for the highest level of education completed by the respondent. The categories include less than high school diploma, a high school diploma/GED, some college but less than a bachelor's degree, a bachelor's degree, and a degree beyond a bachelors. The religion variable is a dichotomous measure based on a question asking if religion is important in the respondent's life. If the respondent answered yes, the variable is coded at 1. It is coded as a 0 otherwise. Both income measures are broken into quartiles, which means the variables range from 1 to 4. Here I use quartiles to partially account for the varied impact of income across location in the United States. For example, making \$50,000 in New York City affords a lifestyle that is vastly different than it does in rural Iowa.

Results

Because my dependent variables are 4-point ordered scales, I used ordered logistic regression to test my hypotheses. Figure 2.2 shows the effects on Democratic partisanship of each of the variables in my model and Figure 2.3 shows the relationships of each variable with the strength of Republican partisan identification. Notably, it suggests that a higher level of anger is positively and significantly associated with stronger Democratic affiliation, but because the anger variable is interacted with both white identity and contextual diversity, a closer look is needed to understand the behavior of the interactions. The interaction of anger and white identity was significant across the range of white identity with anger being associated with higher levels of partisanship. Specifically, a white woman who expressed the lowest level of white


identity and the lowest level of anger had a 0.362 likelihood of being an independent but that decreased to 0.1050 ($\Delta=-0.2574$) at the highest level of anger with white identity held constant. Similarly, a non-woman with the lowest level of white identity had a 0.1745 likelihood of reporting that she was a strong Democrat while a woman at the lowest level of white identity who was always angry had a 0.5258 ($\Delta=0.3841$) likelihood of reporting being a strong Democrat.³ These results lend partial support to Hypothesis 1 in that they show a conditional relationship between anger, white identity, and strength of Democratic partisanship.

Figure 2.2: Effects on Democratic Partisan Identification



³ To check for robustness, I ran models with a 2-point anger scale (1=almost always or always angry, 0= everyone else). I also ran models with white consciousness rather than the importance of white identity, and the results were consistent but more dramatic—as one would expect as that measure is a more politicized variable (Jardina 2019). I also ran multinomial and ordinal logit models with the full sample of white women respondents.

Figure 2.3: Effects on Republican Partisan Identification



For the Republican model, the interaction of anger and white identity is statistically significant across the range of white identity. At the lowest level of white identity, a non-angry woman has a 0.3846 likelihood of saying she is an independent, but that decreases to a likelihood of 0.1239 ($\Delta=-0.2607$) at the highest level of anger. There is a corresponding increase in identification as a strong Republican as anger increases with a non-angry woman has a 0.1497 likelihood of identifying as a strong Republican which rises to a likelihood of 0.4375 ($\Delta=0.2878$) at the highest level of anger. A similar relationship is seen at the highest levels of white identity. A non-angry woman with the highest levels of white identity has a 0.2692 likelihood of being an independent which falls to a likelihood of 0.0796 ($\Delta=-0.1896$) if she is angry. There is also a corresponding rise in the likelihood of that a woman will identify as a strong Republican with a likelihood of 0.2300 of being at strong Republican if one has highest level of white identity and is

not angry, but a 0.5599 ($\Delta=0.3299$) likelihood of being a strong Republican at the highest levels of white identity and of anger.

Taken together the results of the interactions between white identity and anger in the two models suggest that there is a relationship between increase white identity conditioned on anger and the strength of partisanship for both Republican and Democratic women. These results also support the idea there is a duality in white identity (Feldman & Huddy 2005; Powell et al. 2005; Croll 2007; Lowery et al. 2007) in that similar conceptions of identity are related to opposite political affiliations. White identity and anger appear to be pushing both Democratic and Republican white women towards stronger partisan identification.

To test Hypothesis 2, I used predicted probabilities of the interaction of anger and contextual diversity for both the Democratic and Republican models. For the Democratic models, the interaction was only significant in the highest diversity contexts when varying the levels of anger. Unexpectedly, for the highest diversity contexts, an angry woman's likelihood of being a strong Democrat decreases from 0.2153 to 0.0021 ($\Delta=-0.2132$). Similar decreases are seen in the chances that she will be a not very strong ($\Delta=-0.2416$) or leaning ($\Delta=-0.2235$) Democrat. The likelihood that she will identify as an Independent increases from 0.3046 to 0.9830 ($\Delta=0.6783$). There are similar relationships in In the Republican models, the interaction was not significant low levels of anger. However, at the highest level of anger there was a relationship between increasing the contextual diversity from the minimum to the maximum levels. The likelihood of an angry white woman being a strong republican decreased from 0.2455 in a low diversity context to 0.0001 ($\Delta=-0.2453$) in the highest diversity context. Similar changes were observed in the likelihood of a woman being a not very strong ($\Delta=-0.2517$) and leaning ($\Delta=-0.2492$)

Republican. In comparison, the likelihood of an angry white woman being an independent in the Republican model increased from 0.2527 in the lowest diversity context to 0.9989 ($\Delta=0.7462$) in the highest diversity contexts. Taken together these suggest that anger and high levels of diversity are related to weaker partisan identification among both Republican and Democratic women. This does not support Hypothesis 2 because instead of the stronger Democratic partisanship that was expected, the results indicate that partisanship is much weaker among angry white women who identify with both parties living in high contextual diversity areas.

Conclusion

This examination explains, at least in part, why we observe white women participating in both extremes of the political spectrum. Analysis of the 2016 ANES data finds the strength of a woman's white identity and anger have a conditional relationship that strengthens her partisan identification whether she is a Democrat or a Republican. This is consistent with the 2017 Women's March protesting the inauguration of Donald Trump and the white women who participated in the 2021 Capital Insurrection in an attempt to prevent the certification of the election of Joe Biden as President. In contrast, the conditional relationship between anger and contextual racial threat appears to be pushing women from both sides towards being and independent.

White women are a strong political force in the United States making up the plurality of the electorate. How they react to changing local and national demographics has a clear impact on political outcomes at all levels of government. Though there are liberal white women, white women as a group are not an overwhelming liberal force. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA) and Lauren Bobert (R-CO), with their extremely conservative views, are not an aberration. They

are a predictable feature of white womanhood. Understanding the conditions that lead white women to change or strengthen their partisan identification would be useful for parties and candidates who seek to appeal to them as a voting bloc.

This project suggests multiple avenues of further research. I would also like to delve into the mechanism behind why anger and high contextual diversity appears to be pushing women towards the center of the partisan spectrum. Disaggregating whites by gender and women by race is important in understanding the behavior of the different groups in the American electorate and how hierarchies of privilege manifest themselves in political behavior.

CHAPTER 3

LEFT OR RIGHT, WE CAN ALL SEE WRONG: GENDER, RACIAL IDENTITY, AND ISSUE OPINIONS

Introduction

Conventional wisdom tells us there is a gender gap in political behavior, including women espousing more liberal policy positions than men (Smith 1984; Norrander 2008; Norrander & Wilcox 2008) and which leads to a gender gap in vote choice (Chaney et al 1998; Clark & Clark 2008). However, the gender gap in vote choice shrinks dramatically when only considering white men and women and removing people of color (Junn & Masuoka 2020; Junn 2017). The fact that the gap shrinks when looking at only white men and women suggests the gender gap is tied to race and the overlapping identities of being a woman and white mean something different than being both a woman and non-white. Research shows white racial identity has a stronger relationship for white women than for white men when considering partisanship (Branton & Niezgodá 2022) and preferences for gendered descriptive representation do not translate in the voting booth in the same manner they do for non-white women. Specifically, white women vote for women candidates less often than other women when expressing similar preferences for descriptive representation (Phillips 2018). Taken together the smaller gap in vote choice for white Americans compared to the population as a whole and the lower rate of expressive voting for descriptive representation when compared with women of color seem to suggest racial preferences may be stronger than gender preferences in the political behavior of white women. How far does this extend? Do white women's policy preferences differ from those of white men as a function of the strength of their racial identity?

In this article, I examine the relationship between strength of white racial identity and

policy opinions. Furthermore, I analyze how that relationship differs when considering racialized and gendered policy issues and if that relationship is different for white men and white women. To do this, policy issues from that are both racialized and gendered (like government aid to Blacks), either racialized OR gendered (for example abortion or affirmative action based on race), and neither racialized nor gendered (e.g. climate change). There are four key findings. First, I find increased levels of white consciousness (operationalized using Jardina's (2019) white consciousness scale) are associated with lower levels of support for racialized policy issues (e.g. government aid to Blacks and affirmative action) in both white men and white women, regardless of whether an issue is gendered. Second, when an issue is racialized and not gendered, white consciousness appears to have a stronger relationship with levels of support among white women than it does among white men. Third, if the issue is gendered does change the strength of the relationship of white consciousness making thickness of racial identity appear less related to policy preferences for women than it is for men. The difference in the strength of this relationship for white men and white women suggests that, for women, gender may be weakening the pull of white identity in these circumstances. Fourth, for gendered issues that are not racialized, white consciousness among white men—but not among white women— is significant. When an issue is neither racialized nor gendered, there is relationship between white consciousness regardless of gender group. These results contribute to the growing body of knowledge surrounding the effects of overlapping layers of identity, power, and subordination (Hancock 2007; Brown 2014; Montoya 2020) by addressing how gender and white racial identity influence white men and women's opinions on political issues.

Gender and Opinion

Broadly speaking, the differences in opinion observed between men and women are attributed to three factors: socialization and personality, gender and feminist consciousness, and self-interest (work and family) (Huddy, Cassese & Lizotte 2008). In short, these explanations posit that the political gender gap is the result of gender norms, women's level of group attachment to their gender, and self-interests that are different from men's due to differing life circumstances. Junn (2017) cautions that the gender gap looks different when considering men and women of all races than it does when looking at only white men and white women. A growing body of evidence suggests white women prioritize their race over their gender as their most privileged identity when they feel threatened, and they accept the patriarchy so long as they are at the top of the racial hierarchy (Abascal 2015, 2020; Junn 2017; Cassese & Barnes 2019). The precedence of white racial identity over gender is supported by the fact that married white women have lower levels of gender attachment than unmarried white women—an effect that is not seen in Black women (Stout, Kreschmer, & Ruppanner 2017; Campi & Junn 2019). For women with high levels of gender linked fate, there is evidence that it explains political preferences more than racial linked fate (Stout et al. 2017).

Group Consciousness

The literature about group consciousness was developed in the study of subordinated groups—namely women and Blacks (Miller et al. 1981; Gurin 1985; Dawson 1994). However, whites are the dominant racial group in the United States. If we accept that race and gender are socially constructed identities that are dependent on context (Omi & Winant 2014; Gustafsson Sendén et al. 2019), it follows that a dominant group identity would likely be different than one

of a subordinate group. In fact, Jardina (2019) argues against using the same identity measures for whites that are used for other groups not sufficient due to the differences in hierarchical experiences in the American context. Instead, she identifies core aspects of group consciousness—strength of identity, a sense of external deprivation, and a desire to work together to improve the group’s position—and constructs a new measure for white consciousness that is contextually appropriate for American whites (Jardina 2019).

In general, there is evidence that white racial identity is related to opinion about explicitly racialized policy issues like affirmative action (Jardina 2019; Reny et al. 2019; Srikanthiah & Sinnar 2019; Feldman & Huddy 2005). Additionally, research suggests white identity contributes to the policy preferences of whites on issues that are implicitly racialized, such as immigration when the country of origin or race of immigrants is not mentioned. When surveys ask respondents about their attitudes on implicitly racialized issues, the question about the issue does not directly mention race, but issue the respondent is being asked about is racialized because the policy maintains the existing social status quo and power hierarchies. An example of an implicitly racialized issue would be immigration when the country of origin or race of immigrants is not mentioned. Yadon and Piston (2019) found the strength of the relationship between prejudice and policy opinions among whites has increased in recent years. They credit this difference to an increase in perceived racial threat to whites’ dominant social position which was brought on by the Obama presidency. We do not know how white identity is related to opinions on non-racialized policy issues, or how gender changes opinions. Reny et al. (2019) suggest whites are becoming increasingly sorted in their attitudes regarding racial and immigration policies. They found that white voters switched their votes to both Clinton and Trump in the 2016 election

based on these issues. However, no one has yet looked specifically at white women's attitudes or how these racial threats relate to non-racialized policy issues. Understanding the relationships between these identities and issue opinions will help scholars predict future political behavior and under what circumstances political opinions might change.

Theory

The literature is clear that group interests often outweigh individual interests in political behavior (Campbell et al 1980; Bobo 1983; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee 1986; Dawson 1994). While we have long known about the importance of group identity; individuals do not belong to just one group. Newer research accounts for multiple layers of identity and argues against using approaches that account for only one identity because they fail to address the complexity of human behavior and the effects of overlapping statuses (Hancock 2007; Brown 2014; Montoya 2020). Therefore, this examines the intersection of gender and strength of white racial identity, while controlling for socioeconomic status variables (e.g., income and education). There is evidence that the strength of racial identity is associated with various aspects of the political behavior of white Americans and, at least in the area of partisanship, the effects are different for men and women (Jardina 2019; Branton & Niezgodna 2022). Thus, there is more to learn about the how whiteness and gender relate to one another. Because there is evidence that the intersection of gender and racial identity influences issue opinion formation for other racial groups (Lizotte & Carey 2021), it is reasonable to examine the strength of racial identity among white men and women in the area of issue attitude formation. I propose the following three hypotheses that, taken together, suggest that gender and the strength of racial identity are associated with people's policy issue attitudes. For white respondents in general, I expect that

increased racial group affinity will have a relationship with policies related to race regardless of their gender. However, for white women, who are considered hierarchically first in the racial hierarchy and second in gender hierarchy (Junn 2017). Therefore, I expect that among white women, race will be more strongly associated with attitudes on racialized and gendered issues because white women should fall back on their most privileged identity in those cases (Abascal 2015,2020). For issues that do not invoke race, I do not expect that white consciousness will affect the issue opinions of either white men or women.

H1: As white consciousness increases approval for racialized policies will decrease.

H2: White consciousness will not have a relationship with opinion on non-racialized issues.

H3: On issues that are both racialized and gendered, white consciousness will have a stronger association with opinion than gender among women.

Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, I use the 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES). This dataset is a good fit for this project because it has a large, nationally representative sample, asks respondents about a wide range of political issues, and has a history of being used to study American public opinion, partisanship, and voting. The 2016 iteration of the ANES includes the questions necessary to measure white consciousness; whereas, the questions were not included in the 2020 wave of the survey. Because I am interested in the political opinions of white women, I restrict the sample to respondents who identify as white. Depending on the specific model this yields a total N between 2,139 and 2,347 when both men and women are included. I also create a gender variable in which people who identify as women are coded as 1 and those who identify as men are coded as 0. The models for white women have a N that ranges from

1,102 to 1,243. The models for white men have an *N* that ranges from 1,109 to 1,118.

Dependent Variables

In order to assess the importance of race and gender across different types of issues, I use four dependent variables. I chose one issue that is both racialized and gendered (*Aid to Blacks*), one that is gendered but not racialized (*Abortion*), one that is not gendered but is racialized (*Affirmative Action*), and one that is neither racialized nor gendered (*Climate*). Table 3.1 shows these dependent variables and how I conceptualize them here as related to gender and race. The justifications for these classifications are discussed further as each dependent variable is described, but the judgements primarily rest on the explicit wording of the ANES questions. Each dependent variable is coded so a higher value indicates more support for that specific policy issue.⁴

Table 3.1: Dependent Variables

	Racialized	Non-Racialized
Gendered	(1) Aid to Blacks	(2) Abortion
Non-Gendered	(3) Affirmative Action	(4) Climate Policy

⁴ These dependent variables were chosen because they were the best options available from the ANES to look at the intersection of gendered and racialized policy issues. If I were able to design my own survey, I would choose different measures, but that was not the case here. Government aid to Blacks is a type of welfare, and welfare is established as a racialized and gendered issue in the literature (Gillens 1996, 1999; Wetts & Willer 2018). I considered the affirmative action measure to be racialized but not gendered because the question specifically asks about opinions on race based affirmative action. Changes to abortion policy affects women of color more than white women (Pettus & Willingham 2022). However, because it was not specifically framed as a racial issue in the ANES wording, the sample of respondents only included white people, and the same question was used in a similar way by Lizotte and Carey (2021) to measure specifically gender differences in opinion between Black men and women, I felt comfortable using it as a gendered but non-racialized issue. Also, I acknowledge that the effects of climate change are gendered and racialized largely as those identities intersect with poverty, but the public debate surrounding climate change centers more on business regulation and the validity of climate science than the effects on minority groups. I assumed that issues of race and gender would be less in the forefront of the respondent’s mind

The first dependent variable, *Aid to Blacks*, is both racialized and gendered (Gillens 1996, 1999; Wetts & Willer 2018). The variable is based on an ANES measure that asks respondents to place themselves on a 7-point scale for if the government should aid Black Americans. The responses range from 1 for the government “should help Blacks” to 7 for “Blacks should help themselves.” I reverse the coding of the measure so a higher value is indicative of more support for government aid to Blacks. The distribution of this variable is skewed towards the left with 76.20% of respondents falling between 1 and 4. The most common observation at 22.95% is a 4 which is closely followed by the second most common answer of 1 with 22.25% of observations.⁵

The second dependent variable, *Abortion*, represents a gendered and but not racialized policy issue. The ANES item allows respondents to place themselves on a 4-point scale. Respondents can indicate if, by law, abortion should never be permitted (1); should be permitted only in the case of rape, incest, or if the woman’s life is in danger (2); should be permitted for reasons other than rape, incest, or if a woman’s life is in danger of need is established (3); or should be a matter of personal choice (4). I collapsed this into a 3-point ordered variable in which 1 means the respondent thinks abortion should never be legal, 2 means abortion should be legal in certain circumstances, and 3 means abortion should be legal on demand.⁶ In the pooled sample

⁵ Before choosing this measure, I looked at a variety of options from the ANES regarding financial aid to individuals. Other options included opinions on welfare and aid to the poor. I chose the Aid to Blacks measure because the concept has been previously used as racialized policy issue (Lizotte & Carey 2021) and because the question explicitly mentions the race of aid recipients. Welfare is well established as a gendered and a racialized policy issue. To confirm that Aid to Blacks is capturing similar sentiments as welfare, I ran all models with Aid to Black, Welfare, and Aid to the Poor as dependent variables. White consciousness was not significant in the models with Aide to the Poor as the dependent variable whereas higher levels of white consciousness were associated with significantly lower levels of support for both Aid to Blacks and Welfare. There were not statistically significant differences between Aid to Blacks and Welfare. Given this, I chose to use the Aid to Blacks items because the wording of the question makes race explicit.

⁶ The distinctions between rape, incest, woman’s life, and other proven need were not clear enough for me and made the variable seem more categorical than ordered. Collapsing into the 3-point scale made it a clearly ordered

with both men and women included, 11.72% of people believe abortion should never be permitted, 42.01% believe it should be legal in certain circumstances, and 46.27% believe that it should be legal on demand. However, the distribution of support for abortion using either measure is significantly different between white men and women which supports the idea that abortion is a gendered issue. Among white women, 12.92% believe abortion should never be legal while 47.74% believe it should be available on demand. For white men, 10.37% answered that it should never be legal, and 44.63% believe that it should be legal on demand.

The third dependent variable, *Affirmative Action*, represents a racialized but not gendered policy issue. The ANES question asks if respondents support or oppose the use of affirmative action by universities for Black students and to what degree they support or oppose the practice. The responses are on a 7-point scale that I coded for 1 to be most opposed and 7 to be most supportive. Again, this distribution of this variable is abnormal with more responses towards the left which indicates lack of support for universities using affirmative action for Black students. The most frequent observation is a 4 with 35.20% of the respondents which means they neither support nor oppose the use of affirmative action. However, 86.19% of the observations are 1-4 meaning that only 13.81% of respondents indicate support of any strength for affirmative action.

The fourth dependent variable, *Climate Change*, represents a non-gendered and non-racialized policy issue. The ANES question asks respondents to describe how they feel about the level of government action about rising temperatures. Respondents place themselves on a 7-

variable in line with the other three dependent variables in this analysis. I did all models with both the 3- and 4-point scales along with multinomial logistic regression and ordered logistic regression with both. The significance and directions of the relationships held across all variations. I use the 3-point scale and ordered logistic regression

point scale. I have coded the variable such that 1 indicates the government “should be doing a great deal less” and a 7 indicates that the government “should be doing a great deal more.” The most common response is a 4 (the government is “currently doing the right amount”) with 33.93% of the observations. There are more respondents who believes the government should be doing more (46.92) to address rising temperatures rather than less (19.14).

Independent Variables

The key independent variable in this analysis is *White Consciousness*. White consciousness is not merely a measure of group identity. Jardina (2019) defines white consciousness as “a politicized form of group attachment” (p 60). Conceptually it includes components of identity, the feeling an external, unjust force working against the group, and collective orientation—or the need to work together to maintain group dominance which is similar to other group consciousness variables in the literature (Miller et al. 1981; Masuoka 2008). I use Jardina’s (2019) operationalization of this concept using her scaled measure which uses three items from the ANES. The three questions included in the scale are: (1) how important is being white to your identity?; (2) how likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?; and (3) how important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites? The question regarding employment addresses the perception of external threat and the question about working together assesses collective orientation. The ranges from 0 and 1 increasing as the strength of white racial consciousness increases. It is well distributed with the most common score being 0.5 with 291 observations.⁷

⁷ I ran principal component factor analysis. the results indicate the three measures load onto one factor. The eigenvalue is 1.68, which according to Kaiser criterion factors with eigenvalues equal or greater than 1 should be

The analysis controls for respondent-level gender, income, education, religiosity, partisanship, and ideology. Education is a 5-point scale ranging from less than high school to education beyond a bachelor's degree. Religiosity is measured by frequency of religious attendance from never to at least weekly. For partisanship, there are variables for self-identified Democrats and Independents with Republicans being the reference category. Similarly, for ideology, I have variables for Liberals and Moderates with self-identified Conservatives being the reference category.

Results

First, I analyze the effect of white consciousness on opinions of whites—male and female—on racialized and non-racialized policy issues. Table 3.2 presents the ordinal logistic regression results for all four dependent variables. Higher levels of white consciousness were highly significant in predicting lower levels of approval for aid to Blacks, abortion, and affirmative action. There was no significant effect of white consciousness on opinions about government action on climate change. The findings support Hypothesis 1 in that higher levels of white consciousness are indicative of lower levels of support for racialized policies that benefit Blacks. The negative, significant relationship between white consciousness and support for abortion does not confirm with expectations, and this is explored further later in this section. Further, gender does not have a significant effect in a respondent's likelihood of supporting any of the issues— racialized and gendered, racialized only, gendered only, and neutral policies.

retained. The factor loadings are as follows: White ID .65, work together is .80, and work threat is .79. This suggests concerns about unidimensionality of the white consciousness measure are reasonably satisfied.

Table 3.2: Racial and Gender Policy Attitudes Among White Americans

	(1) Aid to Blacks	(2) Abortion	(3) Affirmative Action	(4) Climate Policy
Consciousness	-1.445 (0.248)***	-0.692 (0.258)***	-0.984 (0.202)***	-0.319 (0.225)
Gender	-0.019 (0.094)	-0.111 (0.107)	-0.039 (0.092)	0.159 (0.093)*
Income	-0.010 (0.007)	0.015 (0.007)**	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)
Education	0.137 (0.050)***	0.325 (0.056)***	-0.050 (0.047)	0.035 (0.048)
Age	-0.008 (0.003)***	0.009 (0.003)***	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.010 (0.003)***
Religiosity	0.091 (0.031)***	-0.460 (0.040)***	0.065 (0.032)**	-0.103 (0.033)***
Democrat	1.080 (0.169)***	0.573 (0.174)***	0.834 (0.159)***	1.128 (0.139)***
Independent	0.387 (0.123)***	0.115 (0.138)	0.284 (0.122)**	0.497 (0.116)***
Liberal	1.622 (0.161)***	1.285 (0.173)**	1.075 (0.154)***	1.769 (0.143)***
Moderate	0.418 (0.133)***	0.857 (0.144)***	0.487 (0.123)***	0.887 (0.125)***
r-squared	0.10	0.17	0.05	0.11
n	2,139	2,347	2,361	2,361

Note: Data is from 2016 ANES. Ordered logistic regression models used for all models. Samples include white men and white women. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

However, to examine the specific relationship between gender and white consciousness, the analysis includes additional ordered logistic regression models isolating women and men respondents for each of the four policy issues.⁸ Table 3.3 shows the results for only white women while Table 3.4 shows the results for white men. For the racialized and gendered policy issue—aid to Blacks—the results for men and women were similar. To illustrate the effect, I present the predicted probabilities of white men and women answering the highest and lowest level of support for government support to Blacks. At lowest levels of white consciousness, a white woman has a 0.10 probability of saying that Blacks should support themselves and a 0.07 probability of saying that the government should help Blacks. At the highest levels of white consciousness, a white woman has a 0.29 probability of saying Blacks should support themselves ($\Delta=0.19$) and a 0.0200 probability of believing that the government should help Blacks ($\Delta=-0.05$). A similar effect is seen with white men. As white consciousness increases from the minimum to the maximum, the probability that a white man will express the lowest level of support for government aid to Blacks increases from 0.10 to 0.36 ($\Delta=0.26$), and his likelihood to express the highest level of support for government aid to Blacks decreases from 0.05 to 0.01 ($\Delta=-0.04$). In other words, both white men and women express less support for government aid to Blacks as white consciousness increases, but the effect for women is less than it is for men. There is a 25.98% increase in a white man’s likelihood of expressing the lowest support for government aid to Blacks as white consciousness increases from the minimum to maximum while a white woman’s likelihood of giving the same response increases 19.13% over the same range of white

⁸ To further investigate the relationship between gender and white consciousness, I ran additional ordered logistic regression models including both men and women with interactions between white consciousness and gender. The results supported the results in the single gender models. More details are presented in Appendix A.

consciousness. Hypothesis 1 is supported as white consciousness does lead to lower levels of support for the racialized and gendered policy issue of government aid to Blacks. The affect is less pronounced for white women than white men, which suggests gender is tempering the effect of race as this issue is gendered as well as racialized.

Table 3.3: Racial and Gender Policy Attitudes Among White Women

	(1) Aid to Blacks	(2) Abortion	(3) Affirmative Action	(4) Climate Policy
Consciousness	-1.305 (0.365)***	-0.557 (0.353)	-1.226 (0.284)***	-0.310 (0.304)
Income	-0.014 (0.009)	0.016 (0.009)*	0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)
Education	0.130 (0.071)*	0.422 (0.080)***	-0.043 (0.060)*	0.081 (0.065)
Age	-0.012 (0.004)*	-0.483 (0.004)***	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.004)**
Religiosity	0.102 (0.043)**	-0.463 (0.055)***	0.056 (0.040)	-0.141 (0.043)***
Democrat	1.10 (0.232)***	0.929 (0.239)***	0.882 (0.206)***	0.618 (0.163)***
Independent	0.304 (0.190)	0.239 (0.212)	0.369 (0.166)**	-0.663 (0.170)***
Liberal	1.590 (0.221)***	1.169 (0.226)	1.085 (0.196)***	0.801 (0.171)***
Moderate	0.443 (0.192)*	1.011 (0.204)***	-0.431 (0.172)**	-0.670(0.172)***
r-squared	0.10	0.21	0.06	0.11
n	1,102	1,238	1,243	1,243

Note: Data is from 2016 ANES. Ordered logistic regression models used for all models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

The other racialized issue examined here is support for university use of affirmative action for Black students. Again, higher white consciousness levels are associated with lower levels of support for the use of affirmative action by universities for Black students across the pooled model and those for white men and white women. At the lowest level of white consciousness, a white woman has a 0.17 probability of having the lowest level of support for affirmative action while at the highest level of white consciousness she has a 0.40 probability of expressing the

lowest level of support ($\Delta=0.24$). As white consciousness increases from minimum to maximum, a white woman's likelihood of expressing the strongest level of support for affirmative action decreases from 0.05 to 0.01 ($\Delta=-0.04$). In other words, a white woman's likelihood of having the lowest level of support increases by 24.0% while her probability of supporting it most strongly decreases by 4.0%.

Table 3.4: Racial and Gender Policy Attitudes Among White Men

	(1) Aid to Blacks	(2) Abortion	(3) Affirmative Action	(4) Climate Policy
Consciousness	-1.592 (0.342)***	-0.764 (0.376)**	-0.761 (0.290)***	-0.344 (0.329)
Income	-0.004 (0.010)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.010)
Education	0.133 (0.071)*	0.240 (0.082)***	-0.057 (0.072)	0.008 (0.071)
Age	-0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.011 (0.004)***
Religiosity	0.085 (0.047)*	-0.465 (0.058)***	0.103 (0.048)**	-0.075 (0.050)
Democrat	1.051 (0.259)***	0.155 (0.254)	0.734 (0.003)***	0.944 (0.217)***
Independent	0.473 (0.163)***	0.000 (0.179)	0.178 (0.178)	0.348 (0.159)**
Liberal	1.706 (0.250)***	1.46 (0.247)***	1.056 (0.237)**	2.070 (0.226)***
Moderate	0.427 (0.189)**	0.724 (0.208)***	0.538 (0.172)***	1.086 (0.185)***
r-squared	0.09	0.15	0.05	0.11
n	1,037	1,109	1,118	1,118

Note: Data is from 2016 ANES. Ordered logistic regression models used for all models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

The effects of white consciousness on support for affirmative action on white men is in the also significantly negative but the size of the effect is smaller than for white women. As white consciousness increases from the minimum to maximum, the probability that a white man will express the lowest level or support for affirmative action increases from 0.21 to 0.37 ($\Delta=0.16$). While the probability that a white man will have the highest level of support for affirmative action

decreases from 0.06 to 0.03 ($\Delta=-0.03$) as white consciousness increases from the minimum to the maximum. This means a white man with the highest level of white consciousness is 16.0% more likely to express the lowest level of support for affirmative action and 3.00% less likely to express the highest level of support for the policy than if he had the lowest levels of white consciousness.

Overall, this lends evidence to support Hypothesis 1. Increasing levels of white consciousness is significantly associated with less support for both the gendered and non-gendered racialized policy issues as operationalized by government aid to Blacks and the use of affirmative action for Black students by universities. When we look at the role of gender in these issues, the effect of white consciousness for women is less than for men where gendered and racialized policy areas intersect (government aid to Blacks) but it is larger than that of white men when in the context of a racialized but non-gendered issue (affirmative action for Black students). This suggests the role of white consciousness is greater for men than women in their support of issues where race and gender intersect.

To further analyze the effects of gender and race in white women, I examine the impact of white consciousness on opinions of abortion. While in the pooled model, white consciousness is significant, the gender specific models show that there is a difference between white men and women. In the pooled model, whites are more likely to support banning abortion or only allowing it under certain circumstances and less likely to support abortion on demand as levels of white consciousness rise from their minimum to their maximum. This pattern holds true for white men whose likelihood to support for abortion on demand decreases from 0.53 to 0.34 ($\Delta=-0.19$) as

white consciousness increases from minimum to maximum.⁹ However for white women, while the direction of the effects of white consciousness are the same—less support for abortion on demand and more support for restrictions or making the procedure illegal—none of the effects are statistically significant. White consciousness does not matter for white women on the gendered issue of abortion. This, and the differing results for the models for government aid to Blacks and affirmative action, show that white consciousness does not affect white women’s policy preferences on non-racialized policy issues. These results suggest that in issues that are gendered but not racialized, gender is stronger than white consciousness for women, but in racialized and gendered policy issues, women’s white consciousness is stronger.

The final model examines how if and how white consciousness and gender is associated with policy preferences on an issue that is both non-gendered and non-racialized. As expected, white consciousness had no effect on preferences for the level of government action to address rising temperatures—*Climate Change*—for the pooled or gender specific models. This supports Hypothesis 3 which states that increasing levels of white consciousness will not have an effect on white people’s opinions on non-gendered, non-racialized policy issues.

While religiosity was not considered an explanatory variable in this research design, the results for the control variable are interesting and suggest further investigation could be fruitful. Across all models, the increased levels of church attendance had a statistically significant relationship with greater support for government support for aid to Blacks. For all abortion

⁹ As white consciousness increases from minimum to maximum a white man’s probability of supporting abortion under limited circumstances increases from 0.42 to 0.055 ($\Delta=0.13$). Support for the legal banning of abortion increases as white consciousness decreases, but the approaches—but does not reach—traditional levels of statistical significance.

models, increased levels of religiosity are linked to statistically significant lower levels of support for abortion. Interestingly, religiosity had a statistically significant relationship to greater support affirmative action in the pooled model and in the men only model but not for women. Also, increased religiosity was associated with lower support for government action on climate change but this was only statistically significant in the pooled model and the woman only model. It is important to note the limitations surrounding the specific religiosity measure I used. This is a measure of how often someone attends religious services, but this includes all religious traditions and denominations. It is possible to make assumptions about the mechanisms behind the results for religiosity relationships with support of aid to Blacks and abortion are consistent. Further analysis including measures of denomination, religious tradition, or specific belief could be informative about the mechanisms behind these results. Since Christianity is the majority religion among white Americans, it could be that these are reflections of the Christian beliefs about loving one's neighbor and against abortion, it is impossible to know for sure without better measures. I do not have reasonable assumptions behind why religiosity would have a stronger association with support for affirmative action for men than women or why it would have a stronger relationship for women than men with support for government action on climate change.

Conclusion

The political behavior literature suggests that there are gender gaps in political issue opinions (Smith 1984; Norrander 2008; Norrander & Wilcox 2008) and vote choice (Chaney et al 1998; Clark & Clark 2008), but there is evidence that the gender gap in vote choice is narrower between white men and white women than it is in the population as a whole (Junn & Masuoka 2020; Junn 2017). Additionally, we know that white women do not vote for women candidates

with the same frequency as non-white women even when they express the same level of support for descriptive representation (Philips 2018) and that the strength of white identity is related to partisanship differently for men and women (Branton & Niezgodá 2022). This led me to ask if the differences in political behavior of white men and women as a function of their racial identity extends to issue opinions.

To explore this question, I used the 2016 ANES to compare support of white men and women on policies that are racialized and gendered (government aid to Blacks), racialized OR gendered (raced based affirmative action and abortion respectively), and neither racialized or gendered (climate change) as white consciousness varies. Overall, I find that when an issue is racialized but not gendered, white identity matters for both white men and white women, but it's affect is stronger for white women. If an issue is both racialized and gendered the relative strength of white consciousness between gender groups reverses with it being stronger for men. This suggests that gender consciousness may be allaying the role of racial consciousness in white women's support for these issues; however, this would take further research to determine. Furthermore, the fact that white racial consciousness has a statistically significant relationship with the opinion of white men about the gendered but not racialized issue of abortion which is an interesting finding.

The findings from this article present a further avenue for research in examining the relationship between white consciousness and white men's opinions on gendered but not racialized policy issues. In their experimental research, Westwood and Peterson (2020) find that shifts in racial identity are inseparable with partisan affect. The opinions of men with high levels of white consciousness could be reflective of the GOP's partisan stance on abortion and gender

is mitigating the effect for women, but it is impossible to know without further research that includes a measure of gender affinity.

CHAPTER 4

WE MATTER: LINKED FATE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN ACROSS RACES

Introduction

Historically and contemporaneously, we see instances of political participation among American women, especially non-white women, that appear to be related to an attachment to their racial group. For example, Black women were active participants in the Civil Rights Movement of the Twentieth Century and, more recently, have been credited by Democrats with “saving” elections like the 2017 special election for the US Senate seat in Alabama in which 98% of Black Women voted for Doug Jones against a candidate facing credible accusations of child molestation (St. Felix 2017). For white women, political behavior is often thought of in terms of gender while racial group attachment is considered less often. This article contributes to the racial and ethnic politics literature by developing knowledge in two understudied areas. First, recent work has called for the disaggregation of groups in analysis to gain knowledge about how intersecting identities affect political behavior (i.e. Brown 2014; Montoya 2020). Here, I primarily compare the role of linked fate in the political participation of women from different racial and ethnic groups, but I also include measures of socioeconomic status and citizenship. While there is evidence that linked fate operates differently within various groups, we do not know how linked fate affects various modes of participation for women of different racial and ethnic groups. Secondly, this paper contributes to the understanding of how gender and race operate among white women and how that differs from their role in other groups of women. For example, we know that linked fate has a positive relationship with Blacks contacting elected representatives there is a negative effect for Latinos, but increased levels of linked fate is associated with

increased likelihood of talking to others about politics (Shaw, Foster, & Combs 2019). The literature shows the intersection of race and gender leads to different political choices for white women than it does for non-white women even when they espouse similar preferences for relating to issues like descriptive representation of women (Phillips 2018; Junn 2017), but we still know little about what is behind these differences. Furthermore, gender and politics scholars have also been calling for disaggregation of intersectional identities in analysis (i.e. Ahrens et al. 2018 and Reingold, Haynie & Widner 2020).

Specifically, this article examines how linked fate—or the belief that one’s personal life chances are linked to those of their group (Dawson 1994)—is related to the political participation of women from various racial groups by means of voting, making political donations, protesting, and petitioning. The literature suggests linked fate does not behave consistently among all groups and, sometimes, even varies within groups (Mutz 2018; Gay, Hochschild, & White 2016; Schildkraut 2017; Sanchez & Masuoka 2010). For women, racial linked fate has been shown to be correlated with different political behaviors based one’s race and position in the racial hierarchy and the patriarchy (Campi & Junn 2019). I hypothesize an increase in expressed linked fate will be associated with an increase in political participation for women of all racial groups. Further, I posit increased levels of linked fate will a weaker relationship with political participation among Latinas and Asian American women when compared to this relationship for Black and white women due to the larger percentages of immigrants in the Latina and Asian American populations and the structural and social barriers to their political participation. For this analysis, I use the 2016 Collaborative, Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) (Barreto et al. 2017) to examine the role of linked fate and the likelihood that white, Black, Latina, and Asian American

women will engage in voting, donating, protesting, and petitioning. These forms of participation were chosen because of their different levels of accessibility to people with different demographic characteristics. For example, making a political donation may be prohibitive based on one's socioeconomic status but voting is free. However, voting is limited to citizens while there is no citizenship requirement for protesting.

Overall, the results suggest linked fate does not correlate with a woman's decision to vote regardless of her race, but it is a significant indicator across all models for a woman's probability of signing a petition. The relationship between linked fate and a woman's likelihood to donate or protest varied by racial group with linked fate only reaching significance for Asian American women and Latinas in the donation models. In the models for protest, linked fate was significant indicator of the likelihood of protesting for all non-white women. I find linked fate has the smallest correlation with the participation of white women. Contrary to my expectations, linked fate is most closely related to political participation for Latinas and Asian American women than for Black or white women. Linked fate is most often significant for Latinas and Asian American women and least often significant for white women. Black women fall in between.

As part of the broader dissertation project, this article serves additional theoretical purposes. First, by using linked fate rather than one of the other identity measures employed in the dissertation, this article implicitly tests Phoenix's (2019) threat to anger to participation pathway for white Americans on an entirely female sample. In Chapter 1 the white identity variable is interacted with anger, and in Chapter 2, I use Jardina's (2019) white consciousness measure which includes a question explicitly meant to measure the perception of an external threat against the group. The results suggest that linked fate has the weakest association with

political participation among white women of the four groups examined. The previous chapters found white racial identity—when either interacted with anger or inclusive of a measure of threat—had a significant relationship with the political behavior of white women. Taken together these findings offer support for Phoenix’s (2019) argument and the idea that white racial identity alone may not be sufficient to influence political participation. Additionally, this is the only chapter in which I test the relationship of a racial identity measure to political behavior in side-by-side analysis of white and non-white women. Being able to compare how white women are different from women in other racial and ethnic groups adds depth to our knowledge.

Political Participation

Across the spectrum of racial diversity in the United States and through history, we can observe women participating politically in ways that appear to be driven by their racial identification. For example, in the late spring and early summer of 2020, we saw Black women flooding streets around the country in protests linked to the Black Lives Matter movement—which was founded by Black women—sparked by the death of George Floyd at the hands of the Minneapolis Police department (Buchanan, Bui, & Patel 2020). In spite of being targeted—both historically and contemporaneously—for disenfranchisement and voter suppression, Black women are a consistently active voting block (Solomon & Maxwell 2019). White women are a voting bloc that has reliably voted for Republican candidates since the mid-20th century (Junn 2017) and that participates in protests against the results of these elections like the 2017 Women’s March and the 2021 Capitol Insurrection. Sixty-one percent of Asian American women voted in the 2020 presidential election in which the first Asian American female Vice President, Kamala Harris, was elected. This was a historically large increase over the group’s 48% turn out

in the 2016 election (Ramakrishnan 2021). In 2018, women of color demonstrated against the policy by US immigration services of separating immigrant children from their parents in protests which led to hundreds of arrests (Diaz, Serfaty, & Sullivan 2018). These are certainly not the first or only notable examples of political participation by women of various races in the United States, but they do speak to the salience of race in the political lives of contemporary American women. In spite of these anecdotal examples of political participation that appear to be racially motivated, we do not know if women's attachment to their racial groups is driving their political participation in the mass public.

There are varying operationalizations of political participation. Voting is the most basic form of political participation. However, other activities such as writing letters to a representative, protesting, and giving money to a campaign are also political participation. Various research considers different modes of political participation ranging from simply voting (i.e. Riker & Ordeshook 1968; Brady et al. 1995; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade 2001; Barreto 2007) to more expansive examples which include multiple forms of activity such as protesting, attending political meetings, and campaigning (Verba et al. 1993; Leighley & Vedlitz 1999; Jamal 2005; Willeck & Mendelberg 2022). These choices are often defined by data availability or specific research questions; however, the variation also means there is variation in how contributing factors impact different forms of political participation. Considering forms of participation outside of voting is especially important when discussing non-white groups because members of these groups are more likely to be unable to vote because of citizenship status and various means of legal disenfranchisement (Fraga 2018; Epperly et al. 2020). Citizenship was not assured to non-white populations until after the Civil War and access to the franchise was not guaranteed until

the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Because systematic barriers like identification laws and citizenship status have a disproportionate impact on certain racial groups, it is important to consider ways in which people who are not able to vote might participate in the political process. For women, their different life experiences lead to different political skillsets, different experiences with recruitment to participate, and that they have different psychological orientations to politics all which affect rates of participation (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2002; Kittilson 2016).

Several factors impact political participation. Rational choice studies suggest the small chances of one person's vote influencing the outcome of an election can make participation an irrational act and point to social pressures and collective action motivations that can overcome this (Downs 1957; Olson 1965). It follows that rates of participation will be higher when the costs—such as time, opportunity costs, and requisite knowledge—are lower (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Other models focus on individual level characteristics that change individuals' cost-benefit analyses and suggest a people are more likely to engage in political participation through voting and other means (i.e. Milbrath & Goel 1977; Bennet & Bennet 1986; Conway 1991; Verba et al. 1993), political interest (Holbrook et al. 2016), a sense of political efficacy (Finkel 1985; Bobo & Gilliam 1990; Holbrook et al. 2016), and political skills (Verba et al 1993; Jamal 2005). It is important to note that these factors are not independent of an individual's race (Marschall 2001; Anoll 2018). For example, non-white Americans are likely to have lower socioeconomic levels than white Americans due to persistent racial gaps in income levels, average educational attainment, and unemployment levels (Pew Research Center 2016). The literature seeks to address participation differences among groups by considering factors such as racial identity (Dawson 1994; Nagel 1997; Witmer & Boehmke 2007; Shaw et al. 2019) and the

presence or absence of descriptive representation of non-white groups and women (Bobo & Gilliam 1990; Campbell & Wolbrecht 2006; Baretto 2007; Alexander & Jalalzai 2020; Bos et al. 2021). While voter turnout differences between men and women have closed, women still have lower rates of other modes of participation like calling their elected officials, donating to campaigns, and joining political parties but the strength of these relationships vary among different groups of women (Kittilson 2016). Unexpectedly, there is evidence that religious participation, specifically in denominations that espouse biblical literalism, may have a dampening effect on the political participation of women even though being an active member of a congregation traditionally is seen as an indicator for higher levels of participation (Cassese & Holman 2016). For example, historically, Black women voted and participated in campaign related activities at a lower rate than white women (Welch & Secret 1981). Asian American women are also more likely to participate in nontraditional modes of participation like boycotts and petitions (Brown 2014).

Linked Fate

Linked fate was first used in the literature about Black political behavior to describe the phenomenon that group circumstances often outweigh individual situations when people decide on personal political preferences and actions (Dawson 1994; Miller et al. 1981; Sanchez & Vargas 2016;). Having a sense of linked fate means people feel their life chances cannot be separated from those of other members of their group (Dawson 1994). For example, a Black person with high socioeconomic status and high racial linked fate might vote to impose higher taxes on themselves for redistributive purposes because it benefits the outcomes for Black people more broadly, when we would not expect those choices from a person of that socioeconomic status.

Linked fate also operates in other racial groups though it operates differently among groups (Mutz 2018; Gay et al. 2016; Schildkraut 2017; Sanchez & Masuoka 2010). Black Americans consistently report strong levels of linked fate (Frasure-Yokley, Masuoka, & Barreto 2019; Gay et al. 2016). However, levels of linked fate within the Asian American and Latino communities are generally weaker and fluctuate more (Sanchez & Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2017).

Gender linked fate is associated with political participation like protesting or running for office among women (Jenkins, Poloni-Staudinger, & Strachan 2021) and how a woman views her gender is related to the linked fate has on her political behavior (Simien 2005). Specifically, there is evidence that being married is related to women feeling relatively less connected to other women and can thus lead to a lower level of gender linked fate especially for Latinas and white women (Stout, Kretschmer, & Ruppanner 2017). Additionally, the intersection of race and gender operate differently for women of different races (Phillips 2018; Junn 2017). Evidence suggests that gender linked fate is often weaker than racial linked fate (Gay et al. 2016). We do not know with certainty what causes an individual to have a sense of linked fate. Psychological markers and experiences of discrimination do not show causal links, but linked fate with different identity groups does appear consistent within individuals (Gay et al. 2016). In other words, if a woman expresses strong linked fate with her racial group, we would expect her to have a strong sense of linked fate with other women as well.

Theory

Recent racial, ethnic, and gender politics literature highlights the need to pay closer attention to the effects of being a member of multiple categories of inequality—such as being a minority woman—as the identities work in concert to affect political behavior (Brown 2014;

Montoya 2020). We know that expressed levels of gender linked fate are less stable than racial linked fate and that marital status affects the level of linked fate expressed by Latina and white women but not Black women (Stout, Kretschmer, & Ruppanner 2017). We know that gender attachment can increase political participation among women (Jenkins, Poloni-Staudinger, & Strachan 2021), how a woman views her gender can change the role of linked fate on her political behavior (Simien 2005), and that the intersections of race and gender operate differently by race (Phillips 2018; Junn 2017). Furthermore, we know that linked fate with different identity groups does appear to be consistent (Gay et al. 2016). This means that if a woman expresses a high level of linked fate for her racial group, we can expect her to also have high level of gender linked fate.

Research shows that gender influences voting behavior, especially for female voters given their social and political status relative to men within the patriarchy (Plutzer & Zipp 1996; Simien 2005; Campi & Junn 2019). Gender attachment appears to explain ideological differences with women with high linked fate tending to identify as liberal (Stout, Krescher, & Ruppanner 2017). There is evidence that some white women distance themselves from their relatively disadvantaged identity of gender in favor of their identity as whites in an effort to support the status quo and the position of whites at the top of the gender hierarchy (Junn 2017; Cassese & Barnes 2019). Since we know that when a person feels threatened, they fall back on their most privileged identity (Abascal 2015, 2020), we would expect white women would fall back on their race in threatening situations.

Generally speaking, linked fate is associated with strong group identification and, at least under certain circumstances like resource rich contexts or those when race is politically salient, it can lead to higher levels of political participation (Lien, Conway, & Wong 2004; Merseth 2020;

Shaw et al. 2019). While there is evidence the strength of link fate varies across groups and types of political participation, there is not enough evidence to precisely predict the effects it will have on each mode of political participation for each racial group of women. Generally, if linked fate has an effect on participation, it is a positive one. Because this article is trying to establish a base of knowledge about the differences in these effects, I am testing a hypothesis of the effect of linked fate on political participation across women of different races:

H1: Higher levels of linked fate will be associated with higher levels of political participation for women of all races across all modes of political participation.

Additionally, this analysis will pay special attention to Latinas and Asian American women because there is less known about the political behavior these two groups of women, and they share two relevant group characteristics that white and Black Americans do not. First, there are larger percentages of immigrants within the Latino and Asian American populations. Secondly, Latino and Asian American identities are pan-ethnicities. This means both are a type of umbrella identity that includes people from various national and ethnic origins (Espiritu 1992). Latinos and Asians make up a total of 67% of immigrants to the United States (Bundiman 2020), which contributes to lower rates of citizenship in the Latino and Asian American communities when compared to white and Black populations. Non-citizens do not have the right to vote (“Who Can and Can’t...” 2022) or contribute to campaigns (FEC 2022) and may also feel dissuaded from other forms of political participation due to worries of how it could affect their status in the United States. However, there has been little analysis of this effect and, so far, the evidence is mixed (Potochnick & Stegmaier 2020; Maginot 2021; Altema McNeely, Kim & Kim 2022). There are examples of participation of non-citizens in protests like the Immigration Rallies in 2006.

The role of linked fate in Latinas and Asian American groups are also affected by the pan-

ethnic nature of those identities. Factors such as generation since immigration, educational attainment, country of origin, experience of discrimination, and level of political incorporation affect if a person identifies more closely with their specific country of origin or the broader pan-ethnic identity (Masuoka 2006; Chan, Chong, & Rachaudhuri 2021; Jang et al 2021). This could at least partially explain why linked fate is less common in the Latino and Asian populations than is seen in white or Black Americans (Casellas, Gillion, & Wallace 2019) and has been shown to be more varied Latino and Asian American populations (Sanchez & Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2017). For both Asian Americans and Latinos, being younger, educated, experiencing discrimination and feeling excluded are related to higher levels of pan-ethnic linked fate (Kiang et al. 2021). The strength of linked fate varies among Latinos in different contexts (Sanchez & Masuoka 2010; Sanchez, Masuoka, & Abrams 2019; Maltby et al. 2020). For example, US born Latinos who live near large immigrant communities and in areas with high levels of immigration enforcement have higher levels of linked fate (Maltby et al. 2020). Other indicators of Latino linked fate, like having experienced discrimination, are not consistent over time (Sanchez & Masuoka 2010; Sanchez, Masuoka & Abrams 2019). Brown (2014) tested the effects of linked fate on participation among minority women—but not white women—finding that it was only significant for Black women and not for Latinas and Asian American women.

Considering these findings with the fact that Latinas and Asian American women are expected to have fewer opportunities to participate due to larger proportions of non-citizens and that there are differences in linked fate within these racial ethnic groups related to pan-ethnicity, I expect that:

H2: Increased levels of linked fate will have a weaker relationship with political participation among Latinas and Asian American women, yet a stronger relationship with political participation among white and Black women.

Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, I use the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Postelection Survey (CMPS) (Barreto et al. 2017). This survey, with a total of 10,145 respondents, was conducted online in English, Spanish, Chinese (simplified and traditional), Korean, and Vietnamese in a self-administered format. Though non-citizens and citizens who were not registered to vote are included, there is an oversample of registered voters because of the project's focus on behavior surrounding the 2016 election. Furthermore, because the survey was designed to allow for analysis of minority political behavior, it oversampled Blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos. The result is a sample with 10% white participants and 30% from each of the oversampled groups. After dropping men and accounting for missing data, this makes the sample for my analysis 5,618 women. The sample sizes within each racial group are 640 white women, 1,916 Black women, 1,505 Asian American women, and 1,724 Latinas. The women range from 18 to 98 years old with mean age of 39.39 years.

Dependent Variables

To examine variation across different types of political participation, I created four dichotomous dependent variables that measure if the respondent: (a) voted in the November 2016 election; (b) contributed money to a candidate, political party, ballot issue, or some other campaign organization in the past 12 months; (c) attended a protest march, demonstration, or rally in the past 12 months; and (d) signed a petition regarding an issue or problem that

concerned the individual in the past 12 months.¹⁰ Each dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent participated in the political activity and coded 0 if the respondent did not participate in the activity. I chose to analyze forms of participation with different barriers to access and economic and opportunity costs involved. Voting is a basic measure of political participation, and its cost structure is different than other forms of participation because it is restricted to citizens and, in most states, requires registration days to weeks in advance of the election. Political donations, by their nature, involve a financial cost and, thus, are limited by the economic resources available to the individual. As foreign nationals, non-citizens are not allowed to make political donations (FEC 2022). Protest is not limited to citizens, does not require advanced registration, or a monetary investment but does cost individuals who participate more time than the other forms of participation examined here. Signing a petition is again free and has a low time commitment. While there are requirements for signing a petition the exact regulations and procedures for validating them vary by jurisdiction, and it is typical for a substantial number of signatures on a petition to be declared invalid (Whiteside & Eakin 2008). Commonly, those who sign petitions are supposed to be registered to vote—and thus citizens—but this is not necessarily verified at the time of signature (Whiteside & Eakin 2008). The rise of online petitions lowers access to petitions—and the ability to monitor eligibility at the time of signature—to the extent that signing an online petition has been referred to as “Slacktivism” (Piat 2019). The CMPS

¹⁰ While there are more measures of political participation included in the CMPS, I chose to include modes of participation that had different cost structures and allowed observation of participation by people with varying demographic characteristics. For example, while non-citizens cannot vote they can participate in protest, and while only citizens can give political donations, non-citizens with citizen spouses can have an effect on household political donations. Making political donations requires economic resources but few time resources. Petitions are low in both financial and time commitments for individuals who sign them, but most people who sign petitions are asked to do so rather than seeking out a petition. This speaks to political recruitment which the literature suggests is happens at different rates for women than for men.

measure for petitions does not specify if the petition(s) signed were online or physical. Table 4.1 shows the percentages of women in each group who voted, gave, protested, and petitioned along with the average for the sample as a whole.

Table 4.1: Rates of Political Participation of Women by Race (%)

	Vote	Give	Protest	Petition
White Women	55.51	16.54	8.27	39.76
Black Women	60.08	13.06	11.37	38.27
Asian Women	40.07	9.06	8.23	27.22
Latinas	51.6	10.47	11.56	35.82
All Women	51.7	11.63	10.18	34.73

Independent Variables

The key independent variable is racial linked fate. This variable was constructed from two questions in the CMPS. The first asked if the respondent thinks that “what happens generally to (members of their racial group) in this country will have something to do with what happens in (their) life.” Respondents could give either a yes or no answer. If they said yes, they were then asked if they believed it would affect them a lot, some, or not very much. I combined these questions to form a 4-point scale for Linked Fate. Individuals who said that what happened to their group did not affect them are coded as 0 (2,507). Those who said it affected them “not very much” were coded as 1 (334). “Some” is coded as 2 (2,493), and “a lot” is coded as 3 (1,277).¹¹

I control for partisanship, age, income, education, citizenship status, and political efficacy. Partisanship is measured by two dichotomous variables. Democrat is coded as a 1 if the respondent identified themselves as a Democrat and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Independent is

¹¹ The breakdown of reported linked fate by race can be found in Appendix B.

coded as a 1 if the respondent identified as an independent and a 0 otherwise. Republicans are the reference category. Age is the respondent's age in years at the end of 2016.¹² Income is a 3-point ordered variable with categories of less than \$40,000 a year, \$40,000 to \$80,000 a year, and over \$80,000 a year.¹³ Education is coded from 1 to 6 where 1 indicates that the respondent left school before they reached high school and 6 means that they received at least some post-graduate education. Citizenship status is coded as 1 if the individual is a United States citizen and 0 for all others.¹⁴ The political efficacy variable is drawn from a CMPS item that asks how strongly the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement "public officials don't care much what people like me think?" The variable is a 5-point scale ranging from 1 for those who strongly agree to 5 for those who strongly disagree.

Models

Because each of my dependent variables is dichotomous in nature, I used a series of logistic regression models to test the hypotheses. For each dependent variable, I ran a pooled model for all women and separate models for white women, Black women, Asian American women, and Latinas. This created five models for each of the four dependent variables (vote, give, protest, and petition) for a total of twenty models, allowing for insights into how linked fate behaves in the larger sample as well as for each group. This design allows for the comparison of

¹² The CMPS asks for respondent's birth year. I used this to code a variable for age assuming everyone's birthdays had already occurred when the survey was given.

¹³ For respondents who refused to give more detailed income information, the CMPS asked which of these three bands an individual fit into. Using these income bands instead of only the question with smaller increments increases my sample size by 595 respondents.

¹⁴ Citizenship is not used as a control variable in the models with voting as the dependent variable because only citizens are legally allowed to vote. Furthermore, the CMPS did not ask non-citizens if they had voted. It is also not used in the protest model for white women because no non-citizen white women had protested.

the political behavior of white women to that their non-white peers as well as adding to our knowledge of the behavior of Latina and Asian American women. I created a set of categorical variables for each race based on respondent self-identification. For the models that include all women, I include Black, Asian, and Latino as controls with white as the reference category. Even though the white sample is the smallest, I made this choice because of the theoretical interest of this article for comparing the political behavior of women of color to that of white women. For the models for the individual racial groups, these variables are used to identify which respondents are considered to be in each group.

Results

The logistic regression results for the pooled participation models are presented in Table 4.2. The first column presents the results regarding voter participation, the second column presents the results regarding donations (give), the third column presents the results regarding protesting, and the fourth column presents the results for signing petitions. First, I begin with the voter participation. The findings indicate increasing linked fate from minimum to maximum has a significant relationship on all dependent variables except for likelihood of voting. As linked fate went from the minimum to the maximum, though it is not significant, the probability that a woman would vote grew from 0.50 to 0.51 ($\Delta=0.01$). Second, for making a political donation, as linked fate went from the minimum to the maximum, the probability that a woman had donated grew from 0.07 to 0.14 ($\Delta=0.07$)—a statistically significant difference. Third, as linked fate moved from minimum to maximum the likelihood that a woman had attended a protest went from 0.06 to 0.14 ($\Delta=0.08$). Finally, as linked fate went from minimum to maximum, the likelihood that a woman had signed a petition in the last year grew from 0.27 to 0.45 ($\Delta=0.18$). To summarize, in

the pooled models, linked fate was a significant indicator that women would participate for all modes of political participation except for voting.

Table 4.2: Determinates of Women's Political Participation (n = 5618)
Logistic Regression Models with Modes of Participation as Dependent Variables

	Vote	Give	Protest	Petition
Linked Fate	0.01 (0.04)	0.25** (0.05)	0.28** (0.06)	0.26** (0.03)
Democrat	0.13 (0.16)	0.17 (0.18)	0.72** (0.22)	0.33** (0.13)
Independent	-1.10** (0.17)	-0.56** (0.20)	0.11 (0.24)	-0.02 (0.14)
Education	0.47** (0.06)	0.26** (0.05)	0.01 (0.08)	0.35** (0.04)
Income	0.20** (0.02)	0.10** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.06** (0.01)
Age	0.06** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.00* (0.00)
Citizenship	0.84** (0.12)	0.52** (0.16)	0.19 (0.18)	0.53** (0.00)
Efficacy	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.08* (0.04)
Black	0.73** (0.14)	-0.17 (0.16)	0.36 (0.18)	0.01 (0.12)
Asian	-1.48** (0.13)	-0.43* (0.20)	-0.06 (0.22)	-0.63** (0.14)
Latina	0.11 (0.14)	-0.27 (0.18)	0.47* (0.19)	0.02 (0.12)
Constant	-5.44** (0.40)	-5.10** (0.41)	-3.01** (0.50)	-2.80** (0.28)
Proportional Red. In Error	0.447	0.012	-0.017	0.072

Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (two tailed)

Next, Table 4.3 presents the logistic regression results for white women. A white woman's likelihood of voting, donating, protesting, and signing a petition are shown in Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. For white women, linked fate only reached traditional levels of significance for the likelihood that they would sign a petition. It neared significance for the donation model but not for protesting or voting. While the likelihood that white women will vote does not change significantly across the range of linked fate, the relationship is positive going from 0.66 to 0.76 ($\Delta=0.10$). The likelihood that a white woman will have given a political donation in the past year grew from 0.10 to 0.18 ($\Delta=0.08$) as linked fate increases from minimum to maximum, and it closely approaches significance. It is worth noting that the model for white women is the only protest model in which linked fate does not have a significant relationship on the probability of having protested over the past year, but the relationship is positive increasing from 0.03 to 0.09 ($\Delta=0.06$) over the range of linked fate. Finally, as linked fate increases from minimum to maximum the probability that a white woman has signed a petition in the past year grows from 0.32 to 0.52 ($\Delta=0.20$, but again this is not significant. Again, the only mode of political participation for which linked fate was significant for white women was signing a petition.

Table 4.3: Determinates of White Women's Political Participation (n = 640)
Logistic Regression Models with Modes of Participation as Dependent Variables

	Vote	Give	Protest	Petition
Linked Fate	0.15 (0.11)	0.25 (0.13)	0.32 (0.18)	0.30** (0.09)
Democrat	0.47 (0.30)	0.46 (0.31)	1.20* (0.49)	0.86** (0.25)
Independent	-0.58 (0.30)	-0.49 (0.38)	0.50 (0.55)	0.44 (0.26)

(table continues)

	Vote	Give	Protest	Petition
Education	0.77** (0.15)	0.33** (0.13)	0.67** (0.15)	0.45** (0.10)
Income	0.26** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.03)
Age	0.07** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Citizenship	1.40 (0.15)	-0.42 (0.52)	0.57 (0.92)	-0.01 (0.53)
Efficacy	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.10 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.09)
Constant	-8.21** (1.36)	-4.94** (0.87)	-6.90** (1.48)	-2.99** (0.77)
Proportional Red. In Error	0.543	0.072	0.000	0.165

Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (two tailed)

Now, I turn to Table 4.4 which presents the logistic regression results for political participation for Black women. For Black women, increased linked fate is a significant indicator of protest and petition participation—as presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 4.4—but not for voting or giving political donations—as shown in the first and second columns. As for other women, linked fate does not have a statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of voting, but there is a negative relationship with probability of voting shrinking from 0.73 to 0.70 ($\Delta=-0.03$) as linked fate rises from minimum to maximum. There was not a significant association of linked fate on Black women’s probability of giving political donations. For protest, a Black woman’s chance of having attended a protest in the last year rose from 0.08 to 0.15 across the range of linked fate ($\Delta=0.07$) which is a significant difference. Finally, as linked fate rises from minimum to maximum the probability that a Black woman will have signed a petition within the

last year rises from 0.29 to 0.52 ($\Delta=0.23$) which is significant. To summarize, linked fate has a significant association with Black women’s likelihood to protest or sign a petition but not on their likelihood of voting or giving political donations.

Table 4.4: Determinants of Black Women’s Political Participation (n = 1916)
Logistic Regression Models with Modes of Participation as Dependent Variables

	Vote	Give	Protest	Petition
Linked Fate	-0.06 (0.05)	0.08 (0.07)	0.25** (0.08)	0.03** (0.05)
Democrat	0.95** (0.34)	-0.83* (0.36)	-0.11 (0.39)	-0.09 (0.28)
Independent	-0.71* (0.36)	-1.49** (0.41)	-0.42 (0.44)	-0.46 (0.46)
Education	0.46** (0.09)	0.29** (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.30** (0.06)
Income	0.14** (0.03)	0.09** (0.02)	0.09** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)
Age	0.07** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Citizenship	1.49** (0.29)	0.95* (0.38)	0.26 (0.34)	0.90** (0.24)
Efficacy	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.06)
Constant	-5.99** (0.58)	-4.14** (0.66)	-2.09** (0.66)	-3.13** (0.45)
Proportional Red. In Error	0.402	-0.003	0.216	0.102

Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (two tailed)

Next, Table 4.5 presents the logistic regression results for the relationship of linked fate with political participation for Asian American women. The first column shows the results for voting, the second column shows the results for donating, the third column shows the results for

protesting, and the fourth column shows the results for signing a petition. For Asian American women, like for all groups of women, linked fate does not have a statistically significant association with the likelihood of voting but there is a positive relationship with an increase from 0.20 to 0.29 ($\Delta=0.09$) as linked fate rises from the minimum to the maximum. However, linked fate is a significant indicator for all other types of participation for Asian American women.

Table 4.5: Determinants of Asian American Women’s Political Participation (n = 1505)

Logistic Regression Models with Modes of Participation as Dependent Variables

	Vote	Give	Protest	Petition
Linked Fate	0.16 (0.08)	0.27* (0.13)	0.31* (0.13)	0.16* (0.08)
Democrat	-0.26 (0.26)	0.4 (0.35)	0.92 (0.47)	0.30 (0.24)
Independent	-0.80** (0.28)	-0.42 (0.39)	0.40 (0.54)	(0.23) (0.25)
Education	0.11 (0.10)	0.08 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.15)	0.18* (0.09)
Income	0.19** (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)
Age	0.06** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.00)
Citizenship	-0.15 (0.19)	0.27 (0.25)	0.16 (0.31)	0.21 (0.15)
Efficacy	-0.03 (0.09)	0.04 (0.16)	0.13 (0.18)	-0.11 (0.10)
Constant	-4.84** (0.73)	-5.17** (0.86)	-2.13 (1.16)	-1.76** (0.58)
Proportional Red. In Error	0.264	0.129	0.114	0.012

Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (two tailed)

Linked fate is significant in the likelihood of an Asian American woman having given a political

donation in the past year; the probability grows from 0.06 to 0.12 ($\Delta=0.06$) as linked fate rises from minimum to maximum. As linked fate raises from minimum to maximum, the probability that an Asian American woman had attended a protest in the last year grew from 0.04 to 0.10 ($\Delta=0.06$), and the probability that they had signed a petition grew from 0.23 to 0.32 ($\Delta=0.09$). Both of those differences are significant. In other words, linked fate is significantly related to the likelihood that Asian American women will give a political donation, protest, and sign a petition.

Table 4.6: Determinants of Latina’s Political Participation (n = 1724)
Logistic Regression Models with Modes of Participation as Dependent Variables


	Vote	Give	Protest	Petition
Linked Fate	-0.10 (0.09)	0.60** (0.14)	0.30* (0.14)	0.27** (0.06)
Democrat	0.34 (0.26)	0.14 (0.33)	0.80* (0.34)	0.28 (0.22)
Independent	-1.12** (0.26)	-0.53 (0.38)	-0.08 (0.37)	0.22 (0.26)
Education	0.79** (0.08)	0.35** (0.09)	-0.01 (0.14)	0.49** (0.08)
Income	0.23** (0.03)	0.18** (0.03)	0.09* (0.04)	0.07** (0.02)
Age	0.05** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Citizenship	1.16** (0.19)	0.59* (0.25)	0.11 (0.26)	0.54** (0.18)
Efficacy	-0.06 (0.08)	0.00 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.1 (0.07)
Constant	-6.04** (0.65)	-6.73** (0.84)	-2.67** (0.76)	-3.23** (0.48)
Proportional Red. In Error	0.459	-0.030	0.034	0.087

Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 (two tailed)

Table 4.6 presents the logistic regression results for political participation for Latinas. Again, the first column shows the results for voting, the second column shows the results for donating, the third column shows the results for protesting, and the fourth column shows the results for signing a petition. Like in the models for Asian American women, linked fate was a significant indicator that Latinas would have higher levels of participation in every mode except for voting. While linked fate was not a significant indicator of a Latina's probability of voting, there was a negative relationship with the probability of voting decreasing from 0.55 to 0.47 ($\Delta=0.08$). There was a significant relationship for linked fate and making political donations for Latinas with an increase from 0.03 to 0.17 ($\Delta=0.14$) as linked fate increases from minimum to maximum. There was also a significant relationship for linked fate and a Latina's likelihood to attend a protest which increases from 0.07 to 0.16 ($\Delta=0.09$) as linked fate grows from minimum to maximum. Finally, a Latina's likelihood to have signed a petition increases as linked fate goes from minimum to maximum from 0.30 to 0.50 ($\Delta=0.20$) which was also significant.

To visualize these results, Figure 4.1 plots for levels of all four modes of political participation across the range of linked fate for each of the racial and ethnic groups. The graph in the top left corner of the figure shows the change of the likelihood that a woman from each racial group will vote over the range of linked fate. The top right graph shows the change of likelihood that women from each racial group will give a political donation. The bottom left graph is the likelihood that a woman from each racial group will protest over the range of linked fate, and the bottom right graph shows the change in likelihood that a woman from each racial group of signing a petition as linked fate increases from the minimum to the maximum.

Figure 4.1: Effects of Linked Fate on Political Participation Among Women



To summarize the results and what is shown in Figure 4.1, racial linked fate does not have a statistically significant relationship with the likelihood that a woman will vote in the pooled model or in any of the racial subgroup models. In the models examining white women, linked fate only had a statistically significant relationship with the likelihood with signing a petition. For Black women, linked fate is a predictor of their probability of signing a petition and participating in a protest. However linked fate is a significant indicator that Latinas and Asian American women will engage every mode of political participation. This lends partial support for Hypotheses 1. While linked fate was significant for at least one form of political participation in each racial group, it was not a consistent indicator across all forms of participation and did not behave consistently for all races across all modes of participation. The results also did not support Hypotheses 2 in that, rather than having a weaker relationship with participation for Latina and Asian American women, linked fate actually appears to have a stronger relationship with their likelihood to engage in politics than it did for Black or white women.

Discussion

This analysis conducted with the 2016 CMPS data attempt to contribute to the recognized need in the literature to disaggregate groups (i.e., Brown 2014; Montoya 2020), add detail to what we know about the effect of group identity within the pan-ethnic identity groups of Latina and Asian American women, and test the impact of racial identity on white women in the absence of anger. The racial and ethnic politics literature has greater depth in the study of white and Black Americans than it does in the study of Latino and Asian Americans. The knowledge about the relationships between group identity and political behavior within women in these two subgroups is even thinner. I find that linked fate is significantly related to making donations,

attending protests, and signing petitions for both Latinas and Asian American women—though differences in participation observed with the variance of linked fate were larger for Latinas than for Asian American women for all three of these dependent variables. For Black women, linked fate is predictor of both protesting and signing a petition. Linked fate among white women is only associated with a higher chance of signing a petition. This adds to our knowledge of how linked fate operates in the context of intersecting identities and of the factors involved in political participation of Latinas and Asian American women. Namely, the analysis shows that linked fate is significant in the political participation of Latinas and Asian American women for giving donations, signing petitions, and participating in protest and is, in some cases, stronger than for white and Black women whereas we did not know this before.

Linked fate as a predictor of political participation is weakest for white women and strongest for Latinas. Previous literature suggests that Latino linked fate is variable and grows stronger when Latino identity salient (Sanchez & Masuoka 2010; Sanchez, Masuoka & Abrams 2019; Maltby et al. 2020). Confirmation of the strength of linked fate as an indicator of political participation for Latinas when compared to that of other women using data collected in subsequent time periods or contexts would be informative because the data used for this analysis was collected immediately following the 2016 election of Donald Trump in which Latinx immigration and the relationship between the United States and Mexico were a controversial and much talked about issue. The results of this analysis might not be replicated using data when Latinx identity is not as salient in the political discourse.

Though citizenship was not the focus of this article, the control variable for citizenship

had interesting results for Black, Asian American, and Latina women.¹⁵ Citizenship had a positive and statistically significant relationship with the likelihood that a woman would donate and that a woman would sign a petition in the pooled models and in the models for Black, Latina, and Asian American women. Citizenship was not significant indicator of likelihood to protest in any model. This suggests that protest is a more accessible mode of political participation for non-citizens than the others examined in this analysis.

From a real-world perspective, the results of this analysis suggest that potential candidates could capitalize on racial linked fate for women in specific ways like approaching them to sign petitions. Practically, it is difficult to know the impact of the impact of the specific petitions that are signed. Traditional petitions related to qualifying candidates, recalls, and referenda have clear impacts if they reach their requisite signatures. However, popular issue related petitions on the internet have more questionable efficacy. Statistics from Change.org, the online petition platform, suggest that petitions dealing with racial issues garner large numbers of signatures (Mustafic 2020). In 2020, the four most popular petitions were in response to police killings of Black Americans and the fifth was against the KKK, a traditionally pro-white group whose tactics err towards violence (Mustafic 2020). Likewise, if protest organizers are seeking more participants, considering linked fate appeals for non-white women might be a successful strategy; this finding supports previous evidence for the whole Latinx population (Roman, Walker, & Baretto 2021). Furthermore, political organizations seeking donations could use the same tactic with Latinas and Asian American women. This aligns with recent work that regarding political

¹⁵ There were 10 (or 1.31) percent of white women in the sample who were not citizens which means those results are difficult to interpret with any certainty because the low amount of variation in the variable for white women.

donations by Canadian women of Asian descent (Besco & Tolley 2022). However, candidates or organizers who are seeking to get out the female vote, should find means other than appeals to racial linked fate. By definition, linked fate is the belief that an individual's fate is tied to that of their group. Trying to capitalize on linked fate means either playing on either fears or hopes for the future. Normatively, this can be either positive or detrimental. Linked fate can be harnessed for positive change such as female led movements like Black Women's Health Imperative which was founded by relatively privileged women from Spellman with the goal of improving health outcomes for all Black women. However, the idea of shared group outcomes can also sow division and among the larger population for political motives like the division in white women that happened surrounding the 2017 Women's March. The findings from this analysis could be used in the service of both positive and negative outcomes.

In addition to the stand-alone implications of this article, viewing this analysis in the context of the rest of adds additional conclusions. Of the three measures of racial identity, the one in this article showed the least evidence of a relationship with the political behavior of white women. As this is the only time that racial identity measure was not either interacted with anger or comprised partly of an explicit measure of group threat perception, these results support Phoenix's (2019) argument that anger impacts the political behavior of white Americans. This suggests future avenues for research regarding the relationships between anger and political behavior in white women and white Americans of all genders.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Conclusions

The foundational questions behind this dissertation are what relationship does the strength of white women's racial identity have with their political behavior and does that change if they are angry. Driving these questions were observations of the 2017 Women's March protesting the inauguration of a Republican president and the 2021 Capitol Insurrection which tried to prevent the inauguration of a Democratic president. While there are examples of popular protests involving white women throughout the history of the United States, these two events were notable bookends to Donald Trump's term in the White House. The puzzle here was to understand the underpinnings of contemporary political behavior of white women and to see these opposing partisan activities could be related to the same. I set out to uncover if how white women conceptualized their racial identity was associated with their political behavior and if anger made a difference in the strength of that relationship.

Overall, I find that there is a relationship between the strength of white women's racial identity and their political behavior when there is a measure of anger or threat included. The evidence is weaker for a relationship between white linked fate and political participation among women. In the first substantive chapter, the findings show the strength of a woman's white identity and anger have a conditional relationship that strengthens her partisanship whether she identifies as a Republican or a Democrat. This finding could explain the motivations for white women who attended in the 2017 Women's March protesting the inauguration of Donald Trump as president and those who participated in the January 2021 Capital Insurrection and tried to

prevent the certification of Joe Biden's win in the presidential election. On the other hand, the chapter finds a positive relationship between anger, contextual diversity and the likelihood that a white woman will identify as an Independent. These women seem to be behaving differently from their angry peers in areas that are not as diverse.

In the second substantive chapter, I find differences in the relationship between white consciousness and political opinion for white men and women that vary for issues that are racialized (government aid to Blacks and race based affirmative action), gendered (government aid to Blacks and abortion), or neither (government action on climate change). For the racialized issues, white consciousness had a statistically significant association for both men and women but the relationship was smaller for women than it was for men. Furthermore, white consciousness was a significant indicator of white male opinion on abortion while it was not for women. Together these findings suggest that white consciousness operates when it overlaps with gender. Specifically, gender consciousness may be allaying the role of racial consciousness in white women's support for gendered issues; however, this would take further research to determine causality.

The third substantive chapter suggests that linked fate is a weak predictor of a white woman's likelihood to participate political with the only statistically significant result for white women was the relationship with signing a petition. Linked fate showed the strongest association with participation among Latina and Asian American women for whom there was a significant association with giving political donations, signing petitions, and participating in protests. For all non-white women there was a link between levels of expressed linked fate and if a woman had participated in protest. Overall, I find linked fate to be most often a significant indicator of

participation for Latinas and Asian American women and least often significant indicator of participation for white women. Black women fall in between.

This dissertation makes a unique contribution to the literature because it expands the areas of political behavior with a relationship to anger, threat, and white identity for white women. I add the knowledge that strength of partisanship increases as anger and white identity increase and that white consciousness impacts issue opinions. In addition to the contributions related specifically to white women, Chapter 4 adds to our knowledge of linked fate's varied association with political participation for women of various racial groups and suggests especially strong relationships with Latina and Asian American women.

Further Research

There is more to understand about white Americans' political behavior, its intersection with gender, and how it is evolving during this period of rapid demographic shift. Disaggregating whites by gender and other factors like socioeconomic status is important in understanding these groups in the American electorate and in understanding how hierarchies of privilege manifest themselves in political behavior. Additionally, the ideas of the intersectionality of race, gender, and socioeconomic status are interwoven with the racial and ethnics politics and gender and politics fields which lends itself to future related work in those fields.

Specifically, each of the substantive chapters suggests at least one avenue for further research. Following up on the first substantive chapter, I would like to delve into the mechanism behind why angry white women in contexts of high racial diversity are behaving so differently than their peers. Why are they more likely to be Independents than their peers in less diverse contexts? From Chapter 3, the results showing a relationship for white consciousness and opinion

on abortion for white men. The experimental research from Westwood and Peterson (2020) suggests that shifts in racial identity are inseparable than partisan affect. Is the relationship of high levels of white consciousness in white men and disapproval of abortion reflective of the Republican party's partisan stance on abortion? Are white men conceptualizing of abortion as a racialized issue? It is impossible to know without further research with measures of gender affinity among white men. Finally, Chapter 4 suggests avenues for research regarding the disaggregation of non-white racial and gender groups. Will the strength of the relationship between linked fate and political participation in Latina and Asian American women seen in this 2016 data hold in later time periods or was this caused by contextual factors surrounding the contemporary political climate? Going forward after this dissertation, my research agenda will remain focused on the associations between overlapping layers of identity and intersectionality on political behavior.

As mentioned in the introduction, it will be important to replicate these findings using data from different years because the saliency of race and gender was unusually high in the 2016 presidential campaign. Because white womanhood and attitudes about race and gender were in a unique spotlight that year with the presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton and the rhetoric of Donald Trump, data from different years may yield different results. Data from the 2020 CMPS finds a strong relationship intersectional linked fate and vote choice among Latina and Asian American women which suggests that the observations about the strength of length fate for those groups of women seen in Chapter 4 may hold. (Nafa et al 2022).

Overall the relationship between white identity and political behavior has implication for American politics. Since the emergence of the Tea Party movement, over a decade ago, there

have been divisions within the Republican party. The divisions highlighted by the Tea Party were largely economic. Donald Trump's rise to prominence, term in the White House, and continued influence over the party has highlighted different divisions that were more focused on social issues. The faction of the party for which Trump is influential, utilize emotion and racial appeals. We know that anger stimulates white political participation (Phoenix 2019). The results of Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation suggest that white identity under threat are linked to Republican party affiliation and political opinions that are also associated with that party's ideology. This implies that continued focus on emotion and identity-based issues could have an effect on the Republican party and on American politics as a whole. The party could continue to fracture between the wing that supports Trump's positions and those members that have a more traditional conservative ideology. This could lead to the traditional conservatives defecting from the party in registration or even in voting. Upsetting the balance of power among the parties might change the political landscape. Another possibility is that, as demographics continue to change with whites becoming a lower percentage of the population of the United States, there will be a sizeable angry right-wing group which participates in untraditional ways as anger incites more participation. Given the president of the 2021 Capitol Insurrection, this could include violent forms of expression of their opinions that could include political violence. Normatively, political violence is not a desired outcome in the American political system. On the other hand, realignment of the parties and shifts in political power could be a positive outcome. Because the situation is still evolving, we will not know the outcome of the race based emotional appeals for years to come.

APPENDIX A

ADDITIONAL ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS FOR CHAPTER 3

Table A.1: Racial and Gender Policy Attitudes Among White Americans

	(1) Aid to Blacks	(2) Abortion	(3) Affirmative Action	(4) Climate Policy
Consciousness	-1.562 (0.320)***	-0.725 (0.060)**	-0.688 (0.290)**	-0.432 (0.320)
Gender	-0.121 (0.209)	-0.150 (0.233)	0.199 (0.186)	0.053 (0.200)
Women WtCon	0.2424 (0.446)	0.096 (0.489)	-0.559 (0.394)	0.248 (0.404)
Income	-0.001 (0.006)	0.014 (0.007)**	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)
Education	0.135 (0.050)***	0.323 (0.056)***	-0.051 (0.047)	0.032 (0.048)
Age	-0.008 (0.003)***	0.009 (0.003)***	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.010 (0.002)***
Religiosity	0.092 (0.031)***	-0.461 (0.040)***	0.064 (0.032)**	-0.105 (0.033)***
Democrat	1.083 (0.169)***	0.574 (0.173)***	0.819 (0.160)***	1.133 (0.139)***
Independent	0.388 (0.122)***	0.115 (0.138)	0.282 (0.122)**	0.498 (0.116)***
Liberal	1.626 (0.162)***	1.286 (0.174)***	1.076 (0.154)***	1.769 (0.143)***
Moderate	0.422 (0.133)***	0.860(0.1448)***	0.482 (0.122)***	0.891 (0.125)***
r-squared	0.10	0.17	0.05	0.11
n	2,139	2,347	2,361	2,361

Note: Data is from 2016 ANES. Ordered logistic regression models used for all models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

All findings here were consistent with the findings of the models in the body of the paper with the exception of a small variation in the opinions on abortion for women at the highest levels of white consciousness. Because the significance of interactions is not clear directly from ordered logistic regression results, I computed the predicted probabilities for the interaction of gender and white consciousness for each of the four models here. In each case, there was not a significant relationship across the range of white consciousness when the gender variable was changed. There were not significant relationships for the interaction on the climate policy model. For both racialized policies, the interaction was significant when varying the levels of white consciousness for both men and women which supports the findings in the body of the paper. For abortion, varying the levels of white consciousness was significant for men across the range of observations which was also expected based on the results of the other models. However, for white women, the interaction of gender and white consciousness was only significant at high levels of white consciousness which lowered the likelihood that a woman would support free access to abortion by 17.45% and raised the likelihood that she would support abortion only under certain circumstances by 11.91%. As this is consistent with the results suggesting gender is more important than race for white women on the gendered issue of abortion.

APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 4: BREAKDOWN OF REPORTED LINKED FATE BY RACE

Linked Fate measure distribution from question: “Does what happens generally to (members of respondent’s racial group) in this country have something to do with what happens in (respondent’s) life? If so, how much?”

	All Women	White Women	Black Women	Asian Women	Latinas
Not At All	2507	282	728	712	859
Not Very Much	334	35	110	87	117
Some	2493	320	780	779	681
A Lot	1277	125	564	244	378

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